Comments on interviews. by Roberts, Michael
Unrecorded and Confidential Information -nrovided. Tjy Ilr. I.I.Y/.F.
AUeyakoon, 29 OctoUer 1966.
In conversation with him^ C.L. \7ickremesinghe had said that
the Is.nd Development Ordinance was intended to prevent land falling
into the hands of foreigners. On further inquiry 1 found that this
was an allusion to Chetties and their ilk to whom villagers mort
gaged their lands, Mr. Aheyakoon felt that this was an understand
able policy in any country. In tall-ring of the land Commission of
1956-58 and their suggestion that the L.D.O. temire he altered so
as to permit freehold Mr. Ahej^akoon again stressed that it should
he v;ith restrictions to prevent land passing out of Geylonese hands.
With regard to my inquiry whether D.S. Senana.jmiko had heen on
the decline during his premiership he was positive that he v/as not.
1 stated that D.S. does not seem to have heen a, man who read
lengthy reports hut preferred to work through discussions; he v/as
quite definite in disagreeing. He had found that D.S. went into
matters thoroughly. In fact he read the Land Settlement Officers'
diaries and wanted them to he interesting. On one he hsid minuted
something to the effect of; 'might as well have issued a calendar'.




Comments on Interview with Mr. F.L. Baker, 13 January, 1966.
Mr. Baker is far from senile and seems quite fit "but he had
left Ceylon in 1932 and been engaged in other jobs in the interim
so it is not surprising that his memory is not all that vivid. A
nice man, he was moderately candid. But he also struck me as having
a very moderate mind. Indeed, he seemed to miss the point in many
questions I raised, but I am not certain whether this is due to the
inroads of age. On the whole I should think not; i.e. I do not
think he was a very perceptive or able thinker.
He was in the Survey Department so it was natural that I should
concentrate on matters pertaining to these matters. Here, his
evidence on the work of the L.S. Department and the villagers' atti
tude to the L.S.O.s work is of some importance. I was also hoping
to get something on the 1915 riots but, unfortunately, he was
stationed in Jaffna at that time. I would not rate his appraisal
of personnel very highly. His interest in political matters was
little or none, but it is of some relevance that he took the





Mr. R.G-. Bartholomew's Answers to Questions forwarded "by M.V/. Roberts,
27 January and February 1966.
R.G-. Bartholomew h. 28 July 1884
P.W.D. 1910 - 1936 (?)
Extract froic letter: E.G. Bartholomew - M.V/. Roberts,
27 January 1966
... I fear they are not of great use. I am in my 82nd year, and my
"brain will not work as it should do, and I find there is such a lot
that I have forgotten. But I only trust that you may find at least
a few points in my replies that you may find of use.
1. What are your impressions on the Ceylon Public Service? and, within
it, of the C.0.S.?
Answer:
My impression of the Ceylon Public Service is that it was run in
the very high tradition of the Colonial Public Service which had
prevailed in the British service in other Colonies.
2. Was the dis,tinction between the Civil Service proper and the other
services extended into social relations? Was there much snobbery
and social ostracism?
Answer:
I think many members of the C.C.S. were inclined to look down on
members of the Public Service, especially those who newly arrived
in the country. This is rather to be expected as I feel many
members of the Public Service were rather a mixed lot socially
Personally I enjoyed many friendships in the C.C.S. such as Burd
Sir Maxwell Wedderbum and T.B. Russell. '
3. If so, did it mar administrative liaison?
Answer:
I do not think administrative liaison was affected by social
relationship between the two sections of the Government Serv
ice.
4.. Taking British policy in Ceylon as a whole in the period pre-ig^^
n-n -i -h lc3n'\rar^ TvnT'TinciO _ flr'TTrei n.nfl i TTin XC"! na'did you feel that it lacked purpose, drive and imagination?
a policy of quieta non movere? Y/as there a tendency to prese ^
status quo and concentrate on efficiency as an end in itself?^®
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Answer:
I feel British policy in Ceylon rather failed to train the
natives of the country how to rule. There was a tendency to
preserve the status quo. The Ceylonese generally were unreliah]e
"by nature I consider, and it v/as hard to find any who one could
trust.
5. Were Indian events and the spread of terrorism in India taken note
of "by public servants in Ceylon? Did you personally think about
•its implications regards Ceylon?
Answer:
I am unable to reply to this question. My position in Ceylon did
not come in contact with this.
6. Were the temperance meetings regarded as seditious political meet
ings under the cloak of temperance?
Answer:
I have no knowledge of this.
7. Where were you stationed when the riots broke out in 1915? Was
there any trouble in your neighbourhood? Could you describe the
conditions?
Answer:
I was stationed in Kalutara on the coast south of Colombo. There
was a certain amount of trouble in the neighbourhood, but I think
it was rather exagerated[sic].
8. Were you called out to help restore law and order? Did you partici
pate in or witness any occasions when patrols were forced to open
fire? If so, can you recall the scenes and the reasons which
necessitated shooting?
Answer:
I was a member of the C.P.R.C. and was therefore called up. As
far as I know we did not open fire at anytime. On two or three
occasions we were sent hurriedly to places where troulSfe was
reported or threatened, but there seemed to be nothing serious.
However I re»ember several Sinhalese were caught, presumably by
the police, and were brought into Ealutara. Two young British
planters, - one in the C.M.R. and the other in the C.P.R.c. -
formed themselves illegitimately into a summary Court Martial,
and, after a very perfunctory examination, convicted the accused
persons to punishment by whipping. A long sloping board was
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fixed, "to a free oufsid-e flie Ealufara Resf House. Tlie vicfiia was
•bound face dovm on the "board and was severely ibeaten with, what
I understood was an African sjamhok. Y/e in the C.P.R.C. were
made to surround the place of punishment, and watch it as it was
carried out "by the native police. These officers who were
responsible were, I am told, severely reprimanded in Colombo.
9. Were the instructions given to patrols clear?
Answer:
As far as I knov;, yes.
10. Did you think that the riots were pre-meditated? Did they have
anti-Govt. and anti-European undercurrents besides that of anti-
Moorish feeling? If so, why did you think so?
Answer:
There was always rivalry between the Sinhalese and the Moors, as
the former were usually in debt to Moorish money-lenders. But I
doubt if the riots were pre-meditated. I do not think they had
any anti-Governmental or anti-European significance.
11. Is it correct to say that the European community came to feel that
it was a threat to them? If so, why?
Answer:
I do not think the European community felt it was threatened by
the riots.
12. Would you say that the Colombo Police lacked the training, the
backbone, cohesion or resources to handle this sort of thing?
Answer:
The Colombo police was a disciplined force under a most efficienlt
Chief Inspector (W. Dowbiggin, later knighted). They however
cannot be compared v/ith our police in our own country.
13. Do you think martial law was necessary? Do you think it was necessaiy
to retain it for as long as three months?
Answer:
I think martial law was necessary as the riots were over the
whole Island. I doubt that it was necessary to retain it for
three months, as I feel the trouble was rapidly suppressed.
14. Have you any idea - whether first-hand or through others - what sort
of man General I'alcolm was?
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Answer:
As far as I am aware General Malcolm was a very efficient officer
in command. But I do not think I am in a position to judge.
15. Can you recall what your impression was regarding the natiire of
the General Court Martials?
Answer:
Being in an outstation at the time I had really no knowledge of
any General Court Martial.
16. What did you think of the dimim-head court martiaOs in places like
Kegalla? What did you think of Sir John Anderson's condemnatory
ddespatch on this subject?
Answer:
I cannot remember anything about the drum-head court martials.
I have given you under 8 above some particulars of that held
at Kalutara. If other places had similar, illegitimate court
martials I, of course, would feel thoroughly disgusted. I do
not recollect Sir John Anderson's despatch on the subject.
17. Do you think that Anderson was fooled by cases specially engineered
and fashioned by lawyers?
Ansv/er;
I am unable to reply properly to this question, but, from my
reply to 8 above I should imagine Anderson's despatch was rightly
most condemnatory.
18. Was he unpopular among public servants because of this despatch?
Answer:
As far as I know Sir John Anderson was not unpopular as Governor
of Ceylon.
19. Was it known that the Moors brou^t false cases against many of their
enemies during the riots - i.e during the post-riots investigation?
Answer;
My mind is a blank regarding the post-riot investigation. But
realising how hated the Moors were - and ri^tly so - I feel fairly
convinced they would bring up many false accusations against their
enemie s.
23. Did the rise of an educated Ceylonese class critical of British rule
make things more difficult for public servants?
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Answer:
I never experienced any difficulty.
24. Were you subject to personal criticism from politicians in Council
or in the Press?
Answer:
No, not as far as I can remember.
25. Was this sort of thing vfidely prevalent in the late 1920's and
1930's? Was it more pronounced in the 1930's than in the late
1920's?
26. How did Public Servants react to these criticisms?
27. In addition, id they suffer from political interference, intrigue,
wire-pulling and action over their heads? Hov/ did they react to
this?
Answer to 25,26,2?:
My mind, I fear, is a blank. I cannot recollect anything regard
ing criticisms in the Press or among politicians. As doubtless
you knov/, when the new Constitution was set up, all the elected
members of the State Council were divided into about five
Committees which were placed in charge of different functions.
The Chaiiman of each Committee being the Minister to represent
his Committee in the State Council. Secretaries were appointed
from the C.C.S. for these posts, except in the Committee of the
Minister for Communications and Works. Por this Committee it
was felt that a technical officer was needed, and it so happened
that I was the person appointed. The Ministry for Communication
and Works had under it the Public Works Department, the Irrigation
Department, Railv/ays, Harbour and certain other departments which
I regret I cannot now remember. I can only say that as far as
my Ministry was concerned we all worked together most amicably
I retired about April 1936 partly for personal reasons, and be
cause of alterations among Ministers.
28. What was your personal reaction to the new Constitution set up
the Donoughmore Commission? What did other Public Servants whom
you were acquainted with say about it?
Ansv/er:
As indicated above my reaction to the new Constitution ^as
factory. We, of course, knew that this was only the fing-(.
in total self-government, and I think the majority of Brif
officials felt suspicious as to hov:?e should be affected und
I am sure many retired about the same tnmie. I vividly remembe^^ '^
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one C.C.S. mem'ber accusing me of "deserting the sinking ship".
Hy reply was that I would prefer to he the rat who deserted rather
than the one who sank with the ship. I was not very optimistic
ahout the future of Ceylon.
29. What was - and is —your opinion on the grant of universal franchise?
Answer:
I do not think the native was anywhere like ready for universal
franchise. All he was interested in v/as something to fill his
stomach.
30. Any comments on the Executive Committee system a ]n London County
Council?
Answer:
As far as I know this sytem was quite satisfactory, vide my reply
to 28.
31. Could you provide your appraisal of the following Governors:
Answer:
I am afraid, in my position, I had very little to do with the
Governors of Ceylon. Sir Hugh Clifford came to Ceylon with a very
high reputation from other colonies. His behaviour in Ceylon was
a great disappointment, and I think many people in the services
thought his mental powers were affected. Sir R.E. Stuhhs, who
had "been for many years Chief Secretary "before he was made
Governor, was a very self-opinionated man and would not listen
to any other.
32. Could you also appraise the following (since deceased) as men and
administrators:
Answer;
I had very little direct communication with these officers j
knew Sir Graeme Tyrrell fairly well. He was a good Chief Sgc
tacry, "but was inclined to strange moods at times. Eras©T» t
^-Iso
was a very efficient officer. He married a German lad-^r ••
^» Which
may not have helped him in his career. Socially I fontid him
very likea"ble person. Pagden, --iwho was Postmaster General ^
in active service as long as he could, and I remem"ber nc, -r,
a favourite remark ahout him was ,"Paggy must go"! *




The favourite remark regarding the P.Vf.D. was to call it the
"Puhlic ¥aste Department". I do not thinic it was a fair criti
cism. Dealing v/ith native and imreliahle labour was not easy.
Our methods were, no doubt, old fashioned, but during the 25
years I v/as in it conditions in the country greatly improved.
Main roads especially became more up-to-date. Certain officers
who came out in later years for special duties found that new
fangled ideas which they brought with them did not always v/ork,
and the oldfashioned system was more reliable v/ith the labour we
had.
34. I v/ould also appreciate a description of and your comments on the
system under which minor roads were built and maintained?
Answer:
The P.W.D. was not expected to deal with minor roads. These v/ere
maintained, if such a word could be used of them, by local head
men with village labour. They were, to my mind, merely dirt
tracks.
35. How would you appraise the different Directors of the P.V/.D. under
whom you served?
Answer:
The Directois of Public Works, under whom I served, were, on the
whole, fine and efficient officers. When I came out to Ceylon
in 1911 Mr. Prancis Cooper v/as D.P.W. and I count him as one of
the finest. I forget the names of many of them. Mr. J. Strachan
came out for the construction of the Colombo lake Development
Scheme, and after the completion was made D.P.W. W.J. Thomhill
rose up in the P.Y/.B. and, knowing the difficulties under which
his officers worked, v/as always a thoughtful and kindly Chief.
37. Was Macan Markar able to keep the Committee in order; i.e in some
other Committees there was not only regular squabbling but the
Chairman could not keep control and maintain order; did this occur?
Answer:
Macan Markar had a very well-behaved Committee, and as far as I
can remember we never had any trouble. Two of our members -
W. Preeman and W. Villiers - were Englishmen, and that possibly
kept the Committee in order.
38. Were there many occasions v/hen the Minister presented the Committee
with some fait accompli and then asked for their approval?
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Answer:
I cannot recall any occasion when the Minister carried out any
fait accompli, though no doubt this must have occurred. But I
am sure there was never any trouble in consequence. We held a
large number of Committee meetings - I think once a fortni^t -
and tried to keep the Committee well informed.
39. Did you feel the Committee system provided some administrative
training to politicians? Was it not cumbersome and partial to
delay?
Answer;
I think the Committee system was of use as a training ground. It
was undoubtedly a bit cumbersome. But with so frequent meetings
I do not think we held matters up very much.
40. How would you appraise Macan Markar, Sir H.L. De Mel, H.R.Breeman,
B.C. Villiers and D.J. Wimalasurendra, and Sir John Kotelawala?
Ansv/er:
I found W. Macan Markar very easy to deal with. As you probably
know he was the head of the large jewellery shop on the ground
level of the Grand Oriental Hotel (G.O.H.). He, of course,
became Minister of Communication and Works without having any
inside knowledge or of any experience of Government work. He
consequently was inclined to look to me in various matters. We
worked v/ell together. Of the others you mention as far as I
remember, I had nothing to do with Sir Henry de Mel or Sir John
Kotalawella. As far W.H.R. Freeman, he was an old friend of
mine, and for years used to come and stay a night or two when
I was at Anuradhapura. He was, of course, and old man and well
passed his prime. He was greatly beloved by the Sinhalese of
the Province which he represented and when he was elected to the
State Coimcil, no other person would stand against him. W.E.C.
Villiers, who represented the Planting Community, was a sound
man. I enjoyed his friendship. When Macan Markar went to
England for about six months, W. Villiers was chosen as Chairman
of the Committee. As for Mr. Wimalasurendra, he was perhaps more
pugnacious than any of the others. He had been a District
Enginner in the P.W.D. I therefore knew him. He would have
loved to be Minister for Communication and Works, but I don't
think I would have enjoyed working under him.
I.Irs. R.H. Bassett's Answers to Questions forvva-rded Tjy M.V/. Roberts
17 ITovember 1963. *
Extract from a letter from llrs. R.H. Bassett to TI.V^. Roberts,
dated 9 November 1965:
I am afraid I cannot help you as he^ left no papers on Land
Settlement matters, in which dept. he v/as 6-k years and I
went an every circuit with him.
1. In what districts did Mr. Bassett largely serve?
Answer:
The whole of the Sabarangama (I don't know how you spell
it) Province, starting jxist outside Colombo and going miles
beyond Balangoda. That stretch uas 3^ years.
2. What v;ere your ovm impressions of the peasantry in Ceylon?
Answer:
I thought the people in the villages, most charming and
polite, fond of music, very proud of their children, kept
their homes so clean and tidy, had plenty of chickens and
dogs, and their bit of land in paddy and a fev/ fruit trees,
o.nuts and another kind of nut, well kept. The men worked
hard all morning and slept all afternoon - the v/omen worked
hard. Very cheerful people.
3. Among other things, is it not correct to say that they v/ere
apathetic?
Ansv/er:
I am not so sure that they v/ere apathetic - if they had
enough for today, tomorrow could look after itself.
4. Do you know, from Mr. Bassett's remarks, whether he found it
easy or difficult to esto-blish a rapport with them?
Answer:
Ilr. B. found them very easy to get on with; they knew at
once what kind of a man they were dealing with. He often
said they were very fond of going to law over some very silly
little thing.
1. R.H. Bassett, C.C.S., 1920-1948(?).
* This is a retj/ped version. It was originally typed in elite
and copies in London and Oxford are in that form.
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5. Have you any inkling of their reactions to the 1.3.0. and
the work of the Land Settlement Department? Was there any
grumbling?
Answer:
They welcomed the L.S.D. and produced deeds out of old tin
boxes hundreds of years old, that had been sold and resold
many a time, or faked for them by some land shark, listening
as I so often did, I have seen 50 to, 80 claims put in for
about 20 acres on the I.Tap, they all took their little bit
quite happily, having asked for _3 times the auoiuit of land
on the map.
6. V/hat were the tasks of this Department?
Answer:
The tasks of the Dept. were many, usually a Chief Clerk
and peon went with Hr. B. for three weeks at a time on
circuit, having prepared all they were going to settle at
the Head Office in Colombo.
7. Do you know if your husband had found that villagers were
alienating land (either theirs or Crown land which they used
or claimed) to speculators and planters (Ceylonese or
European) to their (or the village's) detriment?
Answer:
Very little grumbling was heard. If you could get hold of
a book by Ered lewis called '60 years in Ceylon' , it may
help you as he was in the l.S.D. for years, not as a Civil
Servant but as an extra, there was so much to do. I often
met him years later when he came before my husband, with a
claim for some Estate.
8. Did your husband try to prevent this sort of thing?
Answer:
It was so clear to them on the I.Iap they knew they would
get away with a false claim. They had great faith in my
husband and knew they would get a fair deal,
9. Was his policy oriented towards protecting village and v-i t t
Se r
and their lands from outsiders of this sort?
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Ansv/er:
Sometimes a shark from Colombo would turn up at the sales
hut he was soon spotted. He^ always protected the villagers,
He had a free hand to deal with the Map before him - some
times as many as 50 maps were before him. It was very hard
work and he often worked onto midnight.
10. Did he have the power to rescind such sales (where Grown land)
and preserve it for the village? or allot it to individual
villagers?
Answer;
Quite a number of large Estates had to claim so as to see
if their deeds v/ere in order; a few had to give up bits of
their land, I don't remember any of the old names, but one
lir. Patterson used to come up from Colombo for the sales
for some interested loarty. YiThy not try and contact Mr.
liorthcroft or Mr. P.J. Hudson; both were for years with my
husbs,nd in the L.S.D. fhe Crov/n Agents v/ill help with
addresses.
11. Did he ever mention anything about these speculators and
landovmers and planters? Can you recollect any names?
Ansv/er:
Hone.
12. Did he ever refer to the political criticisms on the land
Settlement Dept. in the 1920's and say that some of these
politicians were landowners and speculators etc. v/ho were
being baulked by his Dept. and the type of v/ork he was doing?
Answer:
He never had any dealing v/ith Politicians as far as I know.
13. In cases betv/een Crown and peasant did he give the benefit of
the doubt to the peasant?
Answer:
I don't loiow the ansv/er to this.
1. Obviously 'he' refers to Mr. Bassett.
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14. Did the peasants reflect or feel the criticisms referred to
in Question 12, vis-a-vis the land Settlement Department?
Ansv/er:
Always a welcome for the L.S.D.
15. If you v/ere on circuit in Tamil areas I would like views
(your ovm and ilr. Bassett's) on differences "between the
Tamils and the Sinlialese.
Answer:
Only once did we go to Kurunegala for a fortni^t to settle
land. He often had to go "by Elephant to hits of the land
for sale, for he always looked at every piece of land before
it was sold or settled on anyone.
miiPH NORflAJT BOND, C.M.G. , O.B.E. "b. 31 August 1900.
M.A., CantaB.






































attached to Puttalam Kachoheri.
attached to Hamhantota Kachcheri.
Additional A.G.A., Uva.









Acting Deputy Collector of Customs.
Asst. Controller of Imports, Exports & Exchange.
Asst. Chief Sec.
Civil Sec. to C-inC.
attached to Chief See's Office.
Additional G.A., Western Province as well.
on leave.
Acting G.A., Western Province.
Additional Reg-General.
attached to Chief See's Office.
Acting Deputy Chief Sec.
attached to Chief See's Office.
Permanent Sec.to Minister of Posts & Telecoms,
as well.
Acting Permanent Sec. to the Ministry of
Industries & Fisheries as well.[And many such
additional Permanent Secretaryships in next few
years.]
Permanent Sec. to the Ministry of Posts & Infor
mation [again acting as Permanent Sec. to other
Ministries as well at various times].
retired.
Ilr. R.I'T. Bond's Ansv/ers to Questions forwarded "by M.\7, Roberts,
1 Secember 196^.
1. Baring your work among the peasantry did you find it difficult
to understand their particular 'thought patterns'? Were you
ahle to convey your ovm ideas to them? Could you establish
a rapport with them?
Answer:
My two years in the Wanni and the Mullaittivu district were
very happy ones - thou^ the work was hard and one was alone.
It was a pleasure to he with both the Sinhalese and Tamil
villagers, who were simple and lovable people. Two murders
in tv/o years is some indication of their peace-loving
q,ualities - and then the accused admitted his crime. (By
the way I succeeded R.S.V. Poulier, who had succeeded
Jones-Bateman. My wife and I consulted Mr. And Mrs. Jones-
Bateman before I assumed duties. I had no difficulty in
understanding either the Tamil or Sinhalese villager. I had
good Mudaliyars and a good Ratemahatmaya. A splendid
Kachcheri Mtido^liyar accompanied me on circuit. The R.M.
was unique in being equally fluent in Tamil and Sinhalese -
written and spoken. There were very happy, amicable
relations between Sinhalese and Tamils, where their areas met.
2. Was there a distinction betv/een the Tamils and the Sinhalese
in this regard? V/as there a distinction between the peasantry
in Kurunegala and Kandy as against those in the Vanni?
Answer:
The situation in Kurunegala and Kandy was different, as the
peasants were not so cut off as in the Mullaittivu District.
The only Tamils were Indian Tamils on the Tea and Rubber
estates, and they were aloof from the Sinhalese.
3. Did villagers in the Vanni pay coolies to perform their
statutory obligations for service on roads or tanlcs, often or
only at times?
Answer:
The Vanni villagers sometimes did the statutory v/ork on
tanks and roads themselves and sometimes employed coolies
or commuted their labour by payment. They did not
extensively employ coolies.
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4. \¥here did the coolies come from?
Answer:
The coolies v/ere Indians so far as I rememher, though they
may have been Ceylon Tamils. They were called 'OTTAI'
coolies, i.e. individual coolies (solitary).
5. How did the villagers manage to find the money for this
purpose?
6. Again, from where did they get the money to pay irrigation
fines?
7. Didn't such irrigation fines and their improvidence ih hiring
coolies for the above tasks, etcetera, push them further and
further into debt?
Answer: The roads and tanks were vital to the villagers.
Especially the tanks, and we endeavoured to get the villager:;
to imderstand. this. Y/ork was 'called out' only v/hen
necessary —e.g. if the tanlcfe bund was v/eak and needed
raising or the spill was scoured. The work was not onerous.
V/e al\mys called the Vanni villagers 'country gentlemen.'
They were very easy-going. They corild readily have done the
earthwork, but sometimes preferred to sit back and either
commute or employ 'ottai' coolres. I v/as strict over the
Irrigation Cases taken when they failed to fulfil their
obligations, because when an A.G.A. had a reputation for
meaning business the villagers exerted themselves and did
the v/ork or paid. The work gave them an interest in their
own village works. Their money v/ould come from sale of
their crops or from their labours.
8. Did co-operative credit societies have any influence in
reducing peasant indebtedness?
Answer:
Yes, the co-operative credit societies were excellent. The
members could obtain loans at low interest rates (instes^d
of going to the Chetty) and each member could see that the
members who obtained loans hs^d reasonable security and
repaid the loans when their crops were reaped.
9. Who succeeded W.E.H. Campbell? Would you give your ovm
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appraisal of him (i.e. his successor)?
Ansv/er:
I camiot rememher who succeeded W.H.E. Camphell. I.Iayhin
v/as his assistant, hut he went to Africa on transfer. I do
not knov/ whether Mayhin or E.H. Lucette succeeded Camphell,
hut they were hoth Camphell's assistants and ?/ould follov;
his conservative development on sound lines.
10. Did you come across any such instances of villagers in the
Vanni trying to sell their lands or buffaloes in order to meet
trifling dehts or irrigation fines as Jones-Bateman records?
Answer:
The villager's life was precarious depending on the weather
and the crops, and indebtedness was common.
11. Were those people in the Vanni worse off economically than
peasants in Badulla? in Eurunegala?
Answer:
Life was hard in the Va,nni on account of the small rainfall.
They were worse off than the peasants in Uva or N.W.P.
because they did not have the large estates where they could
obtain employment.
Mr. J.N. Bond's Answers to Questions forwarded "by M.W. Ro"berts,
16 Fe'bru.ary 1966.
1. Have you any idea how the villagers looked on the land Settlement
Officers? Were they scared? Did they grumhle? To v/hat districts
do your remarks apply?
2. Was the politicians' attack on British land policy and the l.S.O.
in response to and reflecting peasant grievances or something arising
from within their own hreasts?
Answer:
I didn't serve in the land Settlement Department. We always were
^ad when a village was "settled" and a Hinal Village Plan issued.
Revenue officers then knew which land had he en admitted private
and which had heen declared Crovmi. latterly the land was 'mapped
out' for various purposes - Porest Reserves, Village Expansion,
etc. - and this facilitated administration. I have not come
across any signs of fear on the part of the villagers. If their
claim T/as so"und they would receive a clear title.
I am not aware of any peasants' grievances. Politicians
complaints were mostly that the Buddhist Eemples had lost their
land and they requested that the land he given hack to the Temples
3. There seems to have heen considerable rivalry within the Irrigation.
Department in the 1920's and some ohstructionism towards other
Departments and the district officials. Did you hear ahout, or
personally experience, such features? Did it continue into the
1930's as well?
Answer:
I have no knowledge of such rivalry or obstruction.
4. What did you think of Brayne' s scheme of indivisible leaseholds?
Did you feel that it was impracticable from the administrative
point of view?
Answer:
For reasons given in the comments on Dr. Leach's hook, i thin^
Brayne' s scheme was sound and in the villagers' interests.
5 Did you feel that the judicial system was too cumbersome and much
too formalised and foreign to the mass of the peasantry?
disputes was it possible for a judge to get at the heart^^of
matter without seeing the configuration of the land and^some .
laiowledge of the village in question? Would you comment on
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view that the British brought law rather than justice?
Answer:
If there v/as anything the British brought, it was justice. The
peasant could be sure of justice. I do not think the system was
too cumbersome. In a land dispute, if the survey plan was in
sufficient, the B-'U-dge inspected the land.
6. Have you any idea how Wodeman came to be chosen over Nevraham as
Deputy Chief Secretary?
Answer:
I have no idea.
7. How would you appraise the following (since deceased):
Answer:
Besting He was my Government Agent in Uva. Efficient but not
outstanding.
Maybin A capable officer. Was Assistant to W.H.E. Campbell
when he started the Cooperative Movement, and worked
hard at it.
Archibald Ho personal knov/ledge, but I believe he did good work
in the Land Settlement Department.
Ingledow I knew him as Police Magistrate, Chilaw. Rather pompous,
but q^uite good.
Sudbury He was Office Assistant when I was Cadet at Puttalum, my
first station. He was a capable officer. After being
wounded in the war, he had a plate in his head. This
made him rather fussy and nervy.
Sir S. Phillipson Did well in the Treasury.
T.A. Hodson Was my Government Agent in Kandy, when I was Assistant
Govt. Agent. Keen on his fishing, bridge and tennis and
rather a self—seeker. Not outstanding.
R.IJ.M. Worsley Was A.G.A. Puttalum when I was Office Assistant,
fii'si;—class officer of considerable ability.
H.G. Kaufman An efficient officer with ideas.
E.E. Marshall An unusual type who never rose very high. Was on
the bench in Uva as D.J. and P.M. A kindly sort, who
sometimes paid the accused's fine he had imposed.
Luddington I knew him as Excise Commissioner. Intelligent and
capable.
8. Have you any idea over what Sir Robert Drayton and D.S. Senanayake
had a row in 1945 or 1946? It would seem that this big row completel;
marred a relationship which had been very successful till then.
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Answer:
Sir RolDert Drayton was a very able man, of whom I had a high
opinion: I was Assistant Chief Secretary when he was Chief
Secretary. He worked harmoniously with D.S. Senanayake, being
Chairman of the Board of Ministers. The only conflict of which
I am aware was that D.S. Senanayake as Minister of Agriculture
and lands wanted the appointment of certain Civil Servants: the
Chief Secretary v/as in charge of the Public Service, and couldn't
alv;ays agree to the appointments D.S. wanted. D.S. felt frustrated
and unable to carry out the work of his Ministry as he wished.
Conmients on Interview with J'tr. R.N.Bond, C.M,G«, O.B.E., 26.12.1965
Mir. Bond took little notice of the tape. His comments were unrestrained .
This, I feel, was largely because he is a conscientious man and tried his best to
help me. As the interview reveals, and as I gathered during my visit to his house,
there is much that can be said regarding Mir. Bond which would apply to his actions
during his Colonial Service.
A humble man, deliberate, conscientious and methodical I think he would have
been pedantic in his earlier days as well. During the interview I fo^lnd him slow
on the uptake on occasions (though he was by no means aged or infirm) but would
hesitate to state whether would have been so in his younger days. However, this
does not mean that he was incompetent. He clearly had some ability. He must also
have been a very industrious type. But he would have tended to work on stereotyped
lines according to routine and direction from above. He would not have bmached off
on his own - an aspect which some of his answers spotli^t quite clearly.
Neither was he politically-minded. He does not seem to have thought very
deeply about the Donoughmore Constitution. His interests were otherwise. Steeped in
local matters no doubt. It is clear that he made efficiency and integrity his
watchwords. One could say that he made a fetish of efficiency.
This sort of outlbOk must be taken into consideration in evaluating his
answers. In several cases it would detract from the weight to be given to his views.
It is noticeable, for instance, that he gives both Governors Stanley and Caldecott
a higher billing than either Williams or Gimson. On the other hand, he did not
consider all the top men uniformly brilliant - he distinguishes between Stubbs and
Thomson and again between Drayton and Collins.
Though he was not able to give an opinion on some questions, on some of these
occasions his very negative answer is a salient point in itself.
Lest listeners think that Mr. Bond was putting on a false front in claiming
his inspiration from Christianity and proclaiming a doctrine of service, let me
assure them that Mr. Bond is a truthful man and ♦hat he Ts ' mdetd a practising
Christian. I stayed a night with Mr. and Mrs. and assure the listeners on this
point ; Mrs.Bond, incidentally, was bom and bred in Ceylon being the daughter of
an English missionary, Revd. Ward. As Mr. Bond will probably admit, he was not , I
think, typical of the C.C.S. in being thus. Not that others were not similarly
conscientious and dutiful but that they drew their inspiration from other factors.
Mr. Bond was not employing the arts of flattery in lauding the ability of the
Ceylonese members of the C.C.S. This was his conviction. It is significant that he
identified the Ceylonese and Europeans in the C.C.S. as one body and did not
consider them separately, S'everal of my questions pertaining solely to the latter —
Ithough^, using the term Civil Service-were not looked on in the same light by




Mr. G-. Bromley's Answers to Questions forwarded Tjy M.\Y. RoTjerts,
13 Janixary. 1966.
G-.H. Bromley "b. 28 Sept. 1894.
1914 appointed to. Ceylon Police Poroe
1915 Riots stationed in Galle
1924 promoted to S.P.
1938-39 acted as B.I.G.P. for a while
? B.I.G.P.
1944 retired as B.I.G.P.
1. With what feelings did you set out for Ceylon? Bid you feel
that you were going to "a land of the second-rate", to a "social
desert"?
Answer
My "brother was in India. Prom enquiries I leamt that Ceylon
was/iSlich nicer and far more "civilised" country so I was pleased
to "be going to Ceylon and not India (and I've never regretted it)
2. What are your impressions of the pu'blic service in Ceylon?
Answer
Judging by a scanty acquaintance with Govt. service at home I
would say in general the Public Servants in Ceylon were far more
conscientious and efficient.
3. In British political terms (parties) what was the prevailing
shade of thought in the public service?
Answer
None — work first and politics were never considered.
4. Was their much cynicism in their conceptions of their duties and
j-g their attitude to the local peoples?
Answer
No, certainly not.
5. Was the distinction between the Civil Service proper and the
services extended into :social relations? Was there much snohh
6, If so, did it mar administrative liaison?
7, Were there any changes in these aspects during the period of
service?
Answer to 5,6,7
I found none. If any other than a Civil Servant thought so
was due to his "inferiority complex".








9. S^as there a tendency to preserve the status quo and concentrate on
efficiency as an end in itself?
Answer to 8 and 9
This obviously depends on the different points of view just as
does the British action at present in respect of Rhodesia. The
Lagos communique just issued seems to have shown that "Hasten
slowly", "Look before you leap" are not bad mottoes and roughly
this was the policy in Ceylon.
10. Lid the rise of an educated Geylonese class critical of British
rule make things more difficult for public servants?
Answer:
No - fair criticism is always helpful.
11. Were Indian events and the spread of terrorism in that quarter
taken note of by public servants in Ceylon?
12. Was it feared that Indian sedition would spread to Ceylon?
Answer to 11 and 12:
No - Ceylon did not copy India.
13. Were the temperance meetings looked on as political meetings held
under the doak of temperance?
Answer:
No.
14. Where were you stationed when the riots broke out in 1915?
there any trouble in your neighbourhood?
15. Were you called upon to help maintain law and order?
Answer to 14 and 15:
In Galle. Yes.
16. Lo you think the riots were pre-meditated? Were they organised,
any way, even if badly? ^
Answer:
No.
17. Who were the instigators?
Answer:
After the initial trouble in Kandy rumour mongers and ini e,
"^-'•scnie-p
makers fomented the riots in other places.
18. Lo you think it had strong anti-British tendencies?
- 3 -
19. Is it correct to say that the European community came to feel
that it was a threat to them?
20. For what specific reasons did they feel so?
Answer to 18, 19 and 20:
No.
21. Do you think initial firmness on the part of the police (a) in
Kandy (h) in Colombo might have prevented further trouble?
22. Did the authorities in Kandy show great weakness? Was the G.A.
known to be a weak man?
Answer to 21 and 22:
It is generally admitted the trouble in Gampola was dealt with
efficiently. It is impossible to stop lying inimours from being
circulated except in a "Police State".
23. Would you say that the Colombo Police did not have the training,
the backbone or the resources to handle this sort of thing?
Answer:
Probably, yes. Nothing similar had happened within living
memory and the general direction of the Police was that it was
a civil force and its being armed was a irule of the Malay Rifigg
from which it emerged.
24. Do you think martial law was necessary?
25. Do you think it was necessary to prolong martial law for three
months?
Answer to 24 and 25:
In my opinion - no.
26. Did Brigadier-General Malcolm's advice have much to do with i-t;«?
Answer:
I don't know what it was.
27. What sort of role did Sir Herbert Dowbiggin play? Was it
advised the arrest of Senanayake and Co.?
Answer:
Martial law put the matter in military hands. The
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civilian police activites were no longer solely in the hands
of the Inspector General.
28. What influence did Bowes have on Govt. action?
29. Would you say that Sir A. Bertram was a weak man?
Answer to 28 and 29:
No comment - I do not know details.
30, Were you involved in any shooting escapades or did you participate
in any court-martials?
31. Were the drum-head court martials fairly conducted?
Answer:
Mr. L.J.B. Turner the Riot Commissioner was such a fair minded
man that it is impossible to think any trial before him was
unfair.
32. Was it kno^m that the Moors brought cases against many of their
enemies even if they had no foundation?
Answer:
In such cireTimstances false cases against your enemies are common
33. Would you comment on the popular view that Government panicked and
went to extremes?
34. ^Vhat do you think of Sir John Anderson's verdict on Government's
measures?
Answer to 33 and 34:
Everyone was cau^t unawares and it was unfortunate (it is
generally admitted) that the Governor had no previous experience
as a Colonial Govt. Servant or Colonial Governor nor had he had
Sir John Anderson's experience as a Home Secretary.
35. Did his illness affect his judgement?
36. Would you call his despatch "appalling"? Do you think he was
fooled by cases which were specially engineered and fashioned by
the lawyers?
37, Was he -unpopular among Civil Servants? If so was it for his
views on the subject or because of other factors?
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38. Is there any foundation in the local gossip that G-.P.M. Ennis did
not get a Knighthood "because he was critical of Government? s
actions in 1915?
Answer to 35-38:
No comment - it is impossible to do so without records or
access to them.
39. Since the riots in Colombo were led by discontented workers -
especially the Railway workers - would it not be correct to say
that Government's failure to grant any significant concessions
to the demands they had presented in 1912-13 contributed to the
uprising?
Answer:
I did not realise that the riots in Colombo were led by
"discontented railway workers". After all the railway workers
viere of all nationalities, these were Sinhalese Muslim riots.
40. DiG Anderson succeed in conciliating the embittered Ceylonese
peoples?
Answer:
It was recognised that Sir John Anderson was a man of wide
experience and had not been involved in the troubles.
41. What was your reaction to the Donoughmore Constitution?
42. What was the reaction of other Public Servants you were friendly
with?
Answer:
It was accepted and welcomed as a necessary step to the Settle-.
ment of self government.
43. What were (and are) your views on the grant of universal franchise"?
44, Would you comment on its working in the practice?
Answer to 43 and 44:
A bold and imaginative step towards democratic government,
set the pattern for all dependencies and of course it takes
long time for it to function properly.
45. Have you any ideas what factors contributed to the frictiojj^
between the 3 Officers-of-State and the Ministers, parties
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in the early 1930's?
Ansv/er:
Possihly the ministers thought they should have a free hand
in respect of the Government servants.
46. Did you resent the action of the State Council in refusing to
grant passage allov;ances, etc. to European Puhlio Servants?
Answer:
I don't think this was more than a gesture.
47. Were you subject to personal political attacks or political inter
ference at any time? Did you resent these, if any?
48. Was there an increase in political interference in administrative
matters in the 1920's? ... any further increase in the 1930's?
49. How did the Public Service react to these criticisms and to the
interference? Was it resented? Were they "demoralised" as a
result?
Answer to 47-49:
I would not say any criticism of Government Servants were from
purely Political motives. They were made because it was
generally felt there was something wrong, a new view should be
taken and always as far as I was concerned in a constructive
manner.
50. Can you recall the Suriya Mai Movement? Was this taken seriously
by Europeans?
Answer:
No —I assume had it been serious I would have remembered.
51. Why was Bracegirdle deported? Was he creating serious disruption
among estate labour?
52. Do you think Goveirmient mishandled the situation?
Answer to 51 and 52:
He was doing no good to himself or anyone else and had no settled
occupation in the Island. A slip was made in the Deportation
order - that was all.
53. Was serious notice taken of the I.S.S.P. and the Communists in
late 1930's? Was an eye kept on them by the Police?
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Answer:
It was known that from the formation of the Third International
early 1920's that it was sending its revolutionary literature
to certain people in Ceylon.
54. Wh.at sort of man was D.B. Jayatilaka? Was he a good Minister?
55. WoTild you appraise any other Ceylonese politicians you came into
contact with?
Answer 54 and 55i
They were highly respected and competent.
56. Why were trade union activities considered seditious (in the
1920's)?
Answer:
See 53 hut there were no seditious activities.
57. (a) V/hat sort of man was A.E. Goonesinha in the 1920's? ...later?(h) Were you involved in policing any strikes? Could you des
crihe them - the alleged causes for each - personalities in
volved and outcome?
(c) Did Goonesinha ever employ the racial issue?
Answer: ^.4. •
(a) Aflamboyant labour leader who did start the fxrst organis
labour party. ^ -u 4.(t) The tramway strike Iti 1930. A--^- Goonesinha can he saxS to
have led the strike. The calling ih of volnntary drivers
hy the Company duly led to their heing afforded Po ioepLteotion, and this/MriaiiSed hy hostility to the Polroe.
The strikers with sympathisers finally attacked PoliceHeadouarters with stones and firehrands hut no real d^ge
^ arrival of a small detachment of Royalwas done and on the arrxvax ux ^ 4.^ r.-u • ^ o
Artillery the crowd dispersed. Belatedly the Chief Secre
tary took action and the dispute settled without any more
trouble. 4? n n
-hp paid to have been aware of or condoned(e) No - nor could he be saxa
the trouble in the Tramway Strike.
Were there any fears that Indian types of sedition and the
aandhi-inspired movements would spread to Ceylon or arise in
some form in Ceylon?
58.
Answer:
See 11 sjid 12,
(7) /jct-uilly
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59. Did you find tliat one weakness among Ceylonese (Policemen, Civil
Servants, Government Servants and politicians) was an unwilling
ness to accept responsibility?
Answer:
No. I think most of such criticism arises because of inexper
ience and the desire to do the right thing needs careful con
sideration.
60. YiTould you appraise the Ceylon Police Force. Any shortcomings?
61. y/ould you present a picture of Sir Herbert Dowbiggin the man and
Dowbiggin the Inspector-General of Police?
Answer to 60 and 61:
Sir Herbert Dowbiggin made the Police Force efficient. My only
criticism is that he could not forget the Sinhalese Muslim Riots
of 1915.
62. Of what calibre were Sir H. Stanl^r, Sir G. Thomson, Sir R.E.Stubbs,
and Sir A. Caldecott as Governors and Sir M. Fletcher, Sir M.M.
Wedderbum, Sir F.G. Tymell, Sir H. Bourdillon as Colonial
Secretaries?
63. Did Tyrrell, Bourdillon and Wedderbum have imagination and any




Unrecorded Infomation provided Tpy Mr. A.E, Christoffel sz during
conversation, 28 September 1966.
He had told Edmund Rodrii^o that his trouble was that he wrote
first and thought aftervrards. 'That's why he did not get on with
Senanayake?' , I inquired. 'V/ith everyone', said Mr. Christoffelsz.
Continuing he said that Rodrigo was a contrast to C.L. Wickremasinghe;
C.L, thought first and then put pen to paper; Rodrigo had a far
better brain but was 'impulsive'; he had his letters posted before
he had thought things out. His letters were prone to be 'sarcastic'.
'Was he an essay v/riter?', I inquired. He seemed inclined to agree
but added that he was one of the best Directors of Agriculture we
have had.
Codrington was a student. He was 'high and haughty' and reserved;
did a very good job of work but kept aloof. This aloofness was
applied to Europeans as well. Christoffelsz thought highly of him.
ITewnham was a Don Juan and a gad-about. Married twice officially,
'many times unofficially'; quite a noted subject of gossip among
his Municipal workers. Did a very good job as Commissioner for the
Relief of Distress during the malaria epidemic.
Stace was not very keen on his job, his heart being in Philosophical
subjects. But he had a good brain, was able, listened to reason and
grasped points quickly. Stace disliked the Ratnapura planters:
called them 'Aberdonian guttersnipes'. Stace moved in intellectual
circles, with Professor Marrs and with Read, Principal of Royal; he
was a member of the Twenty Club.
Pentelow was a very good linguist and mixed freely with Ceylonese
Pentelow had told him once that this was frowned upon; he had been
transferred to NuwaraEliya as a result. He had taken to drink and
become slipshod in his work. Was sacked as a result.
Bond was a staunch Methodist and a lay preacher; 'thorough'; 'loj^g
winded'.
Stevens was a nice man; 'unassuming' .
T.W. Roberts (my father) was fearless and strong. You knew where
you stood with him. I raised the point about the West Indians t,
\ ^ Cifand my father, being neither here(with the Europeans)nor "^liere(wi-tj^
the Ceylonese). He said that T.W. had a better brain than Roch
When S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake had approached Christoffelsz to be
Chairman of the Bribery Commission (c. 1959) Christoffelsz had he
recovering from illness and had suggested that Banda wouldn't
a more independent person than my father. Banda had had a Iq^^
with T.W. in the Orient Club and T.W. had come in as a ^oiDmissj^gj^
though not as Chairman.
Purse Roberts was known for his 'draconisji' and stem sentencpo
eg
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a judge. He was a chap who had worked his way up from the ranks (in
Britain) into the Civil Service and was not favoured in the hest
circles in Ceylon, I inquired if he Vi^as notorious for
giving "biased decisions in favour of Europeans hut he did not
comment. He said that he was stem; and added that he was 'crude'.
Paul Pieris^ come across a Jaffna man with an European surname
and written something to the effect of this fellow with 'a foreign
name' and V/ood Renton had it expurged from the records. Wood Renton
was known to "be stem and severe.
Christoffelsz had got into the local division of the Civil
Service and then asked for permission to go to Cambridge (1912-15) ,
hut had lost seniority as a result; with no regrets. He had liked
it at Camhri(^gg^ j inquired v/hether the colour-har operated there.
'Oh, yes', he said. It had heen quite pronounced in those days.
Ceylonese an(j Indians were prohibited from membership of certain
societies, though, strangely, Japanese and Chinese were less
discriminated against. The Union Society did not have such a bar.
If you took part in sports, you v/ere more acceptable and Christoffelsz
had participated in athletics, cricket and tennis. However when he
had tumed up for Queen's College soccer practice he had been asked
to keep goalj thou^ a forward. He had refused and not played
thereafter.
The British believed in their superiority and Christoffelsz was
convinced that it exists among Britons in Ceylon even today. In his
time there Was much aloofness. Purse Roberts had kicked a Ceylonese
out of his first-class compar"tment. Porrest(?) had refused to share
a two-berth sleeping compar-fcment with a Supreme Court Judge named
Thomas Be Sampayo. On one occasion, an Assistant Settlement Officg^
named P.J. Hudson had remarked to Christoffelsz and some others,
referring to some Ceylonese, 'I consider myself superior to any
Ceylonese'. j inquired whether the post First World War set were
not more liberal and sympathetic. 'Some were(, he said; but added
that the whole lot were caught up in this groove and had to conform,
to the standards of the European circle. Thus fellow-administrators
from the same station as Christoffelsz would not deign to see him
when he was Nuwara Eliya. Nuwara Eliya had to be a British
preserve. The Irrigation Bepar"tment was a notorious centre of
judice. There is a written minute where it was stated that they
would prefer a man from the streets of London to a Ceylonese engin
As a matter of fact many of the European irrigation men were third
rate trash. There was a chap said to have been down and out and
reduced to searching dustbins who had got in to the Bepartment
had been sacked from India and called on aBirmingham friend of h^^^^
in Ceylon anq asked for a job and promptly got one. There was
one reality dussy chap in the Bepar-bment and that was Kennedy.
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had a •hrillia.ntJ brain. Unfortunately he was an alcoholic.
Christoffelsz had known him in Kurunegala. He used to drink a lot
then but get up at 4 or 5a.m, and work; in fact, he worked better
when drunk, in Christoffelsz•s opinion. I inquired about Wilson and
Taylor and Kitching. Wilson he could not recall. 'Taylor was
mediocre'. 'Kitching was good but was not here for long'.
Luddington v/as a first-rate mathematician and a very able officer
but had been kept in the backwoods because he was not from the top-
drawer and was not an Oxbridge product, being a Durham University
graduate.
Huxham had worked his v/ay up and was first-class in his field.




Comments on Interview v/ith Sir Charles Collins, C.M.G-. 25 January 1966.
In his 70's Sir Charles is obviously ageing but has his wits
about him and is at present in the process of writing a chapter for
an American book on "Newly Emergent Nations". In his letter to me he
had expressed some doubts about the use of a tape-recorder and said he
would prefer not to have one, but I had replied putting my case for
the use of one and we had agreed to the compromise of shutting it off
whenever he wished. Nevertheless he did not request this once. But
this would indicate that he was moderately guarded.
I had, often without seeking to, gathered a lot about Sir Charles
before the interview, the consensus of opinion^without any exception,
being that he was pedestrian and only of moderate ability though a
prodiguous worker. On the whole I would say the interview supported
this view (and my expectations). I found him friendly and more candid
than I expected and very mild-mannered but he also gave one the
impression that he lacked depth. Lady Collins v/as a dear old thing
but, perhaps, because of a natural reserve, he somehow gave the
impression that he lacked that extra little bit of warmth which would
make one take to a man, I repeat, this could have been due to a
natural reserve, I should add that he was quite ready to chuckle and
was not quite pedantic. His long experience in Ceylon and, above all,
his experience in Secretariat posts and in the Legislative and State
Councils - not to mention his hand in the constitutional problems
from 1945 to 1948 - meant that he had perforce acquired considerable
knowledge of many problems which did not normally interest non-
politically minded Civil Servants, The facility with which he aired
views on such points, therefore, need not be held to indicate either
wide interests or any great perception. But he was not ready to agree
with the view that British rule lacked drive and imagination. Indeed
his answer here would support the view that British rule lacked ulti
mate political ends. His assessment of Stubbs and many other indivi
duals would also suggest that he him^f was an average man, though he
was not wholly indiscriminatory in his appraisal of men.
Given the guardedness which I expected and his long stints in the
Secretariat I could hardly raise queries as to the essay-writing ten
dencies and obstructionism in the Secretariat, Those relating to the
sticky issues of arrogance and aloofness as well as Ceylonisation I
raised over tea [see note on unrecorded information]. He was, on the
face of it, only a trifle guarded on the 1915 riots but again, it was
surprising that he saw nothing wrong with Brigadier-General Malcolm,
His answers on the riots, however, were useful, one way or another.
I did not press for his opinions on personnel to any marked extent,
A very useful interview, providing tit-bits of valuable information on
many topics: 1915 riots. Secretariat attitude to Goonesinha , the 1924
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Constitution, the reaction of Heads of Department to political
criticism, land Settlement work, the Board of Ministers under the
Donoughmore Constitution, on Tyrrell and ?/oods, the years before
Independence, among others.
I should add that I think Sir Charles got on with the politicians
as, indeed, he claims he did. Thou^, perhaps, somewhat pedantic and
likely to stick to rules, his attitude to7/ards them (during the inter
view) was quite genial and one would presTme that this was so in the
1920's - 1940's as well.
M.W. Roberts
25.1.66
Confidential and Unrecorded Information -provided "by Sir Charles
Collins, C.M.5., 25 January, 1966.
I made the point that Ceylonese Civil Servants felt that they
were shunted into the judicial line and excluded from A.G.A'ships and
G.A'ships, and he said that this was so at the start hut that they
could not complain on this score later on. I inquired whether it
was a matter of policy at the start (i.e. 1900's and 1920's - 1920's
hy implication). He said that it was "not a policy hut just that
they douhted" whether these Ceylonese would "he suited" to these
posts. "In other words their discretion was not trusted", I said.
He said "Yes" rather hesitantly hut went on to say that he considered
their feeling and their douhts on this point "very wrong" and were
"not justified" hy later events - i.e. the performance of Ceylonese
Civil Servants in these posts in the 1930*s and the 1920's.
I inquired whether one of the reasons for this hesitation was
the fact that the people themselves distrusted the impartiality of
Ceylonese officers, and hoth Sir C. Collins and Lady Collins
emphatically agreed that "this was so". I replied that in theory this
would have seemed valid hut when one looked at the Ceylonese personnel
concerned its validity was doubtful. Sir Charles reiterated his
opinion that the British Government was slow on this point and that
it would have heen better to associate Ceylonese in this field at an
earlier date.
I raised W.T. Stace's criticism to the effect that the British
community was guilty of arrogance and racial prejudice; Sir Charles
voiced a rather hesitant "Yes - there was some of it ... Its so up
to a point" while Lady Collins opined a far firmer "Yes, there was
some".
I said that it would seem that the leading Civil Servants Were
also rather too aloof from the people and the educated Ceylonese.
Lady Collins said that her husband was on good terms with and in
touch with the politicians hut, quite firmly added, tliat my critic
was true of "some" of them. Sir Charles acquiesced rather reluctantly
I stated that this aloofness was had in that it meant a lack of
understanding or knowledge with the trend of local political thought
Again Sir Charles nodded hut pointed out that some officials were
"in touch" with the politicians.
I inquired whether it had heen unwise for the Donoughmore
Commission to put the heads of Departments in direct contact with
Ministers instead of having the present system of a permanent Secre
tary who, in effect, acts as a buffer. He replied that the junior
Civil Seivants who were Secretaries to the Executive Committees
fill this role to some extent.
I aaked him whether it had not heen an unwise move on the part
of the Donoughmore Commission to allow Executive Committees to hav
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a say on P.S.C. appointments. He said that it had "been felt that
this was necessary hut said that "perhaps" it v?as unwise.
On my inquiries, he said that he had had considerahle douhts
at the outset whether he liked colonial life - i.e. life in the C.C.S.
"like Woolf" he added. I said, "Oh, did you have the same feelings
against imperialism". His reaction was, "Oh, Woolf had a hee in his
honnet ahout that" and said that it was not that, hut that he had not
settled down and had had douhts ahout the type of life there. "The
fierce young parties?" I queried. "Um-m", he said; hut he added that
he had soon got over these douhts - "one found a niche for oneself".
[Being a religous sort and not the type wrho liked to prop up a har,
I am certain it is to this aspect of social life and the demand for
this sort of drinking cum-outdoor behaviour which he had disliked.]
He did not think S.W.R.D. had "a touch of megalomania" though
this may have heen so later (in the late 50's). His father of course
had heen a great old gent; "a proper Tory", he added, implying how
different the son was.
M.W. Roberts
25.1.66
Confidential and Unrecorded Information provided by Mr, R.Y. Daniel.
during interview, 1 Septem"ber 1966.
Huxham had sent for him and asked him to start a War Savings
Movement. He had said that the Service personnel and the forces
were spending a big sum of money in Ceylon and there was a danger
of pronounced inflation. As a means of diminishing inflation they
were going to start people on Savings.
Daniel felt that in the 1950's D.S. had kept him too long in
charge of Savings. After his operation for cancer in the [throat?
jaw?] in [1950 or 1951], he was not able to speak for long and
could not indulge in propaganda as before; he had wanted to resign
or take on something else but Government had wanted him to continue.
Jennings was 'a genius'; an avid reader with a photographic memory;
only needed four or five hours sleep; very quick to grasp matters;
a good administrator and practical. Sir Nicholas Attygalle compared
very ill; did not have any learning; 'pig-headed'; would not listen
to anyone else; 'a stud-bull'. H.B. That Jennings and then Attygalle
seiTved as Chairman of the National Savings Movement Committees and
that Mr. Daniel would have served with them in this connection.
Dudley was rather lazy; D.S.was on the decline intellectually during
his period of Premiership. Mr. Daniel had a great respect for D.S.
[vide interview]. He obviously could not stick Banda. I inquired
whether Banda had a touch of megalomania and he was most positive
that he had. If I recall correctly he said Banda was 'mad'. I
inquired how Banda was as an administrator. He said, 'Utterly
useless'. Carl Arndt had left the Service because he found that he
could not discuss anything v/ith Banda; Banda used to rave and storm.
He informed me that with regard to my questions on land
speculators and the names I had raised, Batuwantudawe and the Coreas




CoEiments on Interview with G-.L.D, Davidson, 9 I)ecem"ber 1965.
AlDsolutely candid. He started off "by explaining Ms "bias
wMcli was distinctly anti-imperialist and critical of Government.
One should add that he is a labour supporter (in 1965 and the post
2nd World War at least) and, I should think, a strong one.
There were several points at which he asked me to shut off the
recorder. These occasions were when he had some severe personal
remarks to make on some individuals. But as it was he provided many
frank views on individuals while the tape v^as on. I pushed my luck to
the limit here. Though he said he was not a good judge of men and
himself admitted having a sharp tongue, I would be inclined to give
his opinion fair wei^t. He was biased against some individuals but
he knew when and stated it. He v/as always trying to be fair.
This was because he was introspective and inward-looking. Though
his criticisms were pretty severe (re men, policy and practice) they
were rarely sweeping - always qualified. A very perceptive man with a
questioning mind, he was not content to work in grooves. Quite strong
against unnecessary red-tape, orthodoxy and pettiness. He was more a
provincial officer and thought poorly of those in the inner-circle
and the men who were in the Secretariat. I incline to think he was
a practical man; certainly his war experience among the Sappers would
have conduced towards practicality.
What was particularly pleasing was his objectivity. This was
especially useful on colour-bar questions where he stripped the normal
pooh-poohing and wishy-washy 'framework' of all its gloss and its
rationalistic facade. He had also thought about the deeper and more
basic questions for these drew a spate of words (and points) i^
which indicated that they were not new to him - and not mere
•^J-eievant
amorphous words. It is significant that many of his criticisms nv.
^re of
the same strain as those made by Newnham, Gimson, Strong and Stace
A very meaty and juicy and valuable interview - and not
•because lie provides fodder for historical criticism but beo
other more objective, questioning individuals. What I found particq^*^
larly impressive was the fact that he had read Philip Mason's "ib i
of India" (2 vols.) and his book on Rhodesia. Somehov/ I doubt if ^
many O.C.S. men have done so. He had also read Cameron's Judicig^-j^
Report.
He was sometimes like a river in flood. His memory was Q-by
pretty vivid and this is a fact of great importance. (He was bo
1898, and served from 1921-1952.) What was also of great value ^
the many little examples he expounded on at great length. These^^^^
stories were extremely interesting though, perhaps, at times bay
much ballast from the historical point of view. Such was his





come from a perceptive, questioning and introspective mind with very
vivid memories of Ceylon. V/hat is more he was not as flamboyant or
as sweeping as Newnham tended to be at times. His criticism of the
L.S.D. is of special importance; the first I have come across.
M.W. Roberts
9.12.65
P.S. His letter of 19 December 1965 (see MSS) reveals more of the
man. His highly radical ideas are indicated by the fact that he
enclosed Trevor Huddleston's article "To my kith and kin" in obvious
approval of many points made there. Note that leach, who disliked
Davidson and admitted it, considered him too perfectionist and
"efficiency mad".
Extract from Letter: Davidson - M.W. Roberts, 19 December 1965.
In talking about the past, there are two difficulties to contend
with. Hirst, of course, my memory is not as good as it was, and not
only have I forgotten many things, but I realise that my memory may
be inaccurate on other matters. Secondly, I see many things in a
different light now from the light I saw them in when they occurred;
but it is often very hard, when recalling them, to realise that my
attitude has changed in the meantime.
Coinments on Interview with. Mr. Shelton Fernando, 15 May 1966.
As I am a personal friend of his son the interview was always on
a cordial footing. I found Mr. Fernando fresh of memory, very candid,
responsive and eager to help. He was, I think;, wondering what exactly
I wanted hut once I got on to the headmen and the elections of the 30'-"^
you could see him warming to his subject. He was, thereafter, wholly
absorbed in the discussion. He was intensely interested in each query
and his candidness of answer flowed in part from this interest. At
the same time his was the attitude of an academic - he read History at
Oxford — to a retrospective survey of events and administrative prob
lems in which he was a participant. Indeed, consciously so. It is
noticeable that on several occasions, in recollecting some point, he
added "This is interesting" or "This is useful". On several issues,
then, he was striving to give a proper historical assessment.
I do not think he was trying to push himself or the work he did;
but he was ever ready to stress the role of the C.C.S. and to show
that it was an elitist body chosen through competitive exams. Thus
prone to cast himself and the C.C.S. as intellectuals who, on the whole
did act and serve as a professional elLte. He was very much in favour
of the elitist principle. In thus emphasising the role of the C.C.S.
he was not so much blowing the ti*umpet of his team as asking honour
where honour was due.
I do not think he is comm'unal minded; indeed, very fair on this
sphere and no apoLogist for the Sinhalese. Nor is he ri^t wing to the
extent of being pro-U.N.P. though, obviously, he did not care for the
Communists.
I cannot say how one should rate his appraisal of men. He was
not guarded in this sphere but as far as judgments went I don't thirJc
he was the hjrpercritical sort or very demanding - i.e he was likely to
be benign and give individuals the benefit of any doubt.
Since he joined the C.C.S, only in 1931 my range of questions was
limited but I think his information was very, very useful in certain
spheres; the headmen system and its influence in the 31/36 elections;
the Cooperative Movement; the application of Brajme s protected ten
ures under the Land Development Ordinance of 1935; on S.W.R.D. Banda -
ranaike; on Banda and the 1958 riots.
M.W. Roberts
15.5.66
Comments on Second Interview, 19 March 1967.
This interview follov/ed my attempts to get Sir Richard
to write out his comment on certain extracts from the hook
'Pul Eliya'. He preferred to have another recorded session.
A good forty minutes, therefore, was expended on this subject.
The rest of the interview pertained largely to points I had
not raised at our first meeting. (I reviewed the first
interview beforehand) but also touched on some aspects raised
earlier. The latter was partly for purposes of clarification,
partly in order to check on consistency. His information on
his politician brother (Bernard Aluwihare), on Alex Eraser, on
the headmen system, on land-grabbing by speculators and on land
settlement v/ork were the more useful sides of this interview.
M.W. Roberts
20/3/67.
Unrecorded Information provided by Mr. C.H.Z. Fernando during
conversation, 31 July 1966.
In 1910, as a youngster C.H.Z. spoke at a meeting of the
Ceylon Students Union in London - a meeting attended "by the
Secretary of State - and speaking critically of the constitutional
reforms said that he did not v/ant 'the crumhs from the white man's
tahle'. This speech had heen severely criticised in Ceylon,
especially "by the Independent run "by Hector Van Cuylenburg. The
critics had suggested that C.H.Z. be refused permission to re-enter
Ceylon. The only people v/ho supported him were F.R. Senanayake
and A.E. Goonesinha - the latter a clerk in the Railway at that
time - who wrote letters congratulating him on his speech.
In 1915 the Senanayake brothers liad spoken at a meeting of a
temperance society in Mihirigama - a meeting which was held in the
premises of the Railway it would seem; but at any rate A.E. Goonesinha
an employee in the Railway'Department, was stationed there. Mr.
Fernando spoke as if the meeting v/as 'during the 1915 riots',
from his a-nswers (imprecise) to further queries and from what I
know of the period this must have been before May 1915. The C.l b
had approached Goonesinha and wanted him to sign a statement saying
that the Senanayakes had incited the Sinhalese to rise against the
Moors. Goonesinha refused. Again, Mr. Fernando was vague re the
exact date of this request i.e. whether it was before or during the
riots, I should say it was before because Mr. Fernando added that
Goonesinha had to leave the Railway Department as a result.
Mr. Fernando mentioned how a small group had formed a body
called the Servants of Lanka, pledged to work against the British
I inquired whether this was the same as the Young Lanka League but
he made it clear that this group v/as only a section of the Young
Lanka League, which was only 'a political body'. The Servants of
Lanka, it would seem, were thinking of 'throwing bombs' etcetera
They signed a pact in blood. The group included Goonesinha, q.h 2
Femando, E.A.P. Wijeyratne, Jinendradasa, Roland Perera and A.w p
Jayatilaka. It was later suspected that Roland Perera gave inform
tion to the Police. The group were arrested just after the 1915
riots, but C.H.Z. and ? , being Christians, were released at
C.E. Corea and E.T. de Silva had entered into a pact with
W. Duraiswamy agreeing to a fifty fifty representation in Council
In other words, they had accepted that ten Tamils were equal to one
Sinhalese. Thou^ Corea was President of the National Congress
Senanayakas had put young C.H.Z. Femando to contest the ^uttalam
seat in the 1923 elections because of this. Corea asked E.T.
to contest the seat. C.H.Z. had trounced this combine.
M.W. Roberts
31/9/66
Unrecorded Information provided by Mr. Shelton Fernando, 13 May 1966.
He considered S.W.R.U. Bandaranaike's historical role as "enigma
tic". By this he meant: that while in 1956 Banda brought radical
forces to the forefront and inaugurated the age of the common man, the
administration went to the dogs and was undermined hy the "apey amduwa|
mentality. In effect that he hrou^t something had as well. Here Mr.
Fernando was obviously trying to give what he considered a corrective
and balanced viewpoint in the face of the present-day tendency to
eulogise S.V/.R.B.
The G.C.S. has been done away and the elitist concept drowned.
Mr. Fernando v/as against this. He felt that there was much imcalled
for criticism of the G.C.S. men as Brahmins and so forth. The common
view of G.G:S. men was that this was motivated by jealousy - that
most of the sub-editors of the Ceylonese newspapers v;ere chaps who
had sat for the G.G.S. exam and not succeeded.
He related a story about the 1959 Oxford Society dinner which
throws a light on Banda the man - the petty-minded man perhaps? But
this is my inference. Mr. Fernando was not suggesting this. Indeed
he told the story when my wife and Mrs. Fernando were present. The
dinner took place in Mr. Fernando's house just after a minor contre
temps between two prominent old Oxonians. One, Canon Be Saram, had
made a speech at St. Thomas' College in which he criticised glib
politicians who were mere men of words, pulled the wool over people's
eyes, etc., etc. Another, the Prime Minister (Banda)^ had rushed to
the conclusion that this was a barb aimed directly at him (though it
fitted numerous others) and written a letter of protest to Canon Be
Saram, who retorted on the lines that "if the cap fitted ...." But
at the dinner Banda had made it a point to greet the Canon warmly and
conversed at length with him. Come the after dinner speeches hov/ever,
Bishop Lakdasa Be Mel, with his characteristic ability of putting his
foot in it, made a speech where (among other things) he lauded Canon
Be Saram as the first Ceylonese to win a Blue, adding that being a
Boxing Blue he was quite used to taking blows below the belt. At
this Banda had taken offence and pretty soon afterwards had called
Mrs. B. , remarked that they were not there to be insulted and walked
off in a huff. The Oxford Society Binner had promptly fizzled out.
Philip Gunewardena and Mrs. Vimala Wijewardena were "notorious"
as Ministers who gave Permanent Secretaries a dog's life by constant
interference. They sought to run their departments themselves from
the peon to the Permanent Secretary. In response to my query he said
that Mrs. Vimala was able.
M. W. Roberts
15.5.66.
Mr. Shelton Eemando's Answers to Questions forwarded "by IT.W. RoToerts,
3 July 1966
1. What originated the contretemps betv/een D.S. and Edmnnd Rodrigo?
Answer;
Erom personal experience I can say it was the severely indepen
dent spirit of Rodrigo. V/hereas 9/10ths even of senior officials
were only too prone to curry favour with the great man, for
future advancement, Rodrigo v/ould have none of it. He even
kept a file called 'Interference Pile' and Interferer ITo. 1
v/as h.S. the Minister himself!
This v/as mainly for interference from politicians in
Public Service affairs and appointments for which they really
had no right or status even under the then Constitution.
2. Did D.S. incline to desire "yes-men" as heads of departments?
Didn't he undermine the efficiency of the Irrigation Dept. very
seriously by driving several experienced officers away?
Answer:
Not exactly. But he seldom took argument or bona fide advice in
good part if they impinged on any fixed viev/s of his.
Yes, especially Europeans at the top were his pet aversions.
He had a kink I fear that few Europeans (with the notable excep
tion of people like C.V. Brayne) really had the interests of
the country at heart. I could certainly say this of the Agric.
Dept. top officers.
Eev/ Irrigation or Survey Dept. men at the top survived his
regime. He could be rude even to Govt. Agents whom he found to
be too slow in the execution of his land policies.
3. It is commonly said that when it came to a case betv/een Europeans
and local persons British judges and administrators invariably^
and even unconsciously, favoured their own kind. Any comments?
Answer:
Judges. I think British justice v/as undiscriminating except
during the days of the 1915 Riots when the Governor and the
Military lost their nerve and also heads.
Administrators. Yes, to a, great extent with notable exception
like Freeman, Leonard Woolf and C.V. Bra.yne.
I hs.ve personally seen at the Badulla Kachcheri pape^.^
about Brayne being 'reported' to the Chief Secretary for
workij
the
direct with A.G.A's in provincial kachcheris where he founa
G.A. almost obstructive over land work.
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4. V/hat sort of man was Millington?
Ans\ver:
Millington v/as a ratlier difficult man to get on with, "but a
gentleman, fhe unfortunate thing about him, by the time he
got on to Uva, was that he wouiau't trust anybody. It apnears
some unscrupulous liudaliyar at Hambantota v/hen he was A.G-.A.
let him down over a big salt stock and as A.G.A. he had to
suffer a big surcharge of several thousands of Ruppees.
Therefore as G-.A. v/e all found, him painstakingly meticulous
to the slightest detail, and not taking anything or anybody
for granted.
Also as a result, over-conscientious, which ultimately
provoked his sad suicide, v^ith neck on the Railway. I cannot
vouch for the immediate cause the' I was his A.&.A. then but
the story I heard must be largely true.
In lower Uva a well-known Southern trader was detected
felling large quantities of timber on allegedly Crovm. land. As
the village was 'unsettled' the trader offered to deposit the
full value of the timber and asked for authority to remove.
Again \7ith his liabitual caution Millington refused, but by the
time 'settlement' came all the timber had deteriorated, aaad the
trader sued Government for 50,000. Valuations v/ere in a confi
dential safe and somebody in the kachcheri had,before the Court
Case, leaked the contents to the trader.
Taken aback and by surprise when plaintiff's counsel con
fronted him v/ith knowledge that he himself could remember only
hazily, Millington shaped rather badly in the v/itness box under
cross-examination.
As he got off some stupid crov/n counsel remarked that he
had let the Crov/n down. This stung the poor man so much that
within an hour of tea at Temple Trees and 2 hours before a
Queen's House Dinner his neck was on the railv/ay line.
Tragic to relate, the Crown was not let down after all and
won, and the appeal before I.M.D. de Silva failed too.
5. ... and Bassett? I would also like a short account of the aims
of the Rural Marketing Department, the obstacles faced and the
extent of its success? Was liaison with the Co-op Movement called
for?
Answer:
Bassett Pine man, tho' War Service C.C.S. with hardly a Matrie
Certificate. Excellent as Colombo Police Magistrate, who trained
me as Cadet. Later my immediate boss in t he Marketing Denartment.
He can also be called the inspirer of the Marketing Dept.
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initiated in 1935 I thinlc. He gave the idea to H.S. v/hen as
A.G.A. H'Eliya he fonnd that a papaw for which he paid in tovrn
some 50 cents did not fetch 5 cents to the producer. (He told
me himself 8.hout this as a tjrpical case.)
Sad to say after 31 years the Dept. is not fulfilling its
functions as conceived. Often it is one more middle-man "buying
from traders v/ho huy from a multiplicity of small producers.
You are perfectly right that from the beginning suppliers
should have "been small men producers handing themselves into
cooperative units.
6. What sort of man was Brayne?
Answer;
A great lover of Ceylon, if ever there v/as one among foreigners.
Peasant proprietor policies were mooted hy him long before D.S.
became a minister. The real father of the l.D.O. tho* by the
time it came under action it was time for him to retire.
Everybody (non-imperialist) felt that a loii^ithood was
surely his due (got only a C.I.I.G^ but understandably those who
genuinely loved the people, lihe Woolf and Brayne, were not
popular vd-th the British Raj.
(iTote earlier story of 'Many G.A.A's reporting him for going
too fast with A.G.A.A. on land policy!)
His brother E.L. Brayne I.C.S. was a great man for the
peasantry too and his famous Gurgaon experiment of peasant
settlement in the Punjab is said to have inspired younger C.V.
7. How would you appraise the C.O.S. men v/ith whom you worked in the
Secretariat, 1931-32? and the G.A's under v/hom you served in
Matale and Puttalum?
Answer:
Sir Graeme Tyrrell, Chief Secy, was exceedingly kind to me and he
even attended my wedding 30 miles away near Negombo. So were his
Assistants G.C. Miles and C.H. Hartv/ell (nov/ Sir Charles).
R.H.D. Manders later 2nd Asst. Secy, and my boss v/hile cadet
with 5 years' seniority had the ples-sure of serving under me
25 years later 8.s a G.A. in several places!
I think I was one of just 2 or 3 Ceylonese ever to be
appointed cadet at the C.S.O.
W.O. Stevens and A.E. Christoffehz were both very efficigj^^
8,nd hardv/orking. Genuinely interested in their field v/ork.
8. Was the grant of universal franchise in 1931 genero-lly viev/g^ with
misgiving, if not opposition, by most Civil Servants?
_ A -
Ansv/er:
I actually joined a few months after the 1st General Election
of June or July 1931 under the Eonoughmore Constitution. Those
already in service when the Commissioners arrived in Ceylon in
1927 can ansv/er "best.
9. Were there a class of Ceylonese who speculated in land (in the
1920's and 1930's) and tended to "buy up peasant land held on
dubious title (e.g. that of diga-married women)? There is some
suspicion that a fexr politicians critical of British land policy
in the 20's were themselves land sharks. Have you any information
on this point?
Answer:
Notaivare, tho' some were suspect I hear. Yes, I have heard the
same of politicians, some of v/hom even shrunk many a village "by
buying up small holdings in order to enlarge their estates.
10. Did the British bring law rather than justice? Was it possible
for a judge, seated in a distant town, to solve some of the land
cases without Imov/ing the configuration of the land and a know
ledge of the ramified family and personal relationships in the
village concerned?
Ansv/er:
I still thirdc British justice is proverbial. They v?ere not
merely legalistic and the Rule of Law was clearly shown to shine
even against British Governors. (Heard of the famous Bracegirdle
case of 1938?)
Curiously many European judges were quite well-informed, in
my experience, and they generally set about educating themselves
at all times. In this regard, whatever may be said of XTudaliyars
and Court Interpreters I think these officials always kept their
European superiors quite well-informed on such matters. Natur
ally nobody could have dared to mislead without finding himself
caught out before long.
Comments on Interview with Mr. A.E. Goonesinlia, 12 May 1966,
This interview was conducted in association with Dr. Mrs. Eumari
Jayawardena who had had several interviews with Mr. G-oonesinha some
years hack and was on fairly friendly terms v/ith him. He was, there
fore, very much at ease despite the presence of a tape-recorder. In
any event he v/as eager to air his views on many points and expound on
his own activities in the past. Aged 75 years as he is, it is natural
that his memory is dim on certain points. It is noticeable, however,
that the matters on which he was ready to he expansive were those on
which he had already dwelt at length in his previous interviews with
Dr. Kumari or in his serialised memoirs in the Colombo Observer (1965).
This indicates that his store of recollections is something fixed and
something which he repeatedly expands on.
But how reliable are the facts he emphasises? Does he hide or
gloss over any-fching? This obviously varies but the answer is that he
glossed over some things and that his statements can be controverted
on certain points. Thus it is impossible to maintain that the Tem
perance Movement was not political in content or in its underlying
nature; or that the 1915 riots were purely the work of hooligans;
(Heaven help us if we had so many hooligans!). Not that Mr. G-oonesinha
was necessarily hiding things from us but that he himself chose to be
blind to some facts. The views he expressed then, are essentially
those of a politician who was closely involved in the political events
of his day and, inevitably, full of his own prejudices. Such pre
judices influenced his attitude to Britishers as well as other politi-.
cians; e.g. his opinion of S.W'R.D. Bandaranaike was no doubt coloured
by the fact that he was defeated by him in the 1927 m-unicipal elections*
not that what he said of Banda is necessarily wrong.
In many ways the interview is more useful in shov/ing Mr. Goone-
sinha the man. But even this needs significant qualification, it tg
a fact of history that Goonesinha of the 1930's was notes militant as
Goonesinha of the 1910's and 1920's. 1929 can be taken as his heyday
Thereafter, he sobered. Thus the Mr. Goonesinha we hear now is fg.^.
less militant than the young Mr. Goonesinha. But apart from a
mellowed attitude, it is obvious that he seeks to present himself
the best possible light. That he was never a Communist is a fact.
But his criticism of Bandaranaike' s communalism reads strangely
view of his blatant anti Malayali cries of the 1930's; and his dia-
approval of violence and thuggery contrasts with the dubious methods
and the use of thugs that he himself is reliably said to have employg^
in the 20's and 30's. There is no doubt that he drew the line at
overt terrorist activity of the bomb-throwing and assassinist variety
But he was not above strong-arm tactics. It is also curious that for*
his stress on his belief in ahimsa and non-violence he should
iiave an admiration for Tilak.
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If for nothing, else, the interview is useful in revealing the
various influences hearing on the evolution of a young working-class
orientated radical of the 1900's and 1920's - from the works of the
liheral-nationalists of Europe and Ireland to the activities of Indian
nationalists as well as radical Ceylonese like Anagarika Dharmapala.
But even here the interview is essentially supplementary and Mr. G-«s
writings in that period would he more reliable in showing the various
strains and experiences which composed his thought. On the whole,
Mr. G. would seem to have had a conglomeration of ideas which do not
fom a logical or consistent whole, hut these ideas made h-im a radical
for his day, a man of fiieand spirit fighting for recognition and equal
status, genuinely aware of working-class grievances and as aware of
power v/hich he could command through organisation of the working-
classes. In the manner in which he stood up to British Civil Servants
and the touchiness and aggressiveness with which he responded to any
slights, his is the reaction of a man whom officials as well as some
Ceylonese politicians tried to treat as an "untouchahle".
M.W. Roberts
12.5.66
Unrecorded Information provided by Mr. Vemon H. G-unasekara duririig;
interviev/, 23 July 1966.
It was not difficult to hide the L.S.S.P. leaders who jumped
jail while Leslie Goonev/ardena too - richer, well-connected, more
personable than the others - was never in severe straits. Some
times they were in the heart of Colombo. Hiding Bracegirdle was a
different matter. He had sometimes to stay in the jungle, though
on one occasion they had him at a small house, more a hovel, v/ithin
a stone's throw of a Colombo North police station. The L.S.S.P.
leaders visited him there after throwing off any police tails. The
midni^t interview with a Daily News reporter - taken there blind
folded - was there. Vemon wrote the script for this interview;
i.e. Bracegirdle was coached. The 'only occasion' Bracegirdle strayed
from 'the text' hit the headlines. He said that in Ceylon 'The
blacks' hearts are white and the whites' hearts are black'.
Prior to this it was Bracegirdle who took the initiative in
contacting the L.S.S.P. Vemon found it difficult to decipher his
letter. He (Bracegirdle) was 'virtually illiterate'. However they
decided to visit him. Vemon, Philip and Leslie(?) made the trip
to the estate where Bracegirdle was a creeper. But the servants
recognised the latter two. The news filtered up to the boss. Within
tv/o days Bracegirdle was sacked. He came down to Colombo and it
was decided tha^t he would help the L.S.S.P. in their campaign to
form unions among the estate workers.
Bracegirdle, however, was 'a died—in-the-wool Stalinist'(he had
Stalin's Selected Works with him). He postulated the principle -
justifiable in many ways - that it must be the rank and file who
should call the tune rather than a specific bunch of leaders; and
that the leaders should in their personal life exemplify Communist
principles. Thus after the deportation was declared ultra vires
the Trot leaders decided that the principles etc. he was trying to
spread were not desirable and promoted him to go to Britain. There
was no open split but it was felt that Bracegirdle could be a
nuisance. (Later he and Dr. S'.A. Wickramesinghe were expelled from
their London cell when they openly broke with the Communist Party.)
At one stage when I asked him whether Bracegirdle had much of
a personality, he said, 'As I understand personality, no'. He did
not rate him even moderately in intellectual calibre.
Vemon is convinced that the Senanayake eclique promoted
D.B. Jayatilaka to ask for a Commission on the Bracegirdle affair
knowing that it would discredit him. Thus a neat double-cross,
•nlaving on 'the foibles' of a man of 'weakening intellect'. To the
^ of fcttvw. , . ... , » . .
L.S.S-P.y( . I'fc been obvious that such a Conmission would
discredit D.B.
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Philip had been expelled from the London wing of the Communist
Party as a Trotskyite deviationist; thus, on ideological grounds.
V/hen Vemon was sent to London before the 1936 elections in Ceylon
as a plenipotentiary seeking monetary aid for the L.S.S.P. he met
'Comrade Bradley' of the British C.P. Bradley had agreed to give
support only if they expelled Phillip from their group (in Ceylon).
M.W. Roberts
23/7/66
Unrecorded Information provided by Mr. D.C.R. G-unewardena durin/y
Intervie\?, 17 August 1966.
He could not recall the incident related "by Mr. A.N. Strong
when he (G-unewardena) was at the receiving end of arrogant behaviour
from a military officer in Matara Kachcheri.
His attitude on the subject of arrogance and racial superiority
shown by the British v/as that such characteristics are found in all
races. He alluded to the manner in which Sinhalese refer to their
Aryan stock and the use of the word "Aryan".
While on the subject of arrogance, he asked me if I knew of
Hodson. On one occasion when he was P.M., Dandegamuv/a, Hodson was
G-.A. North-Westem Province and, as such, Inspector of the Courts
as well. G-unev/ardena had his own ideas on punishment; he did not
believe in lashes. The Police must have complained re his "leniency"
for Hodson called on him on the subject. He happened to be holding
court and was seeing to the roll-call. Hodson appeared and excusing
himself said that he wished to see Gunewardena. G. asked him to
wait in the Chambers as he was busy. After ten minutes G. v/as able
to go into the chambers and meet Hodson but was only able to give
him a few minutes. Hodson appeared annoyed at having been kept
waiting but G. told him that he should have informed him earlier re
this visit and added that the lawyers had resented his intrusion.
Hov/ever, the matter was discussed. Eventually Hodson reported;
"This man is temperamentally unfitted to hold the reins of justice
in a criminal area". This report was sent back to G. by the
Attorney-General's Department. G. wrote simply: "I am inclined to
agree".
Later he was under Hodson in Kandy. Hodson had quipped about
the matter and never bore him ill-will. They had got on well, to
the point of freely criticising each other. Throughout, Mr. G.
stressed that Hodson was "a very decent fellow" though he had a
reputation for highhandedness. Apparently on one occasion in the
urban council in Kurunegala Hodson had even punched A.B.(?) (3^q
Soysa(?) on the chest, De Soysa had promptly filed a plaint,
liad pleaded guilty and paid the fine.
M.W. Roberts
17/8/66.
Comments on Interview with Mr. A.S. Harrison, 22 January, 1966.
Mrs. Harrison sat in at the interview and therefore this
recording is a three-way affair. Both of them were friendly and
quite eager to talk ahout Ceylon days. Very interested in the topics
raised, Mr. Harrison was very frank in his views - and one could say,
extremely unrestrained though on some points he showed some caution
and alaim after he had supplied his views i.e. after his lack of
restraint; hut this was not unnatural when one considers that he
accused a colleague and superior of making his life difficult for
him as well as being responsible for •losing' an important memorandum.
Quite lively and sprightly for his age, Mr. Harrison was un
doubtedly a livewire in his day and secuned very quick promotion.
I am fairly certain that this was not due to any emphasis on self-
seeking but the result of genuine ability allied with considerable
drive and imagination, In the educational sphere he appears to have
been a progressive for his day and even took a great delight in
battling it out with the diehards. It is clear that during the
inteiTview Mr. Harrison presented himself as a livewire, a reformer,
and a man with an original and sharp mind, but I am inclined to
think he was one. He was certainly not a man who would move on
stereotyped lines. He was ready to be very critical of men and of
Government. He agreed with many of the sharp criticisms raised by
Stace, ITewnham and Company. Many of the wider or ancillary issues
I raised interested him greatly and he saw the point at once. Indeed,
many of these matters were not new to him and one would, therefore
infer that he had fairly wide interests and a lively mind. One
might think that the way he presented himself also indicated conceit
Possibly, but he certainly had, and has, ability above the common.
Both his candidness and his ability are seen in his views on
individuals. He was ready to make severely detrimental remarks
about many Civil Servants, even those he had known as friends.
mediocrity and dumbness he assigned to Sir T. Southom, and the
stolidness he labelled Sir W.L. Murphy and Wodeman with, are
appraisals which have support in many interviews. In my view it
takes a man who is not stereotyped and who is sharp in mind to
distinguish between those who are stolid and stereotyped and those
who are not, and, therefore, this outlook is much in Mr. Harrison's
favour - the more so in that his assessments have collaboration from
other sources and in that he was not wholly laudatory. Much as he
admired Denham, he indicated his conceit and pomposity (rather
tempered her, but Denham was his friend). He had a higher regard
for Stanley than Newnham, Strong, Davidson and Company as indeed "h
Mr. Mulhall who felt Stanley to have been underestimated.
On the whole a very interesting inteiview. Mr. Harrison ig
only official from the Education Department whom I have inte-rvrr-
'=J-^iewed.
- 2 -
Above all, he served in the C.P.R.C. ranhs during the 1915 riots and
was able to give a relatively unbiased account of his impressions.
As a ranker with intelligence above the ordinary, his impressions




Mr. Harrison-Jones' Answers to Questions forwarded Tpy M.W. Roberts,
18 January 1966.

















Acting G.A., Eastern Province
G.A., Eastern Province
G.A., North West Province
G.A., S outh Provine e
Mr. Harrison-Jones is not well and, on his own admission, not
mentally alive. Indeed he seems to have exhausted himself mentally
in answering a section of the questionnaire and could not send
answers on the rest. Naturally his answers must he evaluated in
this light.
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Mr. Harrison-Jones * Answers to Questions -Porvvarded "by M.U. Roberts,
18 January, 1966.
1. As a Cadet and an O.A. did you find tlaat the older Civil Ser
vants tended to treat you with scant respect and a kind of
amused tolerance? Would you have liked greater responsibility
than that which was given to you? Were you treated as a dogs
body?
Answer:
Not myself though I followed 1,3. Woolf at Jaffna (and later
at Hambantota) except perhaps by my first G.A., the eccentric
P.H. Price. No, but I may have been exceptional and was
almost throughout more highly regarded by most High Officials
and even Ministers e.g. D. S. Senanayake and Macan Markar than
I deserved.
2. Did the British habit of empirical training - sending officers
out into the country to leam for themselves - hold true in
your case? Could you have done with more training and discussion?
Without wishing to overstress the uses of theory do you think
courses like those they subsequently had in Oxbridge would have
helped you?
Answer:
It holds true in my case except that poor linguists like my
self would have been helped by a grounding in Sinhalese and/or
Tamil at Oxbridge. I think my son (Malaya C.S. 1939 to '43
died as P.O.W.) benefited by his course at Oxford.
3. Did you feel that there was too great a reliance on precedence
and that routine dominated administration to an undue extent?
Answer:
No, not for what was desired or thought necessary by the great
bulk of the Ceylonese population up to 1939.
4. While in the field did you feel that provincial or central H.Q.
tended to be obstructionist and unreceptive to new ideas?
Answer;
Not much as A.G.A. and G.A. except the Directors of Irrigation.
I found Col. Sec. Pletcher helped me in combating this.
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5. In the period pre 1931 did you feel that in matters large or
small there was a tendency to preserve the status quo and a
policy of quieta non movere?
Answer:
I did not feel it much then as I was urdmowingly a Conservative
though brought up as a Liberal. I considered that the Govt.
policy was on the whole "Pestina Lente" which until recently
I believed had worked with great success in Ceylon with its
thousands of years of civilisation and a century oflenigriant
British rule as contrasted with the rush in much of savage
Africa.
6. In this same period did you feel that there was a lack of purpose
drive and imagination in policy, particularly in the sense of
ultimate ideals? Was there a tendency to seek efficiency as an
end in itself?
Answer:
I did not feel it then. Later I have felt that it was only
Clifford (the last one would expect1) who had the imagination
to realise that Ceylon must proceed more quickly to self-
government though he can hardly have had that as his ideal
7. Due to press-ure of business was the Secretariat a bottleneck by
the 1910's? by the 1920's? If so, why wasn't anything done to
solve this problem?
Answer:
My old friend Sir Mark Young could best answer this. Xn the
mid '20's he and J.A. Maybin worked regularly late into the
night. (Possibly with other intelligent unofficials).
de Mel made some protest about this. Somehow or other Sfj.
B.H. Bourdilbn (thou^ Sir Mark had already left Ceylon)
perhaps by force of example(j), managed to reduce the o-tro-«4--
but I don't know if or how he and Sir H. Stanley somehow
reduced the pressure of business.
8. Were the Gansabhas useful adminijstrative bodies? If gQ ^
what way?
Answer:
I believe I found the Gansabhawas did useful work in .
way but cannot remember in what way.
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9. What were their shortcomings?
Answer:
In many cases they thought their pov/ers were greater than they
actually were.
10. Did A.G-.A's have to keep pushing vel vidanes and gansabhas to
ensure that their work was done?
Ansv/er:
I seem to remember we had to push the Vel Vidanes (through the
Chief Headman or the Korala or Vidane Arachi).
11. Did the villagers prefer the Police Courts to the Village
Tribunals?
Answer:
The simpler villagers preferred the V.T. but the more cantanker
ous and revengeful preferred the Police Court.
12. Do you think the people corrupted the Courts in that they used
them as instruments of revenge and oppression?
Answer:
I think that all too many of the people worried the younger
Police Magistrates with their cases (many of them false)
they brou^t to further revenge and oppression but I don't
think they actually corrupted the Coiirts.
13. Did the British bring law rather than justice?
Answer:
We often thought that we were for justice but the Appeal
Court for strict law (not Wood Renton, the friend of the
good, conscientious P.M.).
14. Where the majority of land disputes were concerned could a
Magistrate or Judge on the bench get to the heart of the matter
without having all the village deeds before him and without
knowing the configuration of the land?
Answer:
Even the P.M. would often require to know the
of the land. The D.J. or C.R. needed also the village deea.
and inspected the land if he reasonably could, i-e. if ®
did not too much upset the hearing of the Court's many ofv
cases.
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15. In this sense would it not have "been more ideal to put a Civil
Servant in charge of a smaller territorial unit and provide >n'Tn
with judicial and executive powers in the former Indian and
Ceylonese tradition rather than having larger territorial units
with two Civil Servants handling judicial and executive duties
separately?
Answer;
I "believe the territorial units in Ceylon were small in compari
son with India, But even so it would have "been more ideal to
put a Civil Servant in charge of a "smaller ... separately".
But in little Ceylon with its comparatively high proportion
of Ceylonese educated in English ideas the lawyers and many
others demanded the separation of the Judiciary from the
Administrative.
16. Bid you think that the politicians of your time suffered from an
inferiority complex which stimulated aggressiveness? Bid many
of them have an exaggerated sense of self-importance?
Answer:
(a) Yes, ("b) Yes, more than most of us have.
17. What sort of "bodes were the temperance societies of the first
few decades of the 19th century? Were their meetings political
meetings under the cloak of temperance?
Answer:
(a) Can't remem"ber. ("b) When I was the first appointed
A.G.A. Colom"bo Bistrict (1910-12) and later at Matara I thought
some of the Temperance Societies meetings were really political
meetings under the cloak of temperance.
18. One aspect of 19th century British policy was to foster the
growth of an educated Ceylonese elite. Yet when this elite
emerged on to the stage they were - as in 1909-10 - denied the
right to any significant share of power - partly on the ground
that they did not represent the masses. Would you comment on this?
Answer:
"Very few of the educated Ceylonese elite represented the wishes
of the masses at that time. I think they did to a great extent
represent them in the coast towns of the maritime provinces
e.g. Moratuva.
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19-27 Questions on 1915 riots.
28. Did the advice and the stories related to the authorities "by
certain Ceylonese have anjrthing to do with these arrests [i.e.
arrest of the Temperance leaders]?
Answer:
After my return I believe I came across some good hearsay
evidence that some of these stories did lead to arrests.
42. In the 1910's and 1920's were the turn of events in India held
to have implications for Ceylon? Personally, did you reflect
upon such events? V/ere they socially discussed?
Answer:
(a) Not much; we were very insular ' (b) Personally I did
reflect a good deal but that was probably as the History of
British India had been my Special Subject (c) Yes, discussed
in themselves but not with the idea that they affected Ceylon
much. I reTnmber our great indignation about Amritsar and the
treatment of Brig-General Dyer.
43. Would it be correct to say that after the 1924 Constitution the
centre of gravity shifted from the Executive Council to the
Finance Committee?
Answer:
Correct, so it seems to me now.
44• Did Government rarely defy this Committee though having the
constitutional power to do so? If so, why? Was it to prevent
the Constitution being brought to a standstill or was it from a
desire to placate the politicians and prevent them from adopting
Indian extremes?
Answer:
Yes. It seemed to me that it was to prevent the Constitution
being brought to a standstill when Clifford explained it to a
gathering of a few G.A's and other senior Civil Servants early
in 1927 before he left Ceylon. I did not know anything about
if'adopting Indian extremes".
Goinments on Inteiview with Mr. A.C.M. Hingley, 16 January, 1966.
Mr. Hingley is one of the relatively younger generation of
Civil Servants and in quite vigorous health. On the other hand ser
vice in several other colonies following that in Ceylon has had its
influence in wiping out or diminishing his Ceylonese memories.
I found him very candid and helpful. An ahle and husiness-like
man, he was and is conservative hy nature. He emphasised the fact
that as a young officer he did not concern himself with the political
questions and many of the wider aspects of policy, hut got on with
his 3oh. This would suggest that he moved on stereotyped lines. But
I feel that he had a mind and the sort of drive which would he quite
ready to prompt action that was unorthodox, though I would not
vouch for it. His experience in African coTzntries in the 1940's and
1950's could not hut make him conscious of constitutional problems
hy the time of our interview hut on the whole I should think he was
not politically-minded, though more so than Naish, Sandys, etc. He
is one of the few Civil Servants who felt that Ceylon was not ready
for independence in 1945-46.
I am uncertain how to rate his assessments of personnel - a
high hilling, I think. He was hardly inhibited even in this sphere
and was ready to criticise.




Confidential and Unrecorded Information provided Tjy Mr. A.O.M.Hin^ley,
16 January, 1966.
Collins, lie considered, a "pedestrian little man"; a chap who worried
a lot and gave the impression that some problems virtually
drove him to tear his hair and strew papers about; enormously
industrious.
Tilney and Phillipson were officers "in the ri^t niche". Tilney was
the right type for the Treasury.
Mingley, too, felt that Newnham was of higher calibre than
Wodeman. Newnham, of course, could be "acid" and tended to "get
people's back up" though Hingley himself had nothing against him.
(Note that Sir Charles Hartwell also remarked that, from this point
of view, "Newnham was his own worst enemy.")
M.W. Roberts
18.1.66
Coniments on Interview with. H.A.J, Hulugalle, 18 AU|g:ast 1966.
Starting as a young journalist in the Daily ITews in 1918 Mr.
Hulugalle eventually rose to the position of editor. Subsequently
he served as Director of Information and in ambassadorial posts,
largely imder the patronage of the TJ.N.P. in the 1940's and 1950's.
His outlook, therefore, was essentially right-wing and conser
vative. Thus, hardly partial to Banda and his associates.
In recent years he has taken to historical and biographical
books and articles, his most notable contribution being The Life
and Times of D.R. Y/ijewardena. Judged by these works, he could
be classed as able but not brilliant. Some of his works certainly
lack depth and even the above-named biography could have been
improved on.
On the whole the interview confirmed the fact that he was of
average ability. His interests v/ere fairly wide but this vYas as
it should be. Glancing over his thumb-nail sketches of individuals,
however, I am struck by his fairness and perceptiveness for many
of his remarks are confirmed by other sources. As examples I wouHd
cite his appraisal of Fletcher, E.Y/. Perera, Tyrrell, Stanley,
Arunachalam and Alexander.
As an onlooker and observer of the national scene in the 1920's
to 1940's he could not but have been nationalistic in outlook. But
his attitude to British rule was fair and even perhaps a trifle
benign. He was certainly not of the extreme v/ing. This had its
uses, particularly in his assessment of individual Britons. But
it also meant that he could not reveal much about the left wing,
its frame of thought, etc. I think, however, that I should have
questioned him about Goonesinha, trade-unionism and the L.S.S.P.
I v/as very interested in his views on the origins of the
feplit between Sinhalese and Tamil leaders in the period around
1920-21. He tried to look at this historically and chronologically;
and dived into his book on Y/ijev/ardena and read portions of it,
rather straining my patience in the process because I had read the
book and preferred sucfimct answer's to specific queries. I do not
think he shed much light on the problem but what he says is of
some interest. On D.S., and his group of lieutenants, on D.H. and
his relationship with D.S. I think he provided some useful infor
mation.
The fact that he dismissed men like Victor Corea and Batuwantu—
dawe as "men of little substance" is perhaps worthy of notice in
the outlook it reflects.
Regarding the reliability of facts that he presents, of course,
it will be obvious that they have to be crosschecked with care.
Oonfirmation from other sources is needed in the case of points
made by Civil Seiwants .HWiii- simply because of the lapse of time,
but in their case they are often stating facts relating to subjects
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v\rliich "bliey administered. Hulugalle is perforce talking of what
others did. Reliability is one notch further removed.
M.W. Roberts
22/8/66
UNRECOKDED INTERVIEW WITH IvIR. H.A.J. HULUGALLE, 18 AUGUST 1966.
[Mr. Hulugalle was a journalist in Ceylonese-run English, language
newspapers from 1918-19.]
The British were "politic" and "astute" in keeping the "balance
"between the communities. Thus the communal pro"blem did not "rise
to the top" . In 1910 he can recall that when his "brother won an
agricultural scholarship, the scholarships v/ere divided among the
communities.
I inquired whether the G.A's and A.G.A's knew the people
"better than did the rising politicians and represented their needs
"better (as Clifford maintained in 1909-10). He was inclined to
agree "but said this was not "entirely correct". They knew the
people's needs; particularly in those days when fast communications
were lacking and horses v/ere used "mlmsh they definitely knev/ the
people "better than in more recent times. However, there were
linguistic differences.
In the elections for the Educated Ceylonese seat in 1910 (Sir)
Marcus Fernando lost to (Sir) P. Ramanathan, a Tamil. The Sinhalese
v/ere split on this occasion "because many of the high caste Sinhalese
were opposed to a Karawa (Fernando). Thus Hector Jayawardena,
J.R's imcle, v/as one of Ramanathan's chief aides.
In the late 19'10's and the 1920's Ramanathan had "become
philosophical and rather withdrav/n. His "brother Arunachalam was
more "down to earth"; he was a ""bureaucrat who v/anted to get things
done". Arunachalam was particularly indignant at the way Ceylonese
in the Civil and Pu"blic Services v/ere shunted into jo"bs of lesser
importance and at the slow rate of Ceylonisation. In April 1917
he delivered an interesting talk on "Our Political Needs". This
proved to "be the spark and "the starting point of the Ceylon
National Congress" (I can recall that either Prof. Rodrigo or Mr.
Hulugalle mentioned that even the use of the word "Congress" had
horrified some Ceylonese). Arunachalam v/as "a typical pu'blic
servant, intellectually conscious of his superiority"; "not a very
approacha"ble chap". In his interviews he "laid down the law".
But this attitude was common to most pu"blic servants and was a
"hangover" from old colonial times. Arunachalam and other Ceylonese
"belonged to the group v/ho "had not got their due" . Arunachalam
had "great driving force"; (Sir) James Pieris was eminent but did
not have his drive or courage.
I inquired into the split between the Tamil and Sinhalese
leaders of the time; and whebher it originated before 1920. He said,
"No, it was about that time" (i.e., 1920). The scheme of political
reform suggested by Government in 1920 included territorial
representation. The Tamils were "not ready for this" [Note that
Manning's suggestions did not go very far and all the Ceylonese v/ere
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dissatisfied; the proposals were severely condemned.] When at this
stage Congress decided to accept Government's suggestion that a
delegation should he sent to discuss the matter and effect a com
promise, Arunachalam refused to join the delegation when he was
invited to do so. Thus the delegation was a purely Sinhalese gvoup.
The split T/as at this point. The "overt reason" for the split was
the City of Colombo seat v/hich was contested hy James Pieris and
Arunachalam [Mr. Hulugalle read some extracts from his hook at this
stage]. I referred to one of the versions regarding this contest:
namely, that Arunachalam had heen approached as a possible candidate
hut refused, expecting to he asked again and reacting unfavourably
when James Pieris was put forv/ard. Mr. Hulugalle v/as quite adamant
that this version was incorrect. He said that the Senanayake
brothers and others were behind Sir James Pieris. The battle was
for the prestige of the Colombo seat. Many of the Congress leaders
had been opposed to a special seat in the Western Province for the
Tamils. (in effect, Mr. Hulugalle was implying that the policy of
some of the Sinhalese leaders contributed to the split; but equally
clearly, he felt the Tamils also contributed.) Ramanathan had
always been against territorial representation and political
democracy and had once said that "the counting of heads results in
the freedom of the wild ass". At this particular point in our
history, Ramanathan was taking a leading part "behind the scenes".
An outcome of the contest for the Colombo seat v;as the formation of
the Tamil Mahapana Sabha in 1921. This had been formed by
Ramanathan and Arunachalam.^ They ssnt two memorials to H.M's
Government.
I inquired whd:her Manning had encouraged these divisions by
encouraging the Tamils. He said tha-t Arunachalam did not mix with
Manning but Ramanathan "worked with" Manning. Manning was "not a
political animal", he thought. He was not interested in the inter
necine quarrels but v/anted a viable Constitution. His idea v/as to
hold the balance between the communities. He was "a decent fellow"
and was fairly popular by the time he left Ceylon. Of course, in
these days all the Governors, excepting, perha.ps, Caldecott, had
to indulge in some "horse-trading". Even of Caldecott, it was said
that he had had deals. Hulugalle knows that Jennings did not think
highly of him.
I inquired whether C.H.2. Pernando had been put up to contest
C.E. Gorea and E.T. De Silva in the Chilaw area in 1924 because
1. James T. Rutnam, in his interview, insisted that Arunachalam
had little to do in originating it, and that it was the Jaffna
crowd of t^anagasabai, Puraiswamy, etc. who were behind it. The
reader will see, therefore, that this is a controversial
subject and that a lot is obscure and iincertain.
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the anti-Tamil Sinhalese group felt that Corea and De Silva v/ere
cooperating too much with the Tamils and had sold away some of the
Sinhalese rights. He did not think this was correct. It v/as
"nothing political". It v/as merely a case of "trying to snatch
a seat". The caste issue arose "because there were ICarawa Christians
in that area and C.H.2. v/as one; he was also pretty a"ble.
On my inquiries, he said that with the 1924 reforms, power
shifted from the Executive Council to the finance Committee of the
Legislative Coimcil. The system was alright with a strong Colonial
Secretary "but not good under a weak one. Fletcher was' "a nice
chap and gentle", hut "weak". I inquired whether Fletcher & Co.
were trying to v/urk a difficult Constitution hy compromise and
were perhaps seeking popularity. He merely said that Fletcher and
the others prohahly saw signs of the times.
Of Thomson, he said: "not had; on the whole, good;" "his first
innings was good". Of dementi: people like D.S. Senanayake liked
and respected him. "On the v/hole a very successful public servant"
for he had won kudos in other colonies as well. Clifford: v/as
"quite liberal" as Governor; "very eccentric"; started Ceylon on
"this agricultural business". Stanley: v/as "shrev/d", "Jewish";
"He was a good type of Jew, not arrogant", but "humanistic". In
reply to my inquiry whether Stanley v/as genuinely sympathetic
tov/ards the aspirations of the Ceylonese, he said that he was.
There were always people (in Ceylon) who v/ere suspicious of
the Briton. Thus even when the British shov/ed sympathy and consi
deration it v/as "construed as cunning". There v/as, therefore,
"a ba.rrier" .
E.W. Perera could not shake off "the Victorian, Gladstonian
approach" to political affairs; he was not statesmanlike. He
implied that many of our politicians in the 1920's v/ere not far-
seeing. Only B.S. had sensed the economic and agricultural needs
of the country; to some extent I.Iarcus Fernando had^earlier on.
I made inquiries re British rule; v/hether it lacked purpose etc
He said that there was "no imagination". Their policy was "to let
sleeping dogs lie". They developed "a section of the economy" and
"made the country viable" .
I put some questions regarding the political attack on British
land policy and on the Land Settlement Department, pointing to the
suspicions that some of the politicians concerned were speculators
themselves. He said that "on the whole, the Land Settlement
Officers were honourable people". They worked on principles of
equity. He did not think there was "anything fundamentally immoral
about it". He did not think that the expansion of estates was a
bad thing. On my suggesting various politicians' names, he said
that Victor Corea "was not a man of any substance" and "carried
little v/eight as a politician". He did not shed any light as to
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whether he was a speculator hut seemed to thinlc he was a had hat.
Of his brother C.E. Corea he said that vhe (C.E.) was "much more
idealistic" than Victor. C. Batuwantudawe and Boyagoda (v/ho was
a Kegalla man) were men of no great importance. Batuwantudawe was
often hahkrupt. He became a I'Tinister from 1931-36 purely by chance
and v/as very lucky to be one. Boyagoda indulged in a lot of
litigation. Meedeniya Adigar, Vanderpooten, E.l. Goonewardena,
Ruxton and Berry were chaps who used "to buy and sell" land,
especially relating to temples and pla^ntation companies, fhere was
a real "free-for-all" in this sphere.
E.B. Alexander was a good G.A., not particularly brilliant but•
a good type. "I liked Alexander". Ereeman led a simple, austere
life. Hellings was "a bit of a sahib". Eraser was "able up to a
point". In response to a further query, he agreed that Eraser
was rather of the old school. E.J. Smith was "the strong, silent
tj^e", Denham was "able". So too was Woods. Woods often fought
the home authorities for the colonial point of view. He got on
well with D.S. Wait was "a nice honourable fellow". Hewnham was
"very clever, very quick and rather cynical". Yoimg was "a clever
fellow". Tyrrell was a typical G.A.; average ability. Huch the
same could be said of Collins. Both of them were good provincial
officers. Maybin was "particularly able". Brayne "probably was
more sympathetic than some of these chaps". He got into trouble
sometimes over his schemes; for example, he started cooperative
credit banks which were not viable. Reid "got a lot of things done"
and was the best Chairman of the Colombo Municipal Coimcil in the
twentieth century. Some of the Civil Servants were very good at
"jobs of work" but when it came to politicians they ran into trouble.
The Donoughmore Constitution was"an interesting device"; it
was doubtful if it v/as given a fair chance. He agreed that the
Ceylonese political opposition to this Constitution v/as due to a
blind attachment to the Westminster model. There was a tendency to
pick holes. The Constitution had had aspects. There was a great
deal of interference in appointments and in matters relating to
tenders. The Executive Committees could sometimes be bribed; i.e.
not all were bribed. But a few who held the balance of the vote
could be. I questioned him closely on the position of the Officers-
of-State and the extent of friction between them and the politicians
tmt got very little information of value. He said that the existence
of these three posts annoyed the Ceylonese. Regarding personnel,
lie agreed that Tyrrell was rigid and without imagination.
I asked him whether B.S* and his associates sought to reduce
the political position of E.W. Perera because he was a potential
challenger to the future post of Prime Minister; and had v/orked
for liis defeat in 1936 and 1943. He did not think E.W. was such
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a threat to D.S.; he "did not have it in him"; he was a good
student and a good writer hut did not carry the guns necessary to
take on the leadership. He was "not a constructive force of any
kind". He should, however, have heen a Minister. 'The first
Ministries were "a gamble". There was no reason for Batuwantudawe
or Periya Sundaram to he Ministers. C.W.W. Kannangara v/as a
"great pal" of E.W. Perera's hut "hroke away" from him and became
a Minister working with B.S. and crowd.
In reply to my queries, he agreed that D.S. Senanayake had a
body of trusted lieutenants whom he consulted on agrarian and other
matters. Among the older set of Civil Servants, these v/ere P. Sara-
vanamuttu, G.L,. Y/ickremasinghe, H.E.Jansz(?) and I.E. Hunter.
"Poulier"? I asked. He did not think Poulier was consulted all
that much. Among the younger set, A.G. Ranasinha, Richard Aluwihare
and L.J. de S. Seneviratne were part of his caucus (this is a word
I used). B.S. was not a very articulate writer or speaker. He got
others to write for him. Jennings used to write a lot of his
speeches, etc. As Director of Infonuation, Hulugalle himself wrote
some. The fact that he v^as not a good reader made him a good thinker.
He "had a profound instinct for the right thing".
O.E. G-oonetilleke v/as D.S's "handyman". I inquired whether O.E.
had worked it so that he got the job of Civil Defence Commissioner
whereas C.lj. Wickremasinghe was more obviously in line for it.
Mr, Hulugalle did not think so. I think he said that O.E.G. was
one of D.S's friends and lieutenants from early days. (If he did
not, someone else did; in any event I have subsequently ascertained
that this was so.) Mr. Hulugalle added that C.L. v/as a man of
integrity with no eye for the main chance. He would balance matters.
O.E.G. acted and hanged the consequences. He was the more obvious
choice for this wartime job.
I inquired about D.R. Wijewardena's role and influence. He said
that D.R. and D.S. had been friends for a long time. D.S. and
Company went to him to get publicity. I questioned him on how
Jennings gijfc hauled into the team. He v/as not certain but added
that D.R. may have brought them together as he was interested in
University College and v/ould have knov/n Jennings. Jennings put
into v/ords v/hat D.S. was groping for.
I asked him what he thought of S.VM R.D. Bandaranaike. He
said: "an ambitious politician, fairly well-equipped". "Was he an
opportunist?" I asked. "On the whole, yes" v/as the reply. Regard
ing his defection in 1951 I pointed out that Banda had been promised
the succession to the Premiership but found himself being edged out.
He did not think that Banda had been promised the succession in so
many words. He was the Leader of the House. In the normal course
of events he would have been P.M., "if patient, if loyal" - implying
that he had not been so. Sir John may have provoked him but all be
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had to do was stick it out, he implied. Banda v/as "intellectually-
very superior" to the others and "sho?;ed it". The Obeyesekere
family were always arrogant. Even at St. Thomas where Hulugalle
had been at school in Banda's time, young Banda v/as inclined to be
clever and to belittle. "Did he have a touch of megalomania?" I
inquired. "Yes, very much" was the reply. He added that he must
have had an inferiority complex at Oxford. I said "bhat many
European Civil Servants felt that he ha.d a chip on his shoulder
against Europeans. He thought so too. I inquired hov/ Banda was as
an administrator. He said: "lazy-" , and implied that he was a bad
one and rather impractical. He added that as Minister of local
Govt. he had also had a very lazy man as Permanent Secretary,
namely E.W. Ksnnangara. As a lainister he had tried to build up
Village Committees but this vras with an eye to electoral purposes
(i.e. to extend his personal influence).
Comments on Interview with Mr. H.S.M.Hoare, 29«12.1965
He was hardly restrained by the tape. A candid man. He set afterwards that he
pulled his punches a little - this was in connection with comments and appraisals of
individuals and it was only natural that he did so and did not reveal the more
outrageous stories.
Mr.Hoare is now 6l years old - still hale and hearty and quite with it - .
Indeed he teaches Latin etc. at a preparatory school.
Mr. Hoare the man, I think, would not be the sort who would kill himself working
i.e. not noticeably conscientious; indeed, several of his answers reveal that he was
inclined to think an idyllic life the thing to be sort after. A somewhat flippant
attitude to life and affairs. Genial. Some bonhomie. Fond of wisecracks and backchat.
I foTind it easy to be at ease with him; thou^ some of the trivialities and
anecdotes might possibly get one down in time.
A classicist, he has (and had) some snobbishness and elitist feeling , but he is
quite conscious of this fact. If in Ceylon one generation earlier he might, perhaps,
have been very like Stubbs in his attitude to political questions; but temperamentally
he was not like Stubbs in his attitude to routine work and administrative matters.
Deliberately against the died-in-the -wool, tradition-bound practices; he was fond of
short cuts and inclined to cut across red-tape. In this sense he would have been an
initiator but one wonders how far his inclination to 'laziness' might have worked
against initiating tough new tasks.
The above description must not be held to reveal lack of depth in his thinking.
I would hesitate to give an opinion either way on this point .A good brain and quite
practical once he got down to it, I should have thought. A shrewd judge of men I
should think: certainly not easy to please him here. On political matters his
reference to Bracegirdle as a 'Bolshie' and his tendency to think the Donoughmore
Constitution 'premature'(??) indicate a degree of the conservatism so typical of the
British and of the C.C.S. in particular.
Since Mr. Hoare did not serve extensively in the provinces and since his
Colombo posts were largely in the Customs or during wartime, the range of questions
I had was limited. Therefore, and given his candidness, 1 tended to concentrate on th




Conmients on Interview with Mr. P.J. Hudson, G.B.E. , M.G.,
15 January, 1966.
Son of an I.G.S. man and partly "brou^t up in India, Mr. Hudson
was somewhat worried by the fact that his views were going on record;
he wanted an arrangement whereby any leading questions could be put
when the recorder was not on, while at the end of the interview he
asked me to regard the inteiwiew as confidential. Thus it is clear
that he would be very guarded. At the same time he stated that his
memories were very hazy. This was, in fact, so on some points.
I would say quite certainly - and I believe he revealed this
clearly himself - that he was not a politically-minded officer.
Indeed his views were extremely short-sighted in this field and his
impression of the average Ceylonese politician, whatever their
faults, was a fantastic and wholly incorrect caricature and reveals
profound ignorance cum prejudice. On general administrative problems
his outlook cannot be regarded as particularly enterprising, or his
interests regarded as wide. Thou^ he was far from being a fool,
I should think he moved in the normal grooves. I also suspect that
he had a pronounced tendency to follow the path of least resistance.
Prom the interviewing point of view I found him discursive and
prolix; what was worse, he was infuriatingly slow in his speech and
sometimes drove me (impatient fellow that I am) to distraction. As
a result, I was only able to cover two areas; Administrative and
Land Settlement, during 1 hour 40 minutes on the spool, and both
only partially. I had intended concentrating on Land Settlement in
any event during this interview because of his long experience in
this field, but I was rather annoyed with myself for not having got
onto the subject from the word go, because there was much more I
could have raised in this sphere as well as in regard to the working
of the system of indefeasible leasehold.
Given his guardedness the failure to cover such aspects as
Ceylonisation, British arrogance, the Donoughmore Constitution and
constitutional questions was no great loss, thou^ I am sure that
he would have had something to say on the Gansabhas, the Headman
system and the Cooperative and Rural Marketing movements. i would
probably have refrained from asking for his views on individual
Governors, Civil Servants and politicians, in any event.
Despite all these drawbacks I feel this was a useful interview
simply because Land Settlement is an important subject and his
evidence in this field was useful,though far short of Prank Leach'
contribution in vividity, depth or volume.
M.W. Roberts
0$ 15.1.66
Ansv/ers provided "by Colonel Charles Jeffries to Questions
forwarded "by M.W. Roberts, 23 Jime 1967.
Extract from letter
Tliank you for your letter of the 2 6th May. I am honoured
by your request for help, and will gladly meet it as far as I
can, though I am afraid that may not he very far. My memory
of 20 years ago is not at all comprehensive and I have no
documents to v/hich I can refer. You will also understand that
I did not deal with Ceylon affairs in the Colonial Office until
1946 and I v/as not a party to the discussions which took place
v/ith Mr. Senanayake before that date.
Before trying to deal with your questions seriatim I
should make .a general obseivation, which arises out of your
final question, and is referred to on page 102 of my book.
So far as the Colonial Office was concerned, events in India
had very little bearing on the matter. India was not a Colony
and her relations with the U.K. were dealt with by a different
departiaent and on quite different lines from the relations of
colonies. Prom the Colonial Office point of view Ceylon co"uld
have continued as a colony just as easily and naturally after
the grant of Dominion status to India as before. Of course
people in Ceylon did not see it that way, but that was the
actual position. Ceylon was not follov^ing a precedent set by
India, but creating a precedent to be folbwed by other colonial
territories. The U.K.attitude cannot be fully appreciated
unless this basic fact is grasped.
Now for the questions, some of which, in the light of the
above, will not need very long ansv/ers.
1. Did the fact that India had already (before the end of World
War 11) been promised dominion status bear appreciably on
the decision of the Soulbury Commission to suggest measures
which went a long way towards full responsible government
in Ceylon (with a view tov/ards eventual dominion status
through the growth of conventions)? i.e. was it felt that




2. With respect to India, nevertheless, isn't it true that the
promise of dominion status did not mean immediate independence
in post war years and the eventual transfer (1947?) on Earl
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MouTLfbatten's advice was much earlier than anticipated?
Answer:
I don't know enou^ ahout the Indian question to he ahle
to answer.
3. When Mr. D.S. Senanayake was in London in July(?) - August
1945 and it was clear that he would request an immediate
grant of dominion status, didn't Viscount Hall and his
aides initially state their willingness - possibly verbally -
to support this request? but eventually, and with some
regret, say that this v/as not possible?
Answer:
I don't know.
4. (a) Wasn't this decision [3 above] the result of a Cabinet
discussion?
(b) and largely on the grounds that the future of India
( in the sense of the timing of the steps towards
dominion status) had to be decided on fiisb?
Ansv/er:
(a) Probably.
(b) Yes, to the extent that India v/as a separate and
immediate issue and the question of independence for
any colonial territories was not likely to be taken
up xmtil India was out of the way.
5. Y/ould it be correct to say that the fact that it was a new
government which was handling the issue also contributed to
this cautious decision in the sense that the Labour Govern
ment needed time to familiarise itself v/ith the problem
and did not want to rush matters (having to consider the
possibility of domestic criticism that they v/ere presiding
over an unduly hasty dismemberment of the Empire)? Could
one go further and argue that a Conservative Government
might have granted such a request in that their ministers
would have been familiar with the history of the Ceylon oase?
Answer:
Y/hile the Labour government, being new, naturally needed
time to consider, I have no reason whatever to suppose
that a Conservative government v/ould have acceded more
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promptly to Ceylon's request. On the whole, the labour
Party was probably more favourable, ideologically, to
independence for colonies than the Conservatives had
been up to that time.
6. Referring to these policy decisions of 1945-46 in "Ceylon
the Path to Independence" (p. 110 lines 34-40)^ you seem to
imply that representations v/ere made (I do not mean to
imply these v/ere improper) by interests in Britain that it
v/as v/ise to hang on to Ceylon as long as possible in view
of the departure from India, I have noted your conjectural
form of "may have"; but would I be free to take it that in
your position in the C.O. you would have seen (or heard)
of any representations to this effect? (b) Again, it would
follow that one of these "sections of British opinion" you
refer to would be that of the navy, in view of Ceylon's
strategic position.
Answer:
I don't remember any specific representations. Obviously
the point of view which I have indicated v/as one of those
which had to be taken into accoimt.
7. Pollowing from 5 above, could it be argued that one factor
contributing to the decision of the Labour Government to
say "Yes" to Senanayake's repeated request in 1947 was
partly due to the fact that they v/ere now familiar with the
issue?
Answer:
Partly, no doubt, but I would not attach great importance
to this.
8. Would it be correct to say that Mr. Creech-Jones was more
decisive anu persuasive (especially vis-a-vis the Cabinet)
than Viscount Hall? Indeed, I came to this conclusion when
reading betv/een the lines of "Ceylon The Path to Independence",
but am, of course, not quite certain about this.
Answer:
I don't know how Creech Jones and Hall compared in their
persuasiveness in Cabinet, But Creech Jones was, of course
an expert in colonial affairs and personally dedicated to
a liberal policy.
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9. I know that (Sir) Oliver and D.S.S. used the argument: "What
hasn't Ceylon done that India and Buma has?" (your hook:
p. 114 also implies this) in 1947- Didn't they employ it
in late 1945 - early 1946 as well?
Ansv/er:
Very likely, hut I have no imformation ahout that.
10. (a) Did the state of anarchy in India (no douht largely
communal hut containing anti-British nationalism) influence
the British G-ovemment's decision to grant dominion status
to Ceylon in that it v/as felt that cautiousness re Ceylon
would only exarcehate feelings and cause disruption?
(h) To which view the Leftist-oriented strikes of 1946-47
in Colombo added fuel? (c) Indeed, how far is it correct
to say that D.S.S. and (Sir) Oliver argued that the British
Government should let them deal v/ith this threa,t and even
reduce it (the agitation) hy diverting Ceylonose opinion
to the fact of complete Independence (v/ith its celebrations
and all that)?
Answer:
None of this was particularly relevant, so far as I know.
11. In Ceylon, today, it is commonly believed that Ceylon
received her independence in 1948 because it was the logical
outcome of the transfer of authority in Indis and a colonial
Ceylon was meaningless without British domination of India.
Any comments?
Answer:
See above. So far as I and my colleagues were concerned,
we looked foiv/ard to the achievement of independence by
our colonial territories and found it natural that Ceylon,
the "premier Colony" should be first in the field. We
should have liked to have had the opportunity to carry
the economic and social development of the country a
little further before handing over responsibility, but
we accepted the fact that nationalist sentiment in Ceylon
was too strong to admit of this.
Comtnents on Interview with. Mr. H.C. Ein^, 8 January 1966.
Mr. King was quite fit and mentally awake. He olDviously wished
to he rather careful for he had not wanted a recorded interview. I
found him a very pleasant man and very homely. But the interview
itself was hardly of real value. Much of what can he said in this
regard is in my summary of this interview. On the whole his information
was vague and/or irrelevant, if not non-existent.
On the whole too, he had a mixed collection of views. He can he
considered somewhat radical in his outlook on the missionary schools,
his point that the tendency to look askance at the hrihery among
Ceylonese subordinates was a European viewpoint, etc. On the other
hand, one got the impression of conservatism and orthodoxy on many
other points.
It should he added that he admitted thatmany of the points he is
making were the views of a man looking hack and were very far from his
thoughts when a young Conservator of Forests in Ceylon in the 1920's -
hence his title "Hindsight on Ceylon".
M.W. Roberts
10.1.66
Hindsi^t on Ceylon 1921-1934-
a paper written lay Mr. H.C. King in January 1966.
Hu^ Christopher King h. 8 June 1899
B.A. Oxen
1920 -1932(?) Forest Department, Ceylon
largely as an Assistant Conservator
of Forests.
Suhsegunntly seized in Mauritius and Sierra
leone.
My main impression of Ceylon in that epoch was of an administration
tolerant, aloof, and modestly progressive. While the administrators
were v:ell endowed intellectually and ready to apply their classics,
Law and history to the languages and customs of the natives, they were
not equipped to promote agriculture, external trade, mineral develop
ment, or manufacture in any form; for this reason it was perhaps wise
that they should not have the direct control of the technical officers
though this would have "been a logical pa-ttem. A good deal of wasted
effort, and of resentment on the part of the Ceylonese, could have been
avoided if administrative and technical officers had been required to
study a condensed syllabus to cover the ethnology, religion, climate
and trade of the territories they were to control. Much could have
been done in a 4-6 months course, though suitable textbooks were few.
If there was friction betv/een the Visitors and the Home team it could
have been reduced if communication had been better and if a Scottish
immigrant had been trained to compare the somewhat bloodthirsty history
of Kandyan feudal past with some of the more murky tales of Highland
glens in the eighteenth century. This failure to communicate, the slow
exchange of East West prejudices, left the land-owning classes rather
isolated on their estates, unwilling to share in commerce or rural
development. Indirect rule had the advantage of cheapness and con
venience, the glamour of the Chief Headmans ancestry was tarnished by
the drab succession of mainly unpaid local administrative duties,
settlement, bridle paths, and rest houses. The hierarchy of two oj.
three grades of minor headmen was used to apply modem ideas of p^Q^
vincial control and while there were delays and cases of injustice
there was a widespread conviction the^t if the underdog could bring hig
complaiute to the G.A. he did eventually get redress.
Ceylon emerged into independence far better equipped for the f -4^
than most other territories, but the large surplus funds were auickl
dispersed by politicians in no way qualified to handle them. Second
education had reached an acceptable level and had been relatively
widespread, but the exceptional abilities of the elite had been synb
off into law and medicine. The Ceylon Budget had always been bala
over a number of years and without vrhoBy antagonising foreign capita^^ '^
y
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it would have "been possible to finance a wider extension of higher
education especially in technology. I believe that even now there is
no medical school attached to the University. Too much reliance was
laid on Christian missions to found and maintain schools of every
grade and it is interesting to speculate whether this led to a too
limited curriculum, and to a reluctance on the part of non Christian
parents to cooperate. It is perhaps more true of Ceylon than in some
other co-untries that talent remained often unrecognised; one could find
a Tamil teamaker on an estate paid 80 rupees a month talking Sinhalese
Tamil and English, keep accounts of some complexity, and playing a
part in factory management.
British administration left the immigrant Tamil community in an
anomalous condition which has deteriorated. Before the emergence of
political Buddhism and the rancour of the dispute about the Tamil lan
guage, it was not foreseen, in fact it would never have been believed,
that Tamil estate labourers resident for three generations could be
classed as "stateless persons" v/ith no right to vote or to elect their
own representative. Mr. Eotelawela's book gives a selection of facts
well calculated to obscure the issue. If assimilation is too slow or
indeed negligible, one can only speculate whether part at least of the
tea estate labour force could not have been settled on the land and
given a peimanent stake in the country. It would have been a difficult
glow, and costly and politically unpopular programme but it is con
ceivable that say of some estates, or a tract of irrigable land in
the Eastern province mi^t have been developed as a settlement for a
Tamil nucleus. The psychological effect of this gesture would be con
siderable but it would be hard to find qualified leaders for the
community; the wealthy Rettiar labour boss had no reputation (30 years
ago) as a philanthropic disseminator of new ideas. It is not strange
that Sinhalese show little aptitude for working through the monsoon on
tea estates at high altitudes, protected only by a blanket from driving
mist and rain; the patemalistic rule of European planters ensured
solid quarters, rice at fair rates, medical care, and a smattering of
primary education but no vestige of a permanent stake in the industry
Personal recollections, carefully censored, are mixed. Visual
impressions of Kandy lake at night, the wild bare hills of Walapane are
unforgetable and so is the view from Hputale. Journeys off the main
roads left vivid pictures of pale green paddy, white dagobas, mango
cocoanuts and banana, and in this setting a junior official would be
hospitably entertained hov/ever unwelcome might be the object of bis
visit. I remember no less a host of Government employees poorly paid
seldom well housed, often overloaded with permits and ^sstrictions *
which almost defied fulfilment. It was of course the I'scognised 0 w.
of indigenous rule that an official of any grade except the higbesb
should be rewarded in cash or kind by the petitioner, but it was
perhaps too readily assumed by overseas staff that intelligeut and
- 3 -
trained sulDordinates were incapalDle of disinterested service. In
1933(?)5 or 6 of the "best Forest Rangers were sent to Coimhatore for
training, gained satisfactory reports and proved useful exponents of
the art.
Information provided hy Mr. H.C. King during an imrecorded interview,
8 Januray 1966.
Mr, King had not agreed to a tape-recorder hut had the kindness
to ?/rite out and type some of his views on affairs in Ceylon and these
I read before the interview. In addition there v/ere some questions I
had sent beforehand at his request on which he had scrawled a fev/ notes.
With regard to a point implied in the first para of his typescript
he agreed that the European Civil Servants were rather aloof from the
people. As far as I remember, he did not give a cogent answer to my
query whether this degenerated into arrogance at times.
His reference to the lack of practical bent among the C.C.S. proper
and the need for training of this sort seems to lie side by side with
the view that the technical officers in each district should be under
the G.A. and not directly "under the heads of their departments. I am
afx^id I failed to question him as to its practicality.
I am afraid that I cannot recall many of the points discussed
during the interview - an interview which follov/ed that with Mr. lucette
However the general impression I have is of a rather amorphous and im^
precise collection of "views. This is even reflected in his notes on
my questions which I table now for the sake of its information.
The first four questions asked for the aims, and problems of and
obstacles faced by the Forest Department. He said he could not give a
detailed answer on these questions. This is a surprising answer from
a Conservator of Forests even if we give allowance for subsequent
service in Sierra Leone and Mauritius. F"urther questioning brought
little more explanation than that there was need to protect the forests
and the timber which was useful for domestic purposes as well as
commercial value. Even the written query about comparison between
policy and problems in Ceylon on the one hand and Sierra Leone on the
other hand brought little beyond the view that there was no comparison
Questions 6,7, and 8 had been as follows:
6. Govt. policy regards chenaing in the N.C.P. has been s^^-erely
criticised for being harsh and unimaginative - e.g. Freeman
and Woolf. (a) Is it not correct to say that it was largely
a sea of old chena and contained very little timber? ("b^
existing timber was of little commercial value? (e) any
commehts on the criticism?
7. What sort of man was Freeman?
8. I quote from Dr. E.R. Leach's socio-anthropological study of
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"Pul Eliya" (1961, Camb.) for comment
... it is still the case that large sections of the total
map area are officially treated as reserved forest and
controlled by the Govt. Eorest Dept. It is impossible for
any villager to*fell any useful type of timbpT' t-ppp. without
©"ither infringing a government regulation or spending
futile v/eeks in endeavours to obtain a felling licence.
If any villager is seen to be putting up a new building
of any kin^ it is almost certain that he has committed some
technical offence to obtain the timber. I need not go into
details. It will suffice to say that the forest regulations
are a constant source of grievance to the villager and a
standing source of illicit income to the Eorest Rangers.
The passing of anonymous reports to the Eorest Office is a
widely practised form of spiteful behaviour between near
neighbours.
His answer v,ras:
6,7,8 A problem which defied cheap or easy solution, compounded of
(l) need for protection (2) demand for produce (3) low
salaries of controlling staff.
* I am much surprised there was any left in 1961.
Similarly he was singularly unforthcoming on the question of
chenaing in the Dry Zone. To the question "Was there ever any danger
of the Dry Zone forests becoming a dust bov/1 as a result of chenaing?" ,
he said, "No - lantana"; i.e there arose a gIc^vbh of lantana which pre
vented that. Dust bowls arose in some other parts of the v/orld but
could not be an outcome of shiftingcultivation in Ceylon. I cannot
recall some of his answers to further queries on the chena Tfuestion
except that it was very indefinite and useless. Indeed, I think his
inclination was to refer me to the short note he had jotted down, which
has been reproduced above.
Questions on the headman system did not elicit much, but, here,
I am afraid my memory is weak. I think he felt that the system was
not too bad though the headmen had a great deal piled on their shoulders,
He thought that the education imparted by the missionary schools
was not aligned to the needs of the country.
He v/as not willing to express views on relations between the C.C.S.
and olher public servants, nor, I think, to say much on personnel.
He had a hi^ regard for D.S. Senanayake but thou^t that his un—
reasone.bleness on some matters had meant the loss of several good men
- like Cameron, the vet, and Wilson and Kennedy of the Irrigation Depart
ment.
To the question "Any second hand knowledge of the work of the
Survey Dept.? Any criticisms" he had written: "Most efficient".
To the question "Did British rule (i.e. pre 1931) lack purpose
and drive? Was efficiency sought as an end in itself?" he wrote "see
my para (1)" - another example of a largely irrelevant answer; indeed
he seems to have missed the point here.
Lucette, he considered, a man of "real humilitj''"and ability.
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Haybin "an excellent officer".
Wodeman, whom lie did not like,
pompous.
He considered Hewnham far ahler than
I think he agreed that Y/odeman was
M.YY. Roberts
10.1.66
Mr. J. Kitchin^'s Answers to Questions forwarded by M.Y/. Ro"berts,
January and Pebruary 1966.
Jolm Kitching, M.B.E. b. 30 July 1900
B. So. Edinburgh
1929 - 1947(?) Irrigation Dept., Ceylon
Subsequently served in Nigeria
1. What v/ere the chief aims of the Irrigation Department in the
1930's and 1940's?
Answer:
During the 1930's and 1940's the main objective of the I±rigation
Department was maximum increase of the land available for
peasant farming. To attain this objective the work undertaken
involved the construction or development of various types of
scheme; including storage dams in the dry zone, barrages on
perennial streams, flood protection works in river valleys, land
drainage projects, and projects for the exclusion of salt water
in coastal areas. In all cases the basic problem was the same;
potential farm land existed but could not be cultivated either
because of prolonged periods of drought, or on account of river
flooding, or because of waterlogged soil.
2. How do the problems and aims in Ceylon compare with those in
Nigeria?
Answer:
In Ceylon, irrigation from storage reservoirs has been practised
for maybe a thousand years. Flood protection, with or without
drainage, dates back at least to the time of the Dutch. In
comparison the whole thing in Nigeria is new. There thus exists
no basis for comparison between the two countries; and when I
went to Nigeria in 1949 the primary objective was to set up an
organisation capable of getting results.
3. What were the obstacles faced in implementing policy? Were there
similar obstacles in Nigeria?
Answer:
Apathy on the part of peasant cultivators proved an obstacle to
progress in Ceylon, and early experience indicated a similar
situation in Nigeria. Villagers would be apt to accept what was
offered to them free, but saw no reason why they themselves
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should make any effort: in particular, maintenance work on dams
or channels was avoided almost as a matter of course. There
were however exceptions to this attitude.
4. Can you pinpoint any shortcomings in policy and in method as far
as the Irrigation Department's work in Ceylon was concerned.
Answer:
Ceylon irrigation policy was determined hy D.S. Senanayake in
consultation with the directorate of the Irrigation Department.
It is hypothetical now to conjecture whether their policy could
have heen "bettered. As regards method, mechanisation had been
introduced by the mid-1930's, but the outbreak of war put a
halt to it. ITot only were new machines then unobtainable, but
spare parts became so scarce that the available tractors etc.
often had to lie idle.
5. What sort of success did the Department have in fulfilling its
aims?
Answer:
It is difficult to find a yardstick for success. If at the time
a graph had been prepared indicating the increase year by year
of cultivable land due to work carried out by the Irrigation
Department, and taking into consideration the technical staff
available as also the cost; an opinion could have been formed.
But no such calculation was ever made as far as I am aware.
6. J-t would seem that in the late 1920's and early 30's the Iirigation
Department was rent by rivalries end that obstructionism prevailed
at the centre. Is this correct? If so, I would appreciate elabora
tion.
•7, How did you find D.S. Senanayake as a Minister? Did he have some
bees in his "bonnet? Was he difficult to get on with? Would i-t
correct to say that he drove some good men away?
Answer to 6 and 7:
D.S. Senanayake was undoubtedly the outstanding Minister of
1930's and 1940's. He was vitally interested in the Irrigatioj^
Department as being the main contributary [sic] factor to his
policy for a steady increase in peasant farming. He therefore
saw to it that there was no hold up caused by shortage of
and his expressed policy was that the amount of work "^-^dertaken '^
by the Department was to be limited only by the capacity of
available technical staff. Unfortunately he completely fa^g^^
to understand that the Department was not a machine whose
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component parts were replaceable. Under this misapprehension
he proceeded to force or accept the resignation of a number of
the most experienced members of the Department in order that he
himself should have complete control. During the period 1938 to
1940 in particular, the Director and Deputy Director were got
rid of; and the next two senior men resi^^ned. These top grade
technicians over a period of years had acquired a very great
knov^ledge of Ceylon conditions, and in effect were irreplaceable,
As regard recruitment to the Department, when I joined in
1929 there were not I think any qualified Ceylon engineers
available. Tjie policy vis-a-vis expatriate engineers at that
time appeared to be to sack 50?^ at the end of their three year
period of probation, in order to ensure a hi^ standard of per
formance. At a later date no such selectivity was possible.
In fact by the mid-1940's a search had to be made by the Ceylon
government for engineers in India, Canada, Italy, etc. to
replace the experienced men v/ho either had been driven away or
had retired in the normal course of age. At no time while I
was in Ceylon did the Irrigation Department appear to be attrac
tive to Ceylonese engineers: perhaps because the work often
involved a lonely life in malarial jungles.
D.S. Senanayake on the occasions I met him, I found to be
quite easy to get on with. As a IOO5J Ceylonese patriot however
I have little doubt that he regarded heads of departments of any
nationality and their staffs as being not so much human beings
with the ordinary rights of human beings, as bits of mechanism
he could throw away when he had done with them.
8. Did you feel that many of the new Ceylonese Ministries rushed
into various schemes of development without weiring the pros and
cons?
Answer:
The Ministers of the 1930's gave the impression of being very
much wrapped up in politics. At Provincial Agricultural meetings
I attended at which irrigation programmes were on the agenda;
those present, whether Ministers, State Councillors, or others
rarely discussed the merits of a project. The sole objective
seemed to be to grab projects for their particular constituency
or sphere of influence.
9. What did you think Of the competence and effectiveness of vel
vidanes in maintaining village tanks and irrigation channels?
10. Any comments on the village headman system, its usefulness and/or
shortcomings?
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Answer to 9 and 10:
Tlie effectiveness of vel vidanes and other village headman was
I think: already declining hy the start of the 1930's. These men
were usually appointed hy Government Agents, who became of
decreasing importance with the introduction of the Donoughmore
Constitution, As the authority of the Government Agent declined,
so did that of the village headman. In particular vel vidanes
would find it increasingly difficult to get peasants to do any
annual maintenance work on village dams or irrigation channels,
11, Did you find it difficult to establish a rapport v/ith the peasan
try? Were they responsive to your demands and to the regulations?
12, Did you feel or know if there was much agricultural indebtedness?
13, In the Up-country areas and the low-country rubber and coconut
areas was there a class of Ceylonese who could be called land
brokers? Did these men, Ceylonese planters and speculators, and
European planters and speculators tend to buy up village land
that was held on dubious title?
14, What do you think of the Brayne-inspired scheme of tenure - i.e.
indivisible leasehold? Do you think it was practicable?
Answer to 11,12,13 and 14:
The increasing demands made by D,S, Senanayake on the engineers
of the Irrigation Department necessarily involved a re-orienta
tion of policy. Throughout each year maximum effort had nov/ to
be put into the investigation, design and construction of pro
jects of one type or another. At the same time there had
occurred, as in other countries, much additional office work,
involving routine reports and returns of many descriptions, it
followed that something had to go by the board, and a casualty
was undoubtedly contact between the Irrigation Engineer and the
peasant farmer. There just was not time available, and any man
who attempted it would have found himself in the position that
whatever he was doing he ought to be doing something else, Jq
be effective then, in the 1930's and 1940's the Irrigation
Engineer had increasingly to concentrate on purely technical
work, while giving grudging attention to the ever increasing
office routine with which he was compelled to deal,
15, As D.I.E,, Land Development from 1943-46 what were your principal
tasks and how did they work out?
Ansv/er:
As D.I.E, Land Development, my task was to convert virgin jungle
into farmland at a target rate of 10 acres a day; at the same
time constructing colonists' houses at a rate of 60 a month.
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All materials for the houses had to he improvised in the jungle.
Por the jungle felling operation there were very few machines
available; and still fewer for uprooting stumps. 3hsome areas
hig trees averaged 70 an acre, so that the programme in effect
called for felling, burning and uprooting of up to 700 trees a
day, and subsequently preparing the cleared land for cultivation
at a rate of 10 acres a day.
Por the housing programme it vras possible to improvise
kilns for the production of somewhat inferior bricks, and also
lime kilns for the manufacture of mortar. But sawmills set up
in the jungle could not work satisfactorily because of the lack
of saws. Bails or screws were unobtainable, so that the roof
timbers of houses had to be bound together with coir rope. The
resultant colonist house was a brick bungalow with a cadjan
roof. It was necessarily a makeshift affair, but a considerable
improvement on B.S. Senanayake's original concept of a mud
edifice costing Rs. 300.
As far as I remember the maximum output attained in a month
was about 25^ of the target; and in retrospect I cannot imagine
how we did even that, for the target was linked more to wishful
thinking than to any sort of reality.
16. How would you appraise the different heads of Department under
whom you served?
Answer:
J.S. Kennedy was the one outstanding man. Before my time he
had originated the conception of a scientific approach to vttt
irrigation projects; and much of what I was able to do sub
sequently derived from his earlier work. Subsequently as Head
of the Department he set up in Colombo a hydraulic laboratory
for model experiments. He also propounded the basic ideas for
the Gal Oya project, a major scheme on the Walawe Ganga, and
other major projects through the Island.
I have no comment to make on the other Directors under
I served, except to remark that J.H. Wilson had little chanc ^
show what he could do before he too was manoeuvred out of
oixiQ0
within a year or so of succeeding Kennedy.
17. What are your impressions and opinions on the Ceylon Public Sei»y--
as a whole? ... and within it, on the C.C.S.?
Answer:
Latterly I found working in Ceylon quite unpleasant, ^
Nigeria proved agreable[sic]. Por example it was assumed
Nigeria that every man was doing his job to the best of b.ig
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alDility, and most men did in fact do so. By the late 1940* s
a quite usual mode of address in Ceylon seemed to he to call
for an individual's explanation why he had or had not followed
a certain course of action.
Prom the introduction of the Donoughmore Constitution on
wards, the C.C.S. undoubtedly suffered from diminishing authority,
and perhaps diminishing usefulness as a consequence.
18. How was liaison in the field "between Irrigation Officers and the
district officials (A.G.A's and G.A.'s, etc.) in your experience?
... generally?
19. Did you find that most G.A.'s and A.G.A.'s were impractical when
it came to agricultural matters?
Ansv/er to 18 and 19:
In my experience G.A.'s and A.G.A.'s were usually willing to
assist Irrigation personnel in any way they could. They appeared
to have no great knowledge of agricultural matters, and they did
not pretend to such knowledge.
20. Did you find that C.C.S. men tended to live up to the phrase
"heaven bom"; i.e., were they snobbish towards other Public
Servants even in your day?
Answer:
A few C.C.S. men gave the impression of regarding themselves as
heaven bom. But they were in the minority, and of this minor
ity some at least may have adopted a pompous attitude as a cloak
to cover shjmess,
A long standing government publication at that time referred
to "Gentlemen of the Civil Service and Officers of other Depart
ments" . This gave rise to the quip that Ceylon was the only
country in the world where it was impossible to be an officer
and a gentleman ... Other official publications of the same
type may well have given rise to the "heaven bom" legend.
21. Were you personally subject to criticism in Press or Council or
faced with political interference of an objectionable kind in
1930's? Do you know if other Public Servants suffered from such
criticism or interference? If so, was it resented?
Answer:
I personally was not subjected to criticism in Press or Council
and I cannot recall it having being experienced by any partic /
individual. But cases did occur.
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22. What did you thiiik: (then) and what do you think now of the rather
novel Constitution set up -under the Donoughnore recommendations,
particularly the grant of universal franchise?
Ansv/er:
By using hindsight, I have no douht that limited electoral
franchise rather than universal should have heen the hasis of
the Donoughmore Constitution. Also that in the first place the
Constitution should have "been introduced for a set period of
years, after v/hich the whole matter wo-uld come np for recon
sideration and if necessary amendment. The Constitution was
after all an innovation (sometimes I "believe referred to as
"The Ceylon Experiment"); and for an experiment to run for just
on twenty years without modification is s-urely excessive?
At the -time the Donoughmore Constitution was introduced I
had only recently arrived in Ceylon, and I had little idea what
it was all about.
23. Any comments on the Executive Committee system?
Answer:
No comment.
24. Did European Public Servants resent the State Council's refusal
to grant them passage allowances, etc.?
Answer:
At the start European Public Servants did resent the State Coun
cil atti-tude towards passage allowances. But they got used to
it when it went on year after year.
25. Can you recollect the Bracegirdle affair? Why was he deported?
Was he a serious threat to Government?
Answer:
The Bracegirdle affair rather gave the impression of being a
political stunt. I doubt if he ever was a serious threat to
anyone, but he was a godsend to the newspapers.
26. How would you appraise the following as men and Governors: Sii> g
Stanley, Sir G. Thomson, Sir R.E. Stubbs, Sir A. Caldecott,
Sir H.M. Moore?
Answer:
I met these Governors only on formal occasions. To the &•
ity of Public Servants of the 1930's and 1940's, Govemnrva^^^^ '^
Were
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not of great interest; in fact v/ere not held in any particular
regard.
27. ... and the following: Sir P.G-. Tyrrell, Sir ? Bourdillon, Sir M.M.
Wedderhum, Wilfred Woods, Sir S. Phillipson, Sir R. Drayton,
R.H. Bassett, C.V. Brayne, the two Balfoiirs, Ingledow, Be G-lanville,
R.M.M. Worsley, H.W. Codrington, Jones-Bateman.
Answer:
I recall Wedderhum as heing an able man, as also Basset[sic];
and Ingledow as heing pleasant to meet. Of the others I have no
particular recollection.
28. I would also appreciate your assessment of any politicians you saw
or 3mew sufficiently well to comment on.
Answer:
B.S. Senanayake. Jungle John, a hull of a man. It was said that
when opposed he would bellow, put dovm. his horns and charge.
Personally I liked him; and I believe he put up with me because
I got results, but considered me to be too independant.
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. At Provincial Agricultural meetings in
Colombo in the 1930's he would begin to speak softly, and finally
almost scream in order to persuade the meeting that all iriiga-
tion projects under consideration for the ensuing year should be
located in his constituency.
29. What is your opinion on the nature and tone of the Ceylonese-run
English language newspapers?
Answer:
It is a long time since I have seen any Ceylon newspapers.
30. Did the Irrigation Department suffer greatly from political medd
ling in appointments in the 1930's? I would appreciate some
elaboration and some examples if possible.
Answer:
In so far as the Directorate of the Irrigation Department ig
concerned, I have discussed political interference in paras g
and 7. As regards the appointment of new Irrigation Engingp
B.S. Senanayake decreed in the early 1930's that no further
j j_j ^ "hViP •np-nmanprt+: .expatriates would be appointed to the permanent
There were at that time five or six European Engineers on
bation. After very considerable wrangling and delay
pro.
of
them, including myself, vere eventually offered permanent
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appointment. The other three or four men then left Ceylon.
31. CoTild you comment on the nature and success of Senanayake's
colonisation schemes?^.." :"
Answer:
The colonisation schemes tended to he conceived in comfortahle
surroundings in Colombo, with rosy pictures of a cont6nded[sic]
peasantry leading a happy life in a smiling countryside. The
reality mi^t well prove to he very different, with families
uprooted from tovms living miserably in unaccustomed conditions;
appaled[sic] by the strenous[sic] efforts required to make
jungle land viable, and quite unable to face up to that prospect.
There was also undoubtedly underestimation both as to the
technical resources required to convert jungle into farm land on
a large scale, and also the cost of such an undertaking. But
the main factor to which insufficient consideration was given
was I believe the influence of the jungle itself. This affected
not only the colonists but the staff and the labour force of
the various government departments who were endevouring[ sic] to
get results. Malaria in many areas was rife. Bulldozers and
other necessary machines were scarce and breakdowns in the
1940's were frequent. Spare parts were in such short supply
that it was by no means -unknown for a project to have two thirds
of its inadequate machines out of action. At times the depart
mental personnel concerned must inevitably have felt that they
were fighting a losing battle, when they saw how fast the jungle
crept back over cleared land which newly arrived colonists had
not the heart to keep under control.
It should be stressed that underestimation of the resources
required for a successful battle with Nature was not confined to
Ceylon. Another example on a larger scale is the G-ro-und Huts
Scheme -undertaken during the latter part of the 1940' s in East
Africa. This project was abandoned after three or fcur years
when it was fo-und that the planned developement[sic] was not
feasible, because the entire available technical resources were
inadequate to keep the already cleared land from reverting to
hush.
32. I would also like your comments on any of the large-scale irriga
tion projects in your time with which you are familiar.
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Answer:
In an executive capacity I was concerned chiefly with village
irrigation projects, having designed and supervised the con
struction of some two hundred schemes. At that time the exist
ing Major Works (i.e. Government maintained projects) were
mostly of long standing, of the size range 1000 to 30,000 acres;
and offering little scope for la,rge scale expansion. One or
two Major Works were in process of development, hut progress had
heen held up hy the war. By the time I left Ceylon, construction
was in hand for several new schemes, and various new projects
were under discussion.
33. In what way co"uld land policy have heen better adapted to assist
the peasantry? ... and capitalists?
Answer:
Please see paras 11 to 14. Por the greater part of my service
my energies were devoted to technical work involved in the
investigation, design and construction of the various types of
water control projects en-umerated in para 1. Land policy did
not come within that orhit.
34. Lid the British judicial system conduce towards the prostitution
of justice and even he said to have hrou^t law rather than justice^
Answer:
You would need a computer and a jury of angels to settle that
question.
Replies to Purther Queries, 2 Pehruary 1966.
35. With reference to your answer to questions 6 and 7 would yo-^ tell
me what methods he used to get rid of Kennedy and Wilson. i
he was Minister hut presumably it was not possible for him to
sack them off-hand. Im I correct in inferring that "the next tw
senior men" who resigned at this stage, resigned because of
^hese
acts and the treatment they were receiving themselves?
As far as I know Kennedy was L.S's man in that D.s. had
hacked his appointment, etc. Also in extenuation of L.s«a
in getting rid of him, could it not he said that Kennedy hy +1^(1938) was far too alcoholic. Indeed another Civil Servant
that L.S. put up with him for so long simply because he was
outstanding that men tolerated a great deal from him. AIqq
adds that he heard that Kennedy "unloaded far too much on him''




tliat Kennedy was "let down "badly in the end".
Answer:
I was on leave in England when Kennedy was actually got rid of.
The accepted story when I returned to Ceylon was that D.S.S.
had made his life such a misery that he eventually appealed to
the Governor for assistance; and was told in reply,"If you
cannot get on with your Minister, you had "better resign".
Wilson was Kennedy's Deputy and stepped up as Acting
Director when Kennedy left. Within a year or so D.S.S. and
Wilson were at loggerheads. In a final clash, Wilson demanded
that D.S.S. should desist from giving orders to I.D. engineers
over his (Wilson's) head; while D.S.S. demanded a definite date
for Wilson to finalise a report on a scheme that had "been
suggested. A deadlock ensued. D.S.S. then sent for S.G. Taylor
v/ho was acting as Deputy of Irrigation, and offered him Wilson's
30"b. Taylor, a much junior man to Wilson, accepted with the
proviso that the appointment should "be immediate and su'bstantia-
tive. VfflLson thus found himself having to take orders from his
own su"bordinate, and had no alternative "but to resign. It was
an effective manouevre, "but not conducive to good relations
within the Irrigation Department.
The next two senior men in the I.D. saw the red light and
got out shortly after Kennedy's demise. As far as I am aware
it was a precautionary measure and not "because they themselves
had as yet got em"broiled.
Kennedy was I "believe D.S.S's appointee to the D.I's post.
After four or five years however Senanayake may have considered
he had nothing more to learn from Kennedy. In which case a less
strong personality might well suit D.S.S. "better; and his sub
sequent treatment of Wilson does rather suggest that he was
looking for a yes-man as D.I. Kennedy's alcoholism must have
been a factor in the situation, but whether it was much more
than a contributary lever to help get him out, I do not know.
I am a little puzzled by the suggestion that Kennedy "un
loaded too much on D.S.S."; unless it is that Kennedy had such
an active mind and so few interests outside of his work that he
could be exhausting to be with.
36. Obviously D.S. was responsible for the visionary targets set for
you and Govt. -under the land Development crash-programme in the
¥/ar Years. But were Dayton and the Secretariat also party to
these unrealistic hopes? I suspect that the demands of war were
such that they (D.S. and Dayton and Secretariat) were inclined to
have optimistic expectations simply because the need was great?
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Answer:
The war must have seemed to Senanayake an opportunity to push
ahead with his colonisation schemes, layton would hardly
question any scheme claiming at ministerial level to he aimed at
the production of more food; and who in the Secretariat would he
likely to point out that an attempt to create in various locali
ties small holdings each with a house on it was perhaps not the
hest way to hump up Ceylon's food supply rapidly?
37. I am certain that many Ceylonese did uot show an inclination to
take to an engineering life in the diihgles, hut I wonder whether
the previous British Administration oould not have done something
to fight this hy providing better salaries, etc. and forcing
(as far as possible) as high a status on engineers as on doctors
and lawyers?
Also in this connection, wasn't the education system far too
aligned to v^hite-collar work and inadequately technological?
Answer:
Increased salaries for Irrigation Engineers would I am afraid
have caused a great outcry from othe^. departments. Already the
I.D. had bigger annual increments, fj.ee housing and slightly
better pension terms. The avoidance uy Ceylonese engineers of
employment in the I.D. was after all quite sensible. To make a
comparison:— What qualified young Eriiishers would choose to
work in an isolated part of say Scotland in which malaria was
known to be rampant? The same argument applies to Ceylonese in
Ceylon. In both instances other oppQ^iunities would be sought.
(And please see P.S.) Education on more technological basis
would I am sure have been much pi'efenable, but for Ceylon to
have adopted such a policy in the l92o's would have put it a
quarter of a centirrry ahead of most other coimtries.
Engineers in general rather lost status vis-a-vis lawyers
and doctors in the latter half of the 19th century by failing
to restrict the use of the word "eng^Lneer" to professional men.
In consequence the term came to include such men as locomotive
drivers and even artisans working ip heavy industry.
I think it would have been quite extraordinary for Ceylon
in the 1920's to have adopted an attitude towards education and
professional status which differed materially from the rest of
the world. To do so would have requij^-eci an almost clairvoyant
pioneer, endowed with tremendous persuasiveness and with over
riding authority.
P.S. The availability of expatriates from the U.K. in the
1920-s for service in Ceylon jungles was due I think to
urge at that time to get out into the wilds (hush, junglean
pampas, etc.), right away from one's own country.
There was no shortage of jobs for young men at that
time, and no one had thought of the Depression which
hit the world ahout
Oomments on Interview with Mr. J.H.L, Lei^-Clare, M.C. ,
14 January, 1966.
A genial classicist JTr, Leigh-Clare was not greatly inhihited
hy the presence of a tape-recorder thou^ somewhat guarded on points.
His memory was not vivid on many points but he did his best to help.
I suspect that he was the hearty type of official who was not
politically-minded and rather blithely and casually saw to his daily
chores. Ability, average I should think. Indeed, from the fact
that he was never a G.A. and was removed from the Chairmanship of
the Port Commission by layton it would seem that even this was
questioned by some of his superiors. He was by no means a dim-wit
however. He had firm opinions on several points I raised which
could, perhaps, be classed as out of the ordinary (the Civil Servants'
"ordinary")- He was liberal enough to agree with criticisms to the
effect of aloofness and arrogance. His views on the question of
excluding Ceylonese from G.A. ships were coloured by the fact that he
was never a G.A. He was certainly willing to be critical of Govern
ment as well as individuals. How far all this was retrospective
and, in some instances, the consequence of mellowed views, I hesitate
to say.
On the questionable theory that an average man cannot be a




p.S. Among his unrecorded comments: He made the point that Sir John
Kotelawela "destroyed" the U.H.P. Also stated that Worsley
followed Sandys as A.G.A., Matara and had "to clean the Au
stables".
rMr« W.M. McNeill's Answers to Questions forwarded "by M.W.RoTjerts,
9 February- 1966.
T/illiam Martin McNeill, M.B.E.
"b. 9 Jan. 1900
M.A. Oxon.
1922? - 1938'"-'.' Forest Dept., Ceylon
1931 for a short period was Aide-de-Camp to the Acting Governor
1932-34 was on a scholarship in U.S.A.
Extracts from letter to M.W.Roberts, 9*2.66
I am sending you herev/ith some "brief answers to most of your
questions. Several of the questions are very searching and would
take a long time to answer fully. I have refrained from commenting
on personalities even thou^ they may now "be dead.
• • • •
Many of the events and happenings you refer to took place a good
many years ago. My general memory of my time in Ceylon is a tremend
ously happy one - especially my time in the jungle. The latter years
when politics played a larger part v/ere not so pleasant.
1. What were the chief aims and principles in Forest Conservation in
the 1920's? in the 1930's?
Answer:
The hest division of forest history into periods is that
followed hy E.G. Champion (Sessional Paper Vll - 1935) vi2;_
Prior to 1882. (ii) 1822-1900. (iii) 1900-1919 (iv) I920-
1932 (v) 1932-1935.
Period 1920-1932 dealt with "by P.M. lushington in his Report
(1921). Main aim to use existing Forest Reserves for purpose
of making Ceylon self sufficient regarding tim'ber ^requirements
Period 1932-1935. Main aim the revision of all Forest Reserva*
tion within the context of a larger Land Policy to achieve self
sufficiency in tim'ber "but with concentration on the esta"bligj^
ment of plantations.
2. Was there any change in either aim or emphasis in 1930-31/
Donoughmore Constitution and D.S. Senanayake?
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Answer:
See 1 above. More a change of emphasis than of aim. Forestry
to be considered along with other land use and consequent
revision of boundaries of B)rest Reserves and general pressure
in favour of more land for agriculture.
3. What were the chief obstacles faced in implementing these aims,
during the 1920's and 1930's, (a) in the Dry Zone? (b) in the
Wet Zone?
Answer:
In both Dry and Wet Zones chief obstacles:-
(a) Lack of complete fresh inventories, stock maps, etc.
(b) lack of cultural(?) knowledge.
(c) lack of specially qualified senior staff.
tn.Dry Zone special difficulties regarding chena cultivation.
In Wet Zone special difficulties regarding utilization of so
called 'inferior' tree species.
4. Did the problems and the needs in Ceylon have any analogy in any
coimtry with which you are familiar, first-hand or second-hand?
Answer:
Yes. Problems similar in all Tropical countries where shifting
cultivation, land hunger and reservation of Forest land by
Ordinance.
5. Was there ever any danger of the Dry Zone ending up as a dust-
bowl as a result of chenaing?
Answer:
Unrestricted chena inevitably results in gradual impoverishment
of the site and ultimate sterility. 'Dustbowl' conditions
ultimately possible but progress gradiial and dangers exaggerated
6. I quote from Dr.E.R. leach's socio-anthropological study of
"Pul Eliya, A Village in Ceylon" (1961, Camb.) for comment ;
i.e. I will like you to verify and otherwise comment on each
sentence and point re applicability in your time.
" ... it is still the case that large sections of the total map
area are officially tceabed as reserved forest and controlled hy
the Govt. Forest Dept. It is impossible for any villager to fei^
any useful type of timber tree without either infringing a
government regulation or spending futile weeks in endeavours to
obtain a felling licence.
If any villager is seen to be putting up a new build *
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any kind, it is almost certain that he has committefi some techni
cal offence to obtain the timber. I need not go into details.
It will suffice to say that the forest regulations are a constant
source of grievance to the villager and a standing source of
illicit income to the i'orest Rangers. The passing of anonymous
reports to the Rorest Office is a widely practised form of spite
ful behaviour between near neighbours."
Answer:
Extracts such as these are rarely entirely right or wrong. In
any country where there is a Forest Policy e.g. Gt. Britain,
there must be considerable areas 'reserved' for forestry where
activities by the 'natives' must be restricted. The inference
here is that the areas are excessively large. I do not think
so if the Policy is to be implemented. It is an exaggeration
to say that theft and decay are inevitable. The Ordinance pro
vides for 'Village Forests' to meet this need and there must
be much land from which local timber requirements can be legi
timately obtained. The best trees are most likely to be in the
Reserves and of course the temptation to steal is very great.
It follows that the second sentence is not untrue but it
suggests a bitterness which may be exaggerated. As a Forest
Officer I had to deal v/ith many cases of illicit felling. i
also had many decent honest Forest Rangers. I can believe that
things may not have improved since 1938 (when I retired from
the Forest Dept.).
7, How was the liaison in the field between Conservators and A.G a •
and G.A.'s in the field within yo\zr personal experience as wen
as
generally in your time?
Answer:
This naturally varied with individuals. Liaison was generali
good, mostly very good. ^
8. Did you feel that the Civil Servants tended to be rather snooty
both socially and administratively?
Answer:
No - this has been absurdly exaggerated, usually by other
British residents who were envious or ill educated. Most
Servants were exceedingly fair, reasonable and highly res
by the local people. ^®*^ted
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9. Did you feel that there was a lack of receptivity to new ideas
and a general ohstinictionism at central (Porest Dept.) head
quarters? and at the Secretariat during the 1920's?
Ansv/er:
I think one must admit that in the 1920's the attitude was
conservative and patriarchal but not hostile. The post war
(1914-18) civil servants including Porest Officers v/ere more
reasonable than the older generation and many new ideas
originated from them.
10. Did you consider that, in British times (i.e. pre 1931), there
was a lack of drive, purpose and imagination in the way Ceylon
was ruled? ?/as efficiency sought as an end in itself?
Answer:
Certainly not. Generally speaking the kind of man entering
Government Service was well-bred and v/ell educated. He was
broadminded, disinterested and had the good of the people at
heart. Efficiency was placed hi^ but not as an end in itself.
]_1. Could you assess the abilities of the different departmental
heads you served under?
Answer:
I could but I should prefer not to.
12. How would you appraise D.S. Senanayake?
Answer:
Probably genuinely sincere but obstinate, limited in his know
ledge, prejudiced and on occasion very unreasonable.
13. What sort of man was H.R. Ereeman? Would you comment on his
criticisms of Government's anti-chenaing regulations and other
aspects of Government administration in the N.C.P.?
Answer:
I always found Freeman a delightful, and charming man and a
completely dedicated civil servant thinking only of the local
villager in the N.C.P. I did not however agree with him about
chena.
14. What was yourreaction to the grant of universal franchise and
other measures taken on the Donoughmore Commission's advice^
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Answer:
Tliis is a very iDig question. Briefly, I regarded universal
franchise, etc. as too precipitate "but ultimately desirable,
15. Hid many public servants have misgivings? Hid many regard the
steps with some horror?
Answer:
Presumably this refers to the Honoughmore Report? Yes, most
with grave misgivings, few with horror.
16. Hid you personally suffer from any political criticism in Press
or newspaper? Or from any interference of an irritating sort?
Answer:
(a) No. (b) Yes. Senanayake interfered with internal Hepart-
mental administration including personalities. He hated
opposition.
17. Were any other Public Servants you knew subject to such criticism
or interference? If so, was it greatly resented?
Answer:
(a) Yes. (b) Yes.
18. How would you assess the following (since deceased) as men and
administrators: Sir H. Stanley, Sir G. Thomson, Sir P.G. Tyrrell
Sir R.E. Stubbs, Wilfred Woods, Sir M.M. Wedderbum, Sir A. Caldel
cott, H.W. Codrington, R.H. Bassett, E.B. Alexander, P. Huxham,
Sir R. Hrayton, W.K.H. Campbell, C.V. Brayne, Sir Bernard Bour-
dillon. Sir M. Pletcher.
Answer:
Some of these people I knev/ very well, some slightly and a few
not at all. I should prefer not to comment.
19. Can you recollect the Bracegirdle affair? ^/hat sort of chap was
Bracegirdle, as far as you know? Was he a serious threat in any
way?
Answer:
I quite forget the details but my impression is that Brace
was not a serious threat. ®
20. Have you any idea what the peasantry thought about the L.s.q
and his work in the 1920's? in'ireneral?
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Ansv/er:
I am quite sure that the ordinary villager considered the land
Settlement Officer as a fair unbiased and considerate ma-n
genuinely concerned about the welfare of the local population.
21. \7hat do you thinlc of Brayne' s scheme of indivisible leasehold?
Was it impracticable from the administrative point of view?
Answer:
I do not know enou^ about it to express a useful opinion.
Conmients on Interview with Mr. R.H.D. Manders, O.B.B. , 6 January 1966.
Having "been G.A. , Galle in the 1950's the Manders knew my
family well and could remember me, so the interview was characterised
by considerable freedom though the many leading questions might v/ell
have made him wonder what to say. Somewhat conscious of the recorder
at the outset, he soon relaxed. On the whole, I think he gave his
frank opinion on most points. He was willing to provide critical
views of Fletcher, Sir John, S.W.R.D. and Dudley. In any event, he
did not strike me as a man who was given to sharp or extreme views
on men or matters. A good mixer, easy-going, simple and unsophisti
cated I am certain Mr. Manders got on well with most Ceylonese, and
even with the politicians. The fact that he remained till 1959 and
was the last European Civil Servant also supports this appraisal.
By nature too Mr. Manders does not seem to have been given to
concern himself much with political matters though not entirely un
interested and somewhat more interested than some others inteiviewed
By nature too I am certain Mr, Manders' thinking on these matters
was highly conservative. I should also say that his friends in the
Civil Service would have been the orthodox and conservative sorts
rather then the radical and the imaginative. His criticism of
Caldecott was very much the planters' criticism and here I feel, he
was reflecting the consensus of thought in the C.C.S. and showing
a lack of critical objectivity - i.e. he seems to have accepted the
climate of European thought in which he lived in the 1930's and
1940's (he was largely in Matale).
I should think he was an officer who moved in the fixed groove
seeing to day to day problems and giving very limited attention to
possibilities of radical improvement or thinking in terms of altern
tives. His outlook on the questions pertaining to the British
judicial system and answer to the query "Did the British bring law
rather than justice?" highlight this characteristic. On the other
hand he did show an awareness of the bribery that moved "wnderneath
as well as some perception on a couple of points: e.g. that the
irural marketing and co-operative movements were not the panaceas
that some thought they would be.
I think his answers will probably seem rather imprecise and
va^e at times but in view of my own failings in this regard T
am




Oomments on Interview with Mr. R.M.S. Monypenny, 9 January, 1966.
A graduate in Modem Languages who had hegun his University
course in Camhridge as a student of History and Modem Languages,
Mr, Monypenny is a small man without the aggressiveness often
associated with such a build. Complete unflappability and mild
manneredness can be considered his hallmarks as, indeed, reflected
in his lazy drawl. A very good example to illustrate the phrase,
•cool, calm and collected'. Y/hat was more, I should think that he
was a good mixer and a very adaptable and homely type - features
which can also be attributed to Mrs. Monypenny. There would have
been little of arrogance and superiority in this couple. The very
fact that they remained to be one of the last European Civil Service
couples is proof of their adaptability and their easy-going nature.
These characteristics were mixed with a good deal of ability
and perception. A quiet worker, I should think, but not one who
was bound by orthodoxy or fixed grooves. He was unworried by the
Donoughmore changes. While not intensively interested in political
matters he does not seem to have been wholly oblivious to them.
Not enamoured of universal franchise, he was willing to see the other
side of the coin and on many questions his views were fairly liberal.
Hardly worried by the tape-recorder. Such was his equanimity
that he calmly allowed himself to be subjected to the questions and
was ready to help me with candid views. Opinions on personalities
are always a good barometer regarding the degree of cautiousness in
answers and I am certain his answers on this point would indicate
much candidness, besides being a pretty good appraisal of the men
concemed. On the whole, his views were very fair; not being a man
with strong likes and dislikes, his views on individuals will also
have the merit of a very limited bias.




tl"nrecorded Information provided "by Mr. R.M.G-. Monypenny,
9 January 1966.
Hev/nham was a man who was 'very clever* "but "because of his
'waspish tongue' did not go dov/n well with his superiors.
Wodaman was not as clever and rather 'stodgy.'
After 1956, as Permanent Secretary to Ilangaratne's Ministry,
Monypenny found himself heing interfered with more and more.
Thou^ he had a year to go before the retiring age he decided
to retire in 1959 before he found himself in the soup, He clearly
did not s.gree with some of Ilangaratne's methods. E.g. Once
Ilangaratne sent a peremptory order to dismiss a certain headman.
It took Monypenny some time to persuade him that neither he nor
Monypenny had the power to do so.
M.W. Roberts
9/1/66
There was a greater sense of purpose and direction in Independent
Ceylon than during 'Donoughmore Ceylon' besides a greater flow of
money. In the earlier period he felt that the politicians at
times wasted their energies in anti-Government activities v/hereas
at the time when they v/ere at the helm they devoted these energies
to better purpose.
Comments on Interview with Mr. R.B.Naish, 11.12.1965
Mr. Naish is 74 years old but had all his wits about him; he still keeps his
mind pretty active interesting himself in archaeology, mediaeval history and the
like. Obviously he could not remember many things but stated this immediately when I
asked such questions; did not feel that I was straining his memory as I did in some
cases; e.g. Mr. E.T.Dyson,or Mr. Sandys.
The fact that I was having the interview for historical purposes and recording
it was always in his mind. Terse and brief by nature, I should think, this
knowledge made him wary. He was giving nothing away. This does not mean that he was
a stuffy old bird. On the contrary, he was a kind-hearted gentleman who spotted
leading questions and, with a twinkle in his eye, refused to be drawn and say
anything sharply critical or outrageous. This means that where his opinion was
critical, it was, in fact, reasonable criticism (on a point which he felt he could
fairly criticise without hurting anyone). Thus his views on the impracticability of
applying Brayne's tenures can be taken as a correct view particularly as it was based
on actual experience in trying to administer it.
When it came to individuals he drew a rigid line at saying anything detrimental
about anyone. When he had a poor opinion of anyone he said nothing. One of these was
Sir Robert Drajrton. Naish, apparently, had had several personal differences with him
and because he felt he was biased against Drayton scrupulously refused to say
anything about him. In its own way, however, this is relevant; anc^it is striking that
G.L.D.Davidson also had differences with Drayton.
But where he thought men able, Naish willingly expressed an opinion. The
question is : how good are his appraisals? It is remarkable that he thought very
highly of Stanley - apart from what is on tape he said Stanley was 'as big a man as
Clifford' and a man with a simcere kind-heartedness while in conversation with me.
Since both Gimson and Davidson besides others ( and for
instance) felt Stanley was a mediocrity and a nonentity, this is suprising. When
there is such a clash whose opinion do we take? We can take it that Stanley had an
ordinary amount of ability for Gimson etc. do not deny this , but was this all? Pfy
personal inclination would be to accept that of Gimson and Co. because they are men
of greater drive than Mr. Naish.
Mr. Naish, I am fairly certain, was an efficient officer; by no means a dullard
but I doubt if he had the drive, the enthusasm and the readiness to move out of fixed
grooves that Brayne, Gimson etc. had. He was a type who would placidly and efficientl
get on with his job while the political fires were burning around him. If Aristotle
was searching for an archetype for his point that 'man is a political a.nimg'] »
(to distort his view somewhat), Mr. Naish would drive him to frustration - he had a
very limited interest in the political changes.
I should think Mr. Naish mixed quite well and in his genial way furthered
peaceable race relations; little prejudice in him; by nature a man who did not
indulge in sharp or extreme views.
P.S.
Mr. Naish is a Quaker.
M.W.Roberts
11.12.65
Unrecorded Infonnation provided "by Mr. R.E. Waish,
9 January 1966.
C.Y. Brayne: 'always "buUlDling with ideas.'
P. Arunachalam: considered a nice gentlemanly sort.
G-.Q-. Ponnamhalam: seemed to think: him agreeable.
S.Y/.R.D. Bandaranayake; 'even' in Naish's time he seemed 'to have
a chip on his shoulder'; always seemed 'hitter' according to
TJr. Naish, v/ho could not miderstand why in view of the fact that
Mr. B. was horn with a silver spoon in his mouth. His switching
over to Buddhism, etc. could also he regarded as showing
opportunist tendencies.
Regarding racial segregation within the Civil Service Mr.
Naish felt that the cluhs in Eurunegala, Kalutara and Jaffna were
mixed and relations with the educated Sinhalese extremely cordial.
But he felt the charge of segregation applied to Colombo and Kandy.
To my point that arrogance v/as not a wise thing he said that
arrogance was not a nice thing anjAvhere, that 'humility' v/as what
was needed; he felt (after I alluded to signs of it in Bov/es) that
it v/as not so much arrogance hut that that sort of thing -
presumably racial intermixing - v/as simply not done. He added that
Tyrrell was not of the same school as Bowes, had more liberal
ideas and a number of friends among the Ceylonese. I think he v/as
warning me that Bowes v/as not typical of his generation; i.e.




Conmients on Interview with Professor S.A. Pakeman, 11 February, 1966.
Professor Pakeman was not an administrator "but "being a European
lecturer in Colom'bo from 1920 it was to "be expected that he moved in
administrative circles as well. Being a historian it was natural
that he should take an interest in political matters. As far as the
interview was concerned, it differed from those with Civil Servants
in that Professor Pakeman did not feel himself a part of that body
(though many of his best friends were Civil Servants). It is not
surprising that he took a historical viewpoint and did his best to
help. The question of guarded answers, therefore, hardly arises.
Only dust retired at a ripe old age, he was fully alive mentally and
his memory quite vivid.
I do not have a high regard for his book written as it is for
a European market. But I found him more critical of British rule
than I expected; i.e. he was ready to see that the C.C.S. were too
aloof and that there was arrogance, etc. He was discriminatory too
in his appraisal of personnel and considered some men very average.
However I am not certain how much reliance I would place on these
appraisals. He certainly had a higher opinion of Southom than I
should think was warranted.
He tended to be expansive and this took up time. I do not
think I handled or organised the interview very well. I left it
with a vague feeling of disquiet. I think I made too many remarks
of my own. I should also have spent more time on the Bonoughmore
Constitution and on the 1940's and 1950's when Professor Pakeman
was in the thick of things. I certainly could have done with more
time with him for I would have liked to know more about Caldecott
Stanley, Pletcher, Brayton and other personnel apart from constitu
tional and political matters in the 1930's and 1940's.
M.W. Roberts
12.2.66
Unrecorded Information provided ty Professor S.A. Pakeman,
February 1966.
Tbere was 3?aoial feeling between the Ceylonese themselves. Caste
came into consideration. He could remember one occasion when Clementi
[Sir Cecil Clementi, Col. Sec., 1923-25(?)3 was "furious". Clementi
had invited Sir Paul Pieris to tea in Kandy, a tea-party to which
George E. Ue Silva or some such politician [he was not certain v/ho; he
thought it was George] had also been invited. Sir Paul Pieris refused
on these grounds. Clementi was "furious". Getting such politicians
and overcoming racial prejudices had been one of the purposes of such
invitations.
I raised the question of Ceylonisation and said that non-Europeans
felt that they were excluded from G.A.ships and higher administrative
posts. His response was "Oh, it was apparently agreeing that
this was so. He said that Ceylonisation was coming in "just about the
time [he] left". I ashed him whether this reluctance to allow Ceylon
ese to accept high posts was a deliberate policy. He did not answer
this one but went on to state that personally he did not agree [with
this policy]. "I think it was wrong", he said. He reiterated his
standpoint: Ceylonese should not have been excluded but should have
been admitted [to higher administrative posts] earlier. He added:
"Of course this was the sort of thing that was frowned upon in those
days. Well, I think it was wrong anyway".
E.W. Perera, he considered not very sound and "a demagogue"; he
"d-idn't have any brains".
Sir Solomon Bias Bandaranaike, he considered "a remarkable old
chap". In response to my views he agreed that Sir S.D.B's book showed
signs of "self-importance", putting it in a rather milder form than I
had ventured. He added that Sir S.D.B. "was as pompous as he looked".
Sir Baron Jayalika, was "a good chap". He "didn't have the
strength of character to be a leader".
C.W.W. Kannangara, had "a rasping voice but underneath he was
weak".
He knew Sir E.B. Denham as Governor of Jamaica as well. I
remarked that he was not popular in Ceylon upon v;hich he said, "He was
not popular anywhere". Elaborating this he stated that Denham's
trouble was that he took all the credit to himself and put all the
blame on others. He was ambitious. I remarked that, nevertheless, he
had some ability and Professor Pakeman agreed: "Oh yes, he had
tremendous drive".
He seemed to think that Sir Tom Southorn was pretty good, though
"orthodox".
Sir Cecil Clementi, was"academic". In response to my query to
the effect he agreed that Clementi was a bit too academic. I explained
how Bowes had called him "a freak" and all manner of things, upon
Irn-
- 2 -
which he said; "Well, he would". Bowes and Clementi were hot the
tjrpe to hit it off. Bowes was a very efficient administrator.
D.S. Senanayake had "his feet fiimly on the ground". As Soulhury
remarked, he "had a remarkable sense of timing", i.e. he knew when
to do a thing. Professor Pakeman had a great respect for him. I
asked him whether D.S. hadn't driven some good men from office, but
he had nothing to say on this point. He seemed to agree with my
point that D.S. had his prejudices. He said, "Tourism was one".
Apparently D.S.was not very keen on encouraging it. Once when the
Tourist Board had asked for Rs. 120,000 they had got only 20,000.
Jennings always maintained that it was D.A.'s constitution
and not his in that Jennings had merely put D.S.'s ideas into
constitutional form.
Drummond Shiels (in his last years) always used to maintain:
"Jennings can't see beyond Westminster".
A* S. Harrison - "a very intelligent" chap.
Wedderbum - he considered "pedestrian".
M.W. Roberts
February and 17 March 1966.
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Comments on Interview v/ith Mr. R.S.V. Poulier, 1 August 1966.
Mr. Poulier did not v/ish to have a recorded interview and
was worried a.hout lihel, etc. It followed that he would, he
cautious. He also appeared to he very modest and said that he
did not want to hit the limelight and emphasise what he had
achieved. In the event he did talk ahout some of his own
activities, particularly his farm-school in Kegalla. In the event
too, he was fairly frank in his comments and v;as much less
inhibited than I anticipated; this is revealed in his references
to individuals.
His memory seemed quite fresh and he v/as ahle to relate many
stories plus excerpts from conversations in illustration of a
point. He was also quick off the mark and seemed to liave a grasp
of a wide range of matters. On the v/hole, he appeared to he a
competent and knowledgeable officer; possibly inclined towards
orthodoxy. But he was certainly not orthodox in preferring the
lonely outstations to Colombo and the towns and would certainly
have been the Secretariat's delight on this point. This is
explained by his interest in v/ild life; but it is on record that
(at one stage in his career) he did not know the difference
between an elk and a sambhur. I have heard a Ceylonese, whose
opinion is entitled to some weight, refer to him as a most
inefficient official but that is not how he struck me.
A practical man I should think from his interest in the
farm-school and other points that emerged during the interview;
also very assiduous and thorough: e.g. again, the farm-school
and the fact that he studied various agricultural matters himself
so as to teach the trainees.
M.W. Roberts
22 August 1966.
UITREGOEDED I!TTERYIgy7 WITH tlR. R.S.V. POUIIER, 1 AUGUST 1966,
Dyson, Bartlett, Hellings and 'Papaw* Brov.'n v/ere some of the
people he had v/orked "under, Dyson and Ba,rtlett v/ere constantly
asking him what the British had done v/rong in Ceylon and whe^t he
v/ould do if he was in their place ('Get rid of yo"u lot first' Poulier
had quipped at times). Dyson had been one of the best of the Civil
Servants. I inquired v/hether he v/as very able. Poulier did not
think so; he was nothing brilliant bvit his high regard for Dyson
was the result of Dyson's kindness and sympathy. A keen Christian,
Dyson helped people very generously; often unostentatiously and in
v/ays known to fewje.g. having dismissed a clerk Dyson ga.ve him-and
his family board ^at the Residency) and lodging.
Mr. PouH-ier thought very highlj'' of Hevrnliam. 'He was a man who
could see both sides of the question'; he used to* seek out and was
aware of Ceylonese opinion. He vised to joke about the policies of
Government. He was also very able and should have risen to be a
Colonial Governor. I asked whether the fact that he had not done
so was not a bed reflection on British lule. He agreed whole
heartedly. He added that Newnham used to make severe remarks and
agreed that he v/as very fond of quips. He had done very good work
as Commissioner of Relief during the malaria epidemic.
Y/hen Mr. Poulier had been transferred to Eega.lla he found
himself without any Office Assistants at all, though Gimson before
him had had two. Hevmham had arrived one da.y and laughed and said,
'I suppose Collins has done the usual trick and left you Ceylonese
without the necessary hands'. (One O.A. had been sent after a time.)
I a.sked why Collins follov/ed such a policy. Mr, Poulier seemed
quite convinced that it v/as meant to show the Ceylonese in a bad
light. As a matter of fact it helped them. They had to work harder
and cover more gro"und and got to know more.
Mark Young was very able, I inquired whether he was inclined
to stand on his dignity. Mr, Poulier was quite positive that he
did not, I think Mr, Poulier said that he was liberal in his views
and not anti-native but my memory is hs.zy on this point.
As a Cadet and an Office Assistant Mr, Poulier v/as not taken
out on circuit though his seniors did invite him for meals. He felt
that the training and help he had received from his G.A's v/ere not
particularly good. He had to pick most things up himself and on
the job. In Galle he had been i.inder W,0. Stevens as far as jud-ic"'
training v/ent, Stevens was a very good judge and magistrate, He^^^
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hardly spoke in Court and this was done as a matter of policy, to
avoid giving, the lawyers any cues.
I inquired whether British rule lacked purpose and drive. He
did not agree wholly. He felt that 'the great thing' that they
had established was 'law and order*. Thej?" had not shown much
initiative on matters of land and land tenure.
In reply to my query he said that he did not think that many
of the British Civil Servants of the early and mid 1920's realised
that self-government was oh the way and would occur during their
lifetime. Host thought it was not possible for quite some time.
In reply to my inquiry whether British Civil Servants showed
bias in decisions, betv/een Europeans and Ceylonese, as a generalisa
tion, he was inclined to think so. For one thing their thought-
patterns were similar and they would be more prone to accept the
view of the European.
In reply to my comments, he agreed that officials were too
aloof and exclusive. This v/as not so in the outstations but was
true of the bigger towns, particularly Colombo. The European clubs
were exclusive; this was disliked. Mr. Poulier himself preferred
the outstations and asked the Secretariat to post him as far from
Colombo as possible. [H.B. He is a wild-life enthusiast.]
Fletcher was not very able and was not liked. He used to go
back on what he said or 'v/ater it down' , once he was criticised.
I thinlc he said that he was weak.
In the late 1920's the Finance Committee of the Legislative
Council had power without responsibility. They used to indulge in
ill-formed and unreasonable criticisms. In response to my query,
Mr. Poulier said that it v/as greatly resented by the Civil Servants.
He had not been consulted ty the Civil Service Committee who
had met the Donouglimore Commissioners in camera.
Stanley v/as a 'very nice man. Liberal and genuinelj?" sympathetic
to the progress towards self-government.
Of the three, Yfoods, Tyrrell, Wedderbum, the latter was 'the
best'. Woods was certainly very able.
Regarding Tyrrell, he related a story which indicates his
standing among the Ceylonese Civil Servants. On one occasion Tyrrell
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had greeted Poiilier heartily and clapped liira on the hack. As soon
as Tyrrell was out of earshot, P. Saravananuttu vdio had heen nearhy,
said semi-jokingly: 'I say, Poulier, you are in for it tomorrow. I
would not open the mail'. Actually, nothing happened. But Poulier
was positive that Tyrrell was not to he trusted. 'V/as he inclined
to stand on his dignity?', I inquired. Mr. Poulier nodded. Further
queries elicited confirmation that Tyrrell was rather of the old
school and not very understanding.
Regarding the relations between T).S. Senanayake and Edmund
Rodrigo: on one occasion B.S. had met Poulier in Eegalla and v/aved
a letter which he had received from Rodrigo and asked him to look
at it, saying, 'look at the way he writes', implying, 'what can I
do with such a chap'. The letter was rather fierce. Rodrigo's
minutes and letters to his Minister 'verged on the offensive'.
•Rude?', I inquired. 'Rude is too hard a word to describe them',
said Mr. Poulier. Much of the trouble had been because of a
difference in their cultural background. Rodrigo's polished and
high-flov/n style of vmriting did not go dov/n well with M.S. and
contributed to misunderstanding. I inquired whether Rodrigo was
merely an essay-vo^iter and office type and not a practical adminis
trator. Mr. Poulier was quite positive that this v/as not true.
On one occasion v/hen Poulier, D.S. and Rodrigo v/ere travelling
in a car, Poulier had told D.S. (semi-joculs,rly?) that he would
vet Rodrigo's letters hereafter and see that they were not offensive.
On another occasion P.S., having heard of Poulier's interest
in a practical farm school in Kegalla, had sought him out and
wished to encourage it. looking for a means of financing it,
Poulier had pointed to an un^^sed vote on a related matter which had
been granted to the Director of Agriculture (Rodrigo). Poulier
suggested that he (Poulier) v/ould write to Rodrigo about it. But
D.S. had said that he would see to it. D.S. had not realised that
there were certain administrative forms and principles under which
such a change must be xmdertaken and had merely written to Rodrigo
and asked him to give the money to Poulier. Rodrigo was highly
annoyed -as he told Poulier - because Poulier would spend the money
and he (Rodrigo) v/ould have to account for it. It did not take long
for Poulier to settle this matter but it was the sort of thing which
need not have arisen at all.
Caldecott was very liberal. He had a very difficult time with
layton. On one occasion Mr. Poulier was present when layton had
used Caldecott like a messenger. Afterwards Caldecott had commented
ruefully about this and told him, 'You are no doubt surprised to
see me treated in this way', and ansv/ering, said, 'We British v/iii
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take anything in wartime•.
Poulier had heen involved in Layton's decision to transfer
Leigh-Clare from the post of Collector of Customs. Layton had
"been dissatisfied v;ith the rate at v/hich goods were clearing the
warehouses. Leigh-Clare had said it v/as due to the transport and
distribution services (Poulier's province). But Layton had met
PoLilier just "before and investigated this point. He told Leigh-
Clare that Poulier had done more tlmn humanly possible and
transferred Leigh-Clare to some other post.
Layton used pretty direct and strong lan.nmge, He knew it
too. . He had oxpla.ined to Mr. Poulier once from where he picked
it up and added, 'You Ceylonese are too sensitive about such things'.
TTr. Poulier did not thing highly of H.M. Moore, the last
Governor. I believe he did not think him all ths.t liberal and
felt he was rather old school.
In the v/ar years v/hen he was Controller of Prices and later
from 1945 when he was Pood Commissioner, G.C.S. Corea was his
Minister. Corea was prone to listen to too many viev/s and had not
been strong enough. On one occasion when Poulier had suggested a
rationing scheme, Corea had given much attention to criticisms of
this scheme as well as encouraged other schemes which were being
suggested. At a big meeting on this subject with twenty others,
incltiding members of the Executive Committee, each member had a
scheme in mind. Poulier had asked for details of each scheme and
broken them down one by one. In this way they had gone through
twenty schemes. It should have been patent to Corea that Poulier
knew his onions after five or six of these had been discussed.
Subsequently, in fact, Poulier's rationing schem.e had been praised
by an English expert who came here; he had wired back that it was
better than the British one.
In reply to my comment that B.S. Senanayake's cabinet had "been
a mediocre bimch, he seemed to agree. He referred to A. Batnayake
one of the Ministers he had to deal with when he was, I think.
Permanent Secreta.ry to the Ministry of Home Affairs and said tha.t
he 'didn't Imow a hang about administration'. He added that
Ratnayake usually followed what Poulier suggested. Another of his
Ministers, E.A.P. Wijeyratne, used to suggest 'cock and bull method
with regaxd to food control. Instead of rejecting these outright
Poulier used to be tactful and write something to the strain of:
'This suggestion is fimny. The possible courses are (a) ,,,
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(Td) Cc) .... I suggest (e) "because ...' Y/ijeyratne usually-
accepted this advice.
Banda had never expected to v/in the 1956 elections as he had
admitted to Poulier. The rest of Ba,nda's remarks had been (roughly)
as follows: 'I would have chosen my candidates v;ith greater care if
I knew that I was going to v/in. Look at the material I've got to
deal v/ith. Look at the llinisters I have had to appoint". Poulier
himself had a very lov/ opinion of Banda' s cahine t.
At a meeting of the Select Committee v/hich was considering
amendments to the Constitution in the time of S.Y/.R.I). Bandaranaike,
Poulier, had spoken highly of the Bonoiighmore Constitution and its
Execulive Committee system and the training in administration which
it provided politicians. Banda hs,d summoned him that evening and
said that he was glad that Poulier spoke in such a strain because
he himself admired the Donoughmore Consti-tation. Banda added that
he dared not speak in the same sense publicly; but wished to
encourage Poulier in airing such viev/s. He had called him in to
obviate any possibility that Poulier would tone dov/n his viev/s,
believing that Banda was opposed to them. Poulier had replied that
he was very glad to hear this because he had wondered v/hether Banda
would think that he v/as favouring a Consti-fcution which gave greater
scope and protection to the minority comm-unities.
Eegs-rding chena cultivation, the British administration had not
realised that it v/as often a question of sufficient food for the
cultivators. P. Saravanamut-tu and Poulier - v/hen Poulier was A.G.A.
I'lullaittivu, November' 1928 to October 1931 - had quite a tussle
with the Secretariat on this question and had. not found it easy to
persuade the latter that chena licenses had not been granted liberally,
Poulier implied tha^t, of course, he granted licenses liberally only
where needed and. that he gave due consideration to Crown interests.
I commented that this issue v;as most notably reflected in the
conflict be-fcv/een Freeman and the Secretariat and that Freeman
syiiibolised the Humanitarian and raore lenient approach. Poulier
said, 'Yes, but to the point of being unreasonable'. I inquired whetter
Freeman v/as naive and. gullible. Without any hesitation, he agreed;
and provided an example. During his State Co-uncil days, Freeman
had produced a handful of rice and. sand that it v;as an example of
the bad rice that Government v/as distributing. D.S. Senanayake had
brought this rice to Poulier (who must have been Controller of Prices)
Poulier ha.d examined it and pointed out that it was mixed rice
consisting of several different varieties of grain. D.S. had used
this point the next day in his defence against Freeman's criticism,.
In the meanv/hile a messenger had been despatched to Anuradhapura to
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ask the authorities to ascertain from v.'here Preenan had got this
rice. It had heen discovered that freeman had got the rice from
his kitchen hut it had heen a portion from a pile of had rice. It
v/as the practice of his servants to sift the had from the good
rice and keep the former in a separate pile for use in cooking
meals for heggars. naturally, this consisted of several varieties
of rice and was of poor quality.
I inquired v/hether the Britisher's antipathy to chena culti
vation stemmed from the fact tliat they were used to permanent
crops in Europe and could not conceive of this form of cultivation
as anything less than wasteful; whether, in fact, they looked at
the matter with European eyes. lie v/as inclined to agree. Ke
cited an exsmi]ple of this sort of attitude. In later years in the
1940's when he sent a memorandum to the Colonial Office showing
hov/ rice could not he grov/n that easily in the Dry Zone (in
connection v/ith the drive towards increased rice production) , they
had sent an expert from Edinburgh named Clyde to investigate this
aspect. It v/as not until Clyde had heen taken on a tour that he
realised what problems they faced in growing rice in the Dry Zone.
As Clyde had comaiented, they had not heen able to grasp this in
England and not understand v/hy they could clear forests and grow
rice. I inquired v/hether British policy stemmed from the fact that
they saw that shifting cultivation had created dusthowls in other
countries and felt that similar results would occur here, adding
that I considered such views unscientific and not adequately
cognisant of different climatic conditions. Poulier simply said
that the British considered that a crop produced from chena culti
vation was v/orth only a few hundreds whereas "the timber was v/orth
a fev/ thousands.
Poulier had heen consulted in drafting .the Land Development.
Ordinance of 1939. I inquired if G.L.D. Davidson had a hand in it.
He said, 'Yes, he had heen very useful and helped a lot'. C.l.
Wickremesinghe had consulted Poulier quite often and sometimes
said, 'Brayne says this, Davidson says this, D.S. says this, this
is the position, what do you say?' Br?ry.ne had included a clause
v/hich said that G-.A's should he legally compelled to enforce this
Ordinance. Povilier had heen against this and said that if G.A's
did not apply the Ordinance they could he transferred, I asked
hmn. what sort of man Brayne v/as. He said that Brayne v/as very
'v/ell-intentioned hut obstinate'. I inquired if several G.A's
were opposed to Brayne and his v/ays. He said that this had heen
the case. He added that the Ceylonese officers had put their
heart and soul into working this Ordinance, fhe older O.A's were
not greatly in favour of this Ordinance. I inquired whether they
had heen obstructionist. He said, 'Ho, that would be putting it
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too strongly'. He agreed that such G-.A's had not put their best
foot forv/ard.
He added that the architects of this Ordinance had under
estimated the number of staff officers that would be needed to
administer this Ordinance. They had not realised hov/ long it would
take and. hov/ many officers more were needed to implement it.
Administering it meant exam.ining the land, choosing allottees,etcetera,
All this took time and it v/as very difficult to check everything.
It wa,s much slower to work than they had anticipated. Both C.L.
and Poulier had definitely underestimated the difficulties.
I inquired whether the pea.sant allottees he.d realised that
this form of tenure wa,s virtually freehold. He said, 'No, because
it could not be mortgaged'. In terms of pea.sant thinlcing what was
desirable v/as land which could be mortgaged. Therefore, those v/ho
had land did not care for this form of grant, but those v/ho
possessed none were glad to have something at leant. As G.A.,
Saharagamuv/a most of the s.llotments he had given were part of
village expansion schemes. Colonisa.tion had come later. 1 asked
how they chose allottees. He said that obviously chaps who were
lame would not be chosen. They had to be able to cultivate the
land and have an interest in agriculture, later on in the inter
view, he said that in the early years most of the original colonists
were chosen from to\vn areas. On further query I found that he
meant people from district tov/ns like Hegalla rather than Colombo.
I am not quite certain whether he is confused here and that in
using the phrase 'tov/n areas' is referring to the more sophisticated
peasants from the Western Province as distinct from the
relatively more rural orientated peasantry of outlying areas. He
said that, on the whole, the allottees from the urban o.reas had
not been a success.
1 T * C" "f"Regarding the prevalence of ande agreements among colonisuo,
he said that administrators would ho.ve tended to have allov/ed this
rather than punish those concerned because the tendency v/ould be
for this practice to decline once the sons of colonists grev/ up.
I inquired v/hether an intermediate form of punishment less severe
than eviction c ould not have been evolved to meet such practices
as ande, e.g: a fine. He said that a peasant would rather go to
jail than pay a fine and inquired what form of intermediate
punishment they could use. I suggested labour. He said that it
would be nice if they could regiment people thus but it was not
possible. He agreed that in practice very few evictions took place.
Regarding the headman system and its influence on elections in
the 1930's: he agreed the.t it v/as very important. As A.G-.A. ,?regalla





Avissawella, where IT.M. Perera had defeated Adeline IJolamure.
N.M. had never expected to v/in. Before the count he had alleged
that some of the hallot "boxes had "been filled with "blocks of
specially marked votes while the "boxes had been transferred from
booth to centre, and that this should be evident once the boxes
were opened because they would be in blocks. Poulier had asked
N.M. to be present when he opened the boxes. They had found nothing
of this sort in any box. I inquired what contributed to IT.II's
victory. He said that there had been criticism against the head
men system. There y/as a reaction against feudal influence. I
inquired v/hether the social work done by the L.S.S.P. during the
malaria, epidemic had helped. He was quite positive that this had
helped the L.S.S.P. In fact, the people had been surprised at
the aid provided by H.H. and others and expected that there was
some catch in it, when there was none.
The other election v/as in the Eegalla area and was between
A.A. Wickremesinghe and Keerthiratne. The latter v/on. The contest
was purely a ca.ste issue, Keerthiratne "being of a lower caste.
Prior to this, the higher caste leaders had been appalled when
Poulier appointed Keerfehiratne to the sanitary board. But Poulier
8.p.d A.E. Christoffelsz had been following a policy of giving lower
castes ;5reater attention; they had gone against previous practice
and appointed lov/-caste headmen in low-caste regions. I inquired
if the high-caste headaen had supported Wickremasinghe. I think
he answered that A.A. Wickremasinghe had been criticising the
headmen and did not have tMr support. The picture is not quite
clear however. Personally, I cannot see the higher caste headmen
supporting Keerthiratne.
In reply to my inquiries he said that A.A. \yickrenasin.the
ovmed a fair amount of land in the district. He was a proctor.
His father had been a Loweountryman vdio liad settled in the district.
This was true of E.A.P. Y/i.-jeym-atne as well. E.A.P. was a poor boy
v/ho had been brought up and educated by the Catholic fathers in the
district. As a boy it was said that he was holjr in the presence
of the priests but quite the opposite when they were out of sight.
Subsequently he had renounced Catholicism, A.A. Wickremasinghe
was a nervous type who coiild never sit still and kept pacing up
and dov/n when he spoke.
On the subject of land speculation, he agreed that Cha.rles
"Batuv/antudawe and A.A. Wickremasinghe \yere speculators. On my
SLiggesting Heedeniya. Adigar's imme he was inclined to thinlc that
Meedeniya helped the European Companies to get land. I inquired
whether other ra.temahatma.^/as also acted in this manner, but he dh
Iq
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not tliini; so. He added tliat, in any event, this sort of thing
ended once D.S. Sens-nayake caiae in.
(Two of his achievements in Kegalla were to ensure that huses
ran to time and to start a practical fanii school with ten lads
heing taught every six months. Prior to this, there had been
competition for passengers betv/een the different companies v/ith
passengers being virtually hauled from one bus to that of another
company. Ke had taken steps to see tha.t the buses ran at regular
intervals. I inquired v/hether the bus mudalalis h8.d influenced
the outcome of elections. He said, 'Yes', quite positively. They
had refused to run buses for voters who did not support their
candidate. But it was more usual for them to act on a monetary
basis, demanding some money in order to transport supporters of
one candidate.
At Mullaittivu in 1931 there was an election, but in Jaffna
there v/as a boycott. The people had followed the advice of an
Indian lo.dy named llrs. Gha.tta ... (Dyson called her Ilrs. Chatterbox)
and decided not to contest elections underlhe Donougbmore Constitution.
On nomination day or the day after Poulier v/as surprised to find
Dyson (G.A. , Jaffna) at his doorstep. Dyson hs.d come to relate the
events of the day and v/anted to Imow if he had acted correctly.
Apparently the potential candidates did not trust each_ other for
they had come to the kachcheri with their applications ready and
sat at a point equidistant from the box just in case one or the
other decided to break the boycott decision. The last two minutes
had been tense. Dyson felt that if he had given any si,ga or any
encouragement, they might have slipped their applications in. He
had given none. I inquired hov; this had come about and why there
was no firm decision on this point. He said that there was much
personal animosity and no unanimity among the Tamil politicians.
Apart from the fact that they were peeved at the Consitution, it
was said tha.t neither the Colombo Tamils nor the Jaffna Tajnils,
v/ho v/ere beginning to challenge the ascenaancy of the Colombo Tamils,
were willing to test the relative strength of their popularity by
going to the polls. They were frightened to go to the polls at a
time when universal franchise was in operation and. to risk d.efeat.
I inquired what sort of man W. Duraisv/amy had been. He said,
'Very quiet
Comments on Interview with Sir Gilbert Rennie, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., 30.11.1965
Though quite friendly to me, he was very reserved and restrained during the
interview. I do not think this was because of the tape. He was not oblivious to it
though it was out of sight (we were talking across a table : an arrangement of his
of some significance) but I think restraint was part of his nature : viz. the
reserved type of British official. Indeed, his comments and views were rather
watery and comparatively, of little value.
This may have been due to a reluctance to generalise. But he was simply not a
forthright type. Indeed, when it came to political matters he seems to have had a
singular lack of interest in the Donoughmore Constitution etc. when out in Ceylon.
Again, this may be due to rather vague recollections and any review of his answers
will probably reveal that he claimed lack of recollection quite often . In this
connection one should note that he seemed quite hale and hearty and was a competent
driver though aged JO, so any suspicions of senility should be ruled out.
On the whole, rather a tradition-bound type of officer, I should think; one
who concentrated on sports and one who did not take as deep an interest in
political matters as other Civil Servants. It is of some relevance that Stubbs
chose him as his secretary.
A pedestrian type, I think. In this view if I recall correctly. Sir Franklin
Gimson would join me, (and Newnham certainly does).
Since he did not serve extensively in the Provinces and since his Colombo
posts were rather uninteresting ones, the range of questions I had was limited.
Where he might have been useful - in revealing a picture of Stubbs and Stubbs' views
etc. on the politicians and the Donoughmore Constitution, he was noticeably
restrained and in the effect unhelpful. His assessment of Stubbs' certainly does
not have the same critical depth which other views have revealed. Indeed, on
appraisals of men he was most guarded - a reaction that is quite natural but which
was not characteristic of many of the other Civil Servants interviewed, I would
hesitate to accept his views on individuals because of this.
M.W.Roberts
29.11.65
Unrecorded Iirformation provided "by Mr. Derek Rowan during a consersation.
31 July 1966.
Mr, Rov^an, a lawyer, worked with Julius & Creasy from 1931-62.
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike never expected to win the 1956 election
and his troubles arose from this fact. He v/as 'enmeshed in his
election manifesto' and never shook himself free of his promises.
In 1958 there were some serious strikes in the Mercantile
sector which v/ere encouraged by Government. A big group of mercan
tile employers etc. - about 75 of them - had to meet Banda on one
occasion to receive 'a pep-talk'. They met before this meeting and
one of them - Rov/an preferred not to name him - stressed that they
should make it a point not to laugh at any of Banda's jokes. Sure
enough, Banda produced a couple of his stock jokes etc. They
remained poker-faced. Banda was 'utterly nonplussed' . At the end
of his talk, Banda gave them ten minutes to discuss matters among
themselves before raising questions. But their spokesman eventually
said there were no questions. Banda was furious and thumped the
table and said, 'I demand that you should tell me what you are
planning to do' .
This strike issue was just before emergency '58. On the day
that emergency was declared a number of prominent citizens met
Banda and asked him to declare an emergency. Banda implied that,
surely, it was not that serious and refused. Several hours later
he had had to do so.
It was said that the Indian ambassador had called on Banda
that morning and warned him that if he did not take action, his
Government would be compelled to intervene; and that this had forced
Banda to take action at long last. Mr. Rowan could vouch for the
fact that the ambassador (Gundevi?) had called on Banda that morning
though he did not know what transpired.
It was Oliver v/ho had saved the situa.tion on that occasion
He hSvd acted with commendable firmness. One example was the imperj^
way which he had commandeered some ships, one French and three
British* He had summoned the firms concerned and said that he would
do so whatever they said and 'face the consequences afterwards'.
The agents had been debarred from informing their principals
Bondon.
Banda was 'generous to his opponents'. Sir John never was.
On my query Mr. Rowan confirmed the fact that O.E. was badly
in debt before the war. As Deputy Auditor-General, he had come
daily to Julius &Greasy and asked that his Rs. 237/ debt be defeIt was said that O.E. became Auditor-General by using the 'pioyt* '^
Qf encouraging and aiding the then Auditor-General to become
w n
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President of tlie Turf Glut).
Mr. Rowan virtually stated that O.E. had made money during the
vrar. He believed there were 685 audit queries. O.E. 'had covered
his tracks' by sending telegrams to a bookmaker in Madras Y/orded
'backing horses heavilyl He had then kept those where he had won.
These telegrams were part of an arrangement and not acted upon. In
any event, he 'amassed a fortune'. As Julius & Creasy had handled
the money he could confirm it.
Mrs. Rowan stressed that O.E. did not like her husband and had
•badgered him' continually, threatening to cancel his Temporary
Residence Permit and the like. (Mr. Rowan did not seem to agree
with this statement.) Mrs. Rowan said that this was because her
husband was too independent and stood up to O.E.
It transpired that O.E. had rung him up two days before he (O.E.)
was chucked out of Ceylon and wanted to consult him. This was for
legal comisel and it had been a large-scale affair with G.G. Ponnam-
balam present besides office paraphenalia (stenographers etc.).
O.E. had come to Rowan's house quite openly. Two days later he
left. Only the Australian, British and W. German ambassadors were
there to see him off. Not one member of Government came. Mr. Rowan
considered that Government treated him 'despicably' at this stage
and had hounded him unmercifully.
^ week after O.E. left — and, mind you, all this was a consi
derable time after the attempted coup - the Police had rung Mr.
Rowan up and asked if he could come to the station at a certain time.
Mr. Rowan, just being 'bloody-minded', had inquired whether he could
not come at once. On arrival he had been questioned on O.E's visit.
He had admitted that O.E. had come there and added that he could not
divulge what had transpired, that they could not compel him to do
so, and that he would claim legal privilege and demand to see the
President of the Law Society and the British High Commissioner.
Prom the interrogator's notes Mr. Rowan had seen that he thought
that Mr. Rowan was the Manager of the B.C.C. Company (and not the
head of Julius & Creasy, a- legal firm). The chap had soon discovered
this mistake. After seeing his superior he essayed a final query —
'Was the discussion related to the coup?' Mr. RoYiran had truthfully
said, 'No'. The error regarding Mr. Rowan's occupation was because
they had got the information from O.E's driver. The Police had
been doing a whole range of questioning. Mr. Rowan felt that all
this was unnecessary. If O.E. was implicated in the coup they would
have had whatever dope was available long before. This was mere
badgering.
Three Civil Servants who had impressed Mr. Rowan were Woods,
Nev/nham and Woolley. Woods had done a great deal to minimise the
impact of the Depression and was a tough campaigner. On my query
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whether he was unpopular with the politicians he said something to
the effect of 'not all that unpopular. Certainly not as much as
Hirxham and one of the first Legal Secretaries'.
When Leach's and Stace's ns^mes cropped up during our conversation
it appeared that Mr. Rowan thought well of thdr ahilities. Murphy
had not been all that good as Mayor of Colombo.
In the early 1930's almost all the members of the State Council
were in debt; largely due to election expenses. This was also a
period v/hen there was a great deal of foreclosing on mortgages.
Much of this was inevitable though the State Bank of India behaved
rather despicably. It was -unfortunate, however, in that the Law of
Mortgage v/as passed at this time. The Ceylonese insisted that only
the particular property mortgaged should be liable to seizure. This
had and continues to have a detrimental effect on the credit afforded
to individuals.
Mr. Rowan thought Caldecott was a 'run of the mill' Governor.
The best of the Governors he had contact with was 'Monkey' Moore.
M.W. Roberts
31/7/66 and 13/8/66
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Goiaments on Interviews with Mr. Edmund Saiaarakkody,
23 April and 28 June 1967.
Mr. Samarakkody v/as shyly insistent that a tape-recorder
was not necessary; hut was otherwise very cooperative and
genial. He was careful on certain issues hut moderately frank.
His memory seemed fair-middling.
Very modest and humhle in approach, he did not strike me
as heing a dominating or domineering type. I would say he
liked to consider himself an intellectual type of comrade
rather than ^ parish-pump politician; that is, preferring
Marxist study circle and trade-union work to platform speaking.
He v/as not very facile in choosing his words and tended to
speak in cliches at times and to repeat certain phrases constantly.
His comments must he viewed in the light of his present
position and the new political complexions around him. As a
leader of the small splinter group of the lanka SamaSamajist
Party, which refused to join the coalition with the S.l.P.P.
in 1965 and remains today a small voice crying in the wilderness,
his attitude towards the past is hound to he a different one
to the Mr. Edmund Samarakkody of 1964. There was certainly a
strong tinge of the doctrinaire in his views with a tendency
to criticise heretics. But he was not hitter or cynical or
polemic. Bias v/as there - generally evident - hut he provided
discrininating comments on his former comrades. The fact that
he mentioned such figures as Vernon Gunasekera (Of, the
official L.S.S.P. history) hears testimony to a willingness
to take a rounded view. Many of the facts he presented accorded
with the circumstances as I Imov/ them.
M.W. Roberts
29 April and 2? May I967.
Unrecorded Inuerviev/s v/ith. Mr. Edja-und Samarakkody,
23 April and 29 June 1967'
girst Interview, 23 April 1967.
[In response to Mr. Sanarakkody*s wish, this interview v/as
not recorded. Notes were taken during the interview,
facilitated greatly hy Mr. Samaralckody's cooperation. This
record is a refined and expanded version of these notes. I
have presented these in question (Q) and answer (A) form hut
also included some straight descriptive reporting.]
In response to my queries, Hr. Samarakkody stated that he was
educated at St, Thomas; thus "a conservative background". But
he qualified this by saying that St. Thomas was not all that
conservative in that all the students were not from upper
middle-class well-to-do families unlike Royal. "And St. Thomas
now?" I inquired. "And St. Thomas nov/" , he agreed. In response
to a query to that effect he agreed that St. Thomas' was over-
westemized. No one thou^t of speaking in Sinhalese.
Q. "Was that considered infra-dig?" A. "No. V/e just did not
think of talking in Sinhalese". He agreed further that his
background was definitely urban. Q. I inquired what had prompted
him to take an interest in politics and to participate actively
in political affairs. He replied that the 1930's was the time
of the Indian nationalist movement. ,Q. I inquired if there was
much literature on the subject or whether our nev/spapers played
it up. He replied that some of their leaders paid visits to
Ceylon. He repeated that the Indian movement had "a noticeable
influence". "We could not escape the atmosphere of the Indian
nationalist movement, of leaders like Gandhi, Nehru and Kamala-
devi".; ...." He added that the 1930's saw the beginning of the
anti-imperialist movement in Ceylon; and was specially reflected
in the Suriya Ivlal movement. The Suriya Mai movement "concretised
anti-imperialism", This v/as about the time - 1932 - Mr. Samaraldcody
entered politics. Q. I inquired if he had joined the Colombo
South Youth League. I cannot recollect his answer but he did
imply that it was one of the expressions of the anti-imperialist
feeling, adding that it included such people as Vemon Gunasekera
and Stanley De Zoysa. Q. I inquired about the split in the
Colombo South Youth League involving Caldera. He agreed that
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there had heen a kind of split, hut did not consider it important
and v/orth dwelling on. The split had heen on personal grounds.
In response to a query, he said that the Youth Leagues had
originated as part of anti-imperialism and were not Marxist
sponsored. I inquired whether the Marxist group had not laid
much emphasis on these bodies as a means of pressing the anti-
imperialist line and, ultimately, the Marxist line. He agreed
that the Marxists did emphasise the Youth League movement hut
was very positive in affirming that they relied a great deal
more on the Suriya Mai movement than that of the Youth Leagues.
Returning to the earlier theme I inquired v/hat sort of
reading had inspired him as a youth. He replied that he had
done very little reading while at school. His reading hegan
while he was at Law College. In response to my inquiry whether
it was socialist literature or that on the Indian nationalist
movement or Ireland, he said that it v/as "Marxist literature".
The Left Book Gluh had heen functioning then. Q. I inquired
if many law students were interested in this sort of reading.
He was quite definite that only a few were. I pointed out that
the Left Book Gluh in Britain was very much a group of common-
room pinkness, implying that they were not deeply commi-cted in
the active sense. He agreed hut said that that presented "an
opening" - presumably an opening into active Marxist politics.
Q. "Was this common-room pink true of Geylon as well?" A. He
did not think so. "We straightaway got into the mass movement".
Q. "Who were the members of the inner group?" The names he
mentioned were: Golvin R.De Silva, Leslie Goonewardena, N.H.Perera,
Philip G^mawardena, Vemon Gunasekera. I inquired about Vemon.
He said Vernon was a very active chap. He had "a high ideological
level even at that stage". He v/as a livewire. I pointed to
the fact that in the recently written [1961] short history of
the L.S.S.P., Vemon's name is mentioned only once. He replied
that, in retrospect, Vemon's allegiance had heen superficial.
He was "witty" and "created impressions" and likeiit.
Q. "Showmanship", A. "Showiaanship, yes", said he, clutching at
the word.
I inquired whether Dr. S.A. Wickremasinghe had heen one of
the inner group and what sort of chap he was? He smiled and
said they all used to call him "a medical socialist;" "More
social service" than socialism; i.e. social service norms
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rather than genuine socialist grounding made Dr. S.A. Wickrema-
singhe a member of the group. He "never seriously understood
Marxism". Q. "It would seem that ss an Independent member of
the State Council from 1931-36 Dr. S.A. v/as not very active
but when he went to Britain he came back as a member of the
Commimist Party?" Mr. Samarakkody said that the Marxist group
of the old days (early 1930's) was Trotskyite. "Trotskyism
was the dominant note". The split in Ceylon came in 1939.
Q. "\7hy in 1939 and not earlier; after all the international
split had been much earlier?" A. "The war question came up",
[meaning the question of the line they should take on the v/ar] .
Q. "Was Dr. S.A.of 1939 the same as Dr. S.A. of the early
1930's? Had the [second] visit to Britain created any changes
and a deeper attachment to Marxism?" A. He did not think so.
There had been "no ideological growth". He v/as merely interested
in the mass movement and in exposing ineqtialities. Q. "Y/hat
about Pieter Eeuneman? Did j^ou try to win him to your party
when he csime back?" A. "No". When he came he - both he and
his wife (his first wife)-v/ere knov/n to be adherents of the
Communist Party.
Q. "Philip was the leading light of the Marxist group at
that time?" He agreed positively: Philip was the most dominant
figure till they [the •^•^aiocist leaders] were jailed. He was a
very able agitator. "Nothing more than that". Q. "Was Philip
difficult to get on with?" He said that this v/as not perceived
then. They were all "immersed in mass work" [i.e. v/ork among
the masses]. Q. I inquired if it v/as true that the idea of
forming a Marxist party in Ceylon had been conceived in London
when Philip and Colvin and others had been there. A. He
replied that Leslie [Goonewardena] in particular had such ideas
N.M. had, throughout, been considered "a Laski Socialist".
Elaborating, he said: "a vague Socialist". But he v/as a hard-
worker [i.e. put in much industrious work for them in the I930's
and 1940*s]. Q. I inquird whether N.M. hadn't been Philiptg
rigL-t-hand man, implying that he was merely that in the early
stages. He replied that N.M. was always a follov/er till I960
He was satisfied with Philip's, Leslie's and Colvin's leadersh-i-
1 P •Q. Regarding Mr. S's personal place, I inquired whether he had
been in the inner group by 1933-34 and whether this had entaiie(3^
1. I^r. ^c\.ma.r(n.kkodk '^s.
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a special initiation in that one was given a kind of 'probationary
training' . His answer was rather vague hut it was implied that
he had been accepted aiuong the party hierarchy pretty early on,
even before the official l.S.S.P. was constituted. He had not
been subjected to any initiation 'course'. I inquired if he
hadn't been going against his family in taking up active
Marxist affiliations. A. "Yes". It vra,s " a revolt against
feudal feat^^res" . His father had been a very strict type.
Turning my attention to aspects of policy in the 1930's
I inquired why they had chosen to challenge G-oonesinha? Hadn't
there been many other (and new) avenues where trade-union work
could have been undertaken? A, "A good question". They did
explore new fields as v/ell. But they could not avoid clashes
because G-oonesinha knev^ they were a danger. In these clashes
he v/as generally the victor. I referred to their success in
the Wellawatte Spinning and \7eaving Mills and to the predominance
they had gained soon enough. He replied that even in the 1930's
they knew he vras cracking. Q. "Cracking? In what way? And v/hy
do you say that?" He replied that "corruption" was the "weak
side" of G-oonesinha's unions. G-oonesinha was beginning to come
to terms with the employers behind the backs of the workers.
The L.S.S.P. exposed him; but Mr. Samarakkody agreed with my
interjection that G-oonesinha, nevertheless, held the support
of the harbour unions. He also confirmed the fact that G-oone
sinha raised "the anti-Indian cry" during the 1930's. Q. "But
in doing so wasn't he cutting off a section of his support?"
A. He did not mind that. He was tightening his connection
with [i.e. presumably, hold over] others. Besides the agitation
he raised was directed more against the Indian trader than
against the Indian worker.
Q. "^Vhen did you begin to concentrate some attention on
winning support among the plantation labour?" A. "Very late" ,
Around 1939. Q. "Weren't the war years rather a bad choice for
this sort of effort?" He replied that it was a period of
"ferment, ferment, ferment". The Mool-oya strike had been
particularly notable. Colvin played a big role. However, he
conceded my point. He also agreed that they had faced the
language problem in trying to win over estate labour. They did
not have the personnel who could conduct a dialogue v/ith the
Indian workers. 1
1. These are my words conveying the idea he presented.
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I inquired wiiether Nehru's visit to Ceylon around 1939-40
and his advice that they should form a group such as the Ceylon
Indian Congress had "knocked" the L.S.S.P. "Knocked us", he
agreed. Q. "In view of Nehru's socialism wasn't this advice
rather strange?" A. Nehru's socialism had "been the outcome
of a need "to mobilise mass support". It was, he thought, no
injustice to Nehru to say that he was not deeply socialist.
Q. "\¥hen he visited Ceylon did the L.S.S.P. have much contact
with him?" A. Yes. They had invited him for a public meeting.
He had been very critical of a slogan they had displayed there:
'Workers of the World Unite'. Hs,d considered it unrealistic.
Q. I inquired if the L.S.S.P, had not used Anthonypillai^ in
their attempts to make inroads into the plantation sector.
A. "Not exactly. He was not doing plantation work as such".
In fact, he did not know his Tamil v/ell-enough.
I inquired abo^^t Esmond Wickremesinghe. He smiled, and
replied that Esmond and Ilangakoon (son of the Attorney-General)
had shown interest in the SamaSamajist movement and soon became
members of the inner group. Q. "How v/ould you expla.in his
progression away from Marxism to the present ...?" A. "We
made a mistake. Took him too seriously. He might have changed
if he had been in the open group" [i.e.rather than the secret
wing of the L.S.S.P. during the v/ar years]. He added that much
the same remarks applied to Ilangakoon.
Q. I inquired if these comments did not apply to Colvin R.
De Silva of the 1930's and that Colvin's Marxism had only
developed during the crucible of his experiences in the war years,
A. "No. He [Colvin] had done a lot of background reading". He
suggested that I read Colvin's book. Whither the Soviet Union?
It was"a correct analysis". It showed that "his background
v/as sound". Colvin showed "ability to concretize". He was
"not abstract". Nevertheless, his reading, though "voracious"
was not "systematic". He tended to oversimplify issues.
Q. "What about N.I'.?" A. He said that N.H. had never been
interested in much Marxist reading, and hadn't a Marxist library.
Parliamentary procedure was his forte. He did not enter into
serious discusBions; and never participated in the ideological
training of others, either through literature or in study
groups. These comments apply to Philip Gunawardena as v/ell.
1. A Ceylon Tamil and inner-core Sama Samajist. Since the war
"Tony" Anthonypillai has been resident in Madras.
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Leslie, Colvin, Bernard [Soysa] and Doric [de Sousa] v/ere the
chief study-group leaders; and later Osmund Jayaratna. On my
inquiries, he modejsay confirmed that he himself had undertaken
training of others through stu.dy-groups hut affirmed that the
above-mentioned group "were the people who were in charge of
the work".
Q. I inquired what purpose the study-groups had served
and if they v/ere of any value? A. He said that they broadened
their understanding of Marxism, and was particularly useful in
distinguishing the Trot line. It was necessary to understand
the differences [between Marxism and Trotskism I think] .
Broadly speaking, in the party circles there v/as a consciousness
of the basic differences. Q. "Weren't the discussions in the
study-groups beyond some of the members?" A. "Yes. And v/hen the
party became involved in the mass movement, the development of
the icledLogical background of the party lagged behind. The
language questxon cropped up. Their ideological v/ork was only
in English. Ho real attempt was made to translate.
Q. Is it not correct to say that the Communist Party have
paid greater attention to the workers and to propaganda among
them through the vernacular? A. He agreed but pointed out that
they had better resources (presumably referring to financial
resources). Q. I inquired if this characteristic in the L.S.S.P.
had turned out to be a bad thing for them? A. "We grew very
fast as a mass movement to the neglect of organisation".
Q. My next question is not very clear according to my notes
being vrritten as "... ideological basis?" This could refer to
a query whether the L.S.S.P. rank and file had no sound ideological
basis. A. "Yes; the dynamics of the Ceylon mass movement was
not worked out [by the L.S.S.P. leaders]"
Q. I inquired about the sources of L.S.S.P. finances in
the 1930's. A. Leslie had spent a lot of his money as also
Colvin R. De Silva and Robert Gunawardena. In response to a
further query re Robert, he said that Robert had had no ideo
logical training but v/as very actively interested. Q. "Was he
more the agitator-tjrpe?" A. "Hot even that at the start". But
he had begun to venture into this field later. With regard to
the question of finances, he added (or possibly agreed to my
prompting) that friends of the party like Harold Pieris had
also helped. Q. I inquired whether the Ij.S.S.P. at this
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stage had lots of friends and supporters who could he classed
within the lunatic fringe. A. He did not think that term
applied. "Fellow-travellers" described them better. An exaraple
was Wilmot Perera. In response to my inquiry if V/iliaot Perera
[who is from a wealthy faiaily] had helped them v/ith money, he
replied that he couldn't say.
Q. I pointed to the SamaSamajists who had not shown the
virtue of self-denial and. married money-making with Marxism.
Wasn't Colvin's legal practice rather incongruous? A. "Yes.
Colvin has ended up as a rich man". It was the quality of the
party [L.3.S.P.] that had brought out the fact that Colvin also
became one of the richest men in Ceylon today. One becomes
popular by being in the left movement.
Q. "\irhat was the organisational structure of the L.S.S.P.
in the 1930's and 1940's?" A. It was democratic in its set-up.
There v/ere regular congresses. But from the start, there v/as
a loose organisation. The concepts of a Communist organisation
weren't all met. There was a system of delegates. It was a
broad socialist party. They did not think of a revolutionary
accession of power.
Q."But didn't they have ideas of effecting a revolutionary
take-over a,nd speak of a revolution around the comer and the
permanent revolution?" A. "Yes; they spoke of a revolution
but had no plan for it".
Q. "V/as the organisation cellular?" A. "No, it was an
open party. It had been cellular only under the illegal status
it enjoyed in the war years,
Q. Hadn't, in fact, the inner core dominated the party?
A. "Yes. That in itself v\^as a weakness. There had been no
ideological conflicts at the party conferences except for a
couple of occasions which preceded splits. As a result there
was "no ideological life". Q. I inquired if one of the weak
nesses of the L.S.S.P. hadn't been this top-down emphasis and
that directives and demands came from the top to the bottom and
not vice versa? A. "Yes. But the laovement was popular."
Everybody was busy. Not bothered that the thinking etcetera
came from the top rungs.
Q. "Hov/ many were expelled in 1939?" A. "Not many; only
about five or six. However this group had formed a broad
party called the United Socialist Party". Q. I inquired if
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there hadn't heen an attempt around 1937 to form a Social
Democratic Party? A. "He had not heard of it".
Q. "Can you tell me something about the Bracegirdle
incident?" A. "It was only an incident and not all that
important. It brought out the anti-imperialistic aspect
[of the L.S.S.P.]. The party had received good propaganda.
Q. "V/hat sort of chap was Bracegirdle?" A. "An agitator".
Q. "Y/as he a Trotskyite?" A. "No, a Communist. But this was
no problem. He functioned as a disciplined member". Q. "\Yhat
was his intellec'bual level?" A. "Not much. Average. He was
very active though. A go-getter".
Q. "V/ho did the v/riting for the l.S.S.P. in these early
years? " A. "Colvin and. Leslie" . Vemon did some writing
at the start but after the arrests he v/as not in the party,
(•il. "But didn't he help you to escape from jail?" A. He had
left the party by then. Q. But didn't he contest a seat under
the party name - Kadugannava - in 1947? A. He had joined
Philip. His was a distant linlc.
Q. "V/hat sort of role did Jack Kotelawala play?" A. He
was an activist and would do jobs. He was not all that
interested ideologically. In response to further queries
Hr. Samaralckody said that he was a very loyal member and caiae
close to the centre; v/as Secretary for a while. But that
meant little. He was in Colombo then as a lav/ student.
Q. "How was he as an organiser?" A. He was a practical sort
but had made no special impact. He had been very useful in
Uva, and came into prominence then. Q. "V/hat about Reggie
Senanayake?" A. He was "very good at secret arrangements" and
coni"idential matters. Proved very useful in the war years.
He agreed with my comment that Reggie v/as Harold Pieris' man.
Q. "V/hen you activated and sponsored the estate-strikes
around the year 1940 did you seek to hinder the war effort?"
A. "Oh, no." The strikes were the result of workers' grievances
v/hiE'h the L.S.S.P. took up. They were quite happy if the
strikes hindered the v/ar effort but that was "only incidental"
They had been drawn into the strikes; the strikes themselves
being levelled against the kanganies. Q. "Did you engineer the
strikes?" A. "No". Q. I inquired if it wouldn't have hindered
the British war effort if they undertook sabotage work and
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wlietlier tliey had considered the idea. A. Hot enough had heen
done in that way. There wasn't enougli planning. Q. "But v/as
it possible to undertake sabotage activity?" A. "Well, if v/e
gave ou-r minds to it. We were av/ay from realities; we were
thinleing in teims of a broad open party?"
Q. I inquired why the party had not adopted revolutionary
tactics. A. They had "not worked out the d3?namics". Q. I
inquired if there wasn't some wisliful thinleing as to the
possibilities of coming to pov/er through the stream of agitation,
A. "Yes. Our approach was infantile. There was a lack of
ideological growth. We stagnated in that position" [presumably
meaning the position reached in the 1940's].
Q. I inquired if there hadn't been room for the party to
anticipate Bandaranaike's cry*^ A. The SamaSamja leadership
was upper and petit bourgeois and did not realise its potent
ialities. Q. "Taking your own case, v/eren't your social
origins an obstacle to the understanding of the situation?"
A. "Yes, definitely. I was not able to see the burning issues.
Underneath the language issue is the question of oppression.
The little people could not rise because of language problems."
I then turned my attention to the issue of the splits
which appeared in the SamaSarnajist ranks and inquired after the
reasons for the split into two wings (B.L.P. and L.S.S.P.) in
1945? A. It was a left and right differentiation; the younger
members against the older. Boric vs Philip. Q. I pointed to
the fact that Leslie v\ras one of the older group but was on
Doric's side and that there v/as some hostility between hira and
Bhilip. A. This was not the cause of the original split. Both
Colvin and Leslie took some time to come over to the thinking
of the B.L.P. group. Q. Wasn't the cleavage due to personal
factors? A. It was wrong to say that. There were "some
personal aspects" [i.e. a clash of personalities] but these
v/ere only an "outv/ard symbol of deeper political differences"
Philip was against the organisation principles of a Bolshevik
party. He "revolted" against the attempt to organise the
party on a disciplined be.sis. He had "dominating tendencies"
and this v/as contrary to Bolshevik organisationary principigg
But superficially the struggle appeared to be one betv/een Dor"
and Philip. Philip had even called Doric a police spy.
Pourth. Intema-tional had inquired into the issue between Dori
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and Pliilip and given a decision against Philip. But he did not
accept this decision.
Q. I pointed to the fact that Philip had objected to the
marriage between Vivienne (his niece) and Leslie, and inQ_uired
whether this paved the way for the split in 1945? A. Leslie
was "the symbol of the correct line". He is "a serious,
intensive type" . Philip believes in astrology; but this v/as
not known to his comrades then: "we knev/ only one side of the
man; what he is? what his objectives are? were a mystery".
Q. I inquired what led to the merger [into the IT.L.S.S.P.]
of 1950 and why Philip stayed out [the V.L.S.S.P.]? A. "Again'^ '
Philip was against any form of orga.nisation. "On his ov/n he
could be his own master. He wanted to dominate. The others
who came over were more disciplined". Q. I inquired again
what had led them to unite in 1950. A. It was the parliamentary
situation that brought it about. There had been an open clash
between the two SamaSamajist gvoups at the Gampaha by; -election
in 1949 when the B.L.P. supporters had been subjected to
phj'-sical assault by a group led by Philip. This had given rise
to some concern later on. Both groups started worrying about
the situation. 'We are all SamaSamajistsjhad been the predominant
thought of the time. Q. I inquired about the number who stayed
within Philip's V.L.S.S.P.? A. A very small number. "Just a
handful". To a further query regarding, I thinlc, the names of
more important chaps who stayed with Philip, he mentioned the
names of Basil Silva and Abubaker.
Q. I inquired if the L.S.S.P. decision to oppose the v/ar
effort had been worth it from the tactical point of view?
A. "Yes, it was worth it. We could not separate our attitude
to general politics". Q. "But didn't the Communist Party
capture some of your unions as a result?" A. "It did. But
our stand during the war was a continuation of politics by
other means".
Q. "In the late 1930's and in the 1940's did you have say
working-class leaders in the L.S.S.P.?" A. Between I935 and
right up to the 1950's there were working-class leaders. B-^t
the working-class membership "suffered because there v/as no
ideological growth". They were just "trade-union bureaucrats"
Q. "Didn't the language problem hinder the growth of working
class leaders in that English was the medium used at Central
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Committee meetings etcetera?" A. "Yes. But the attitude of
the L.S.S.P. leadership also influenced matters." Q. "Y/asn't
the leadership far too Westernised and intellectual in
orientation?" A. He nodded agreement and added that they had
"really a petit-hourgeois outlook" and not a v/orking-class one.
They themselves "had put up a "barrier". Q. It would appear
that on the central committee of the Communist Party 80?° were
working-class whereas the l.S.S.P. central command has a much
smaller element of working-class "background? A. "Yes, that's
correct. That is due to the origins of the two parties. The
C.P. grew on the trade-unions; they concentrated on the city
of Colombo and got a v/orking class cadre. Y/e had trade-unions
hut also had wider interests. The petit-hourgeois layers are
much stronger in the l.S.S.P."
Q. I inquired how far they had sought to win support of
the peasantry and why they failed in this sphere? A. "V/e v/ere
alv/ays conscious of the need to do so. Actually, however, it
was the peasant problem itself that v/as at the root of our
failure to "broaden our "base". The island did not have feudal
conditions, landownership was not feudal; only social
relations were; that is, there v/ere remnants of a feudal
structure socially. Capitalist agriculture existed. There
were numerous small proprietors. "One cannot base a revolution
ary peasa,nt movement" on such a structure, landlessness was
not acute at that stage. In response to further queries, he
agreed that the anti-headmen cry had helped them at the start
but added that, as a v/eapon for winning popular support, it
had "soon exhausted itself" - v/ith the reform of the system.
Q, I inquired as to how much attention had been paid to the
problem of winning the support of the peasantry? A. The
problem v/as "constantly discussed.". What they did v/as to take
up concrete and specific grievances of the peasants: landlessness
rural credit for example. But that v\^as all. There was no
class struggle in the countryside and no oppression by the lard-
lords. Q. I challenged the latter statement and asked if
there hadn't been much oppression by the aristocrats. A. "Hot
really". The big man had considerable influence but ...
Q. I inquired about the causes of the 1953 split? A. This
split was important. Henry Pieris and William Silva had
worked out the parliamentary situation; i.e., worked out the
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statistics. On this basis they had taken an "opporiTunistic
line" and argued that the only way of v;inning a parliamentary
majority v/as to join [I thinlc he means, ally vmth] the S.L.P.P.
They had argued that otherv/ise they had no future. This was
the same argmaent that IT.M. Perera used in I960; but in 1953
the "leadership fou^t that, quite correctly". They had
"consciously fought this strong reformist wing". Q. "Oh, it
was strong?" A. "Oh, yes; about one-third the party". Q. "And
did one-third leave?" A. "Yes, practically one-third left".
Some joined Philip. Those who left never came back to the
SamaSanajist fold. Q. I inquired if T.B. Subasinghe had been
in this breakav/ay group? A. "Yes, Subasinghe too. But William
Silva and Henry Pierie were the principal movers. Q. I inquired
about these tv/o. A. Y/illiam Silva was "never an active member
of the party" i.e.; he didn't "do a particular job" apart from
•public-speaking; i.e. he did not undertake trade-union work.
He was intelligent and came to leadership level. Henry Pieris
rose from the rank and file. He was a good \7riter in Sinhalese,
a 15.P. in 1947. He was defeated in the 1952 elections —a year
in which the L.S.S.P. lost heavily.
Q. "Wlio organised the thuggery against the L.S.S.P. at
their meeting on the language issue in 1955 [when they opted for
parity]?" Both the U.N.P. and S.L.P.P. The same riff-raff who
were behind the language rights. There were no divided loyalties
on this point.
Q. I inquired what factors had counted most in his election
battle vs Cyril Llathew of the U.H.P. at Gampaha by<-election in
1949? It was a rural constituency composed of small landowners.
Each of them had got the votes of caste blocks. In Mirigama
[in 1947] his eleven thousand votes were caste votes. The
identification v/as open. Q. In view of the fact that you do
not have statistical units, how do you know about caste strengths
during your electioneering campaigns? A. "Everybody in the area
Imows". Q. But doesn't the social flux of recent years make
this more difficult? A. "Even now" the local people know the
details.
End of Eirst Interview
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Second Interviev;, 29 June 1967.
Q. I inquired if Mr. Samaralckody could rememler an individual
named A. G-unesekera. A. He remarked that Gunesekera was in
the party [the SamaSamajist party].
Q. "Oh, he was in the Bolshevik-Leninist Party?" A. "ITo,
this v/as [his presence in the SamaSamajist ranks] Before that.
He tried to form a peasant organisation".
Q. "V/ith y/hat success?" A. His party had "an uncertain type
of existence". Its headquarters were in Anuradhapura. It
"lacked perspectives". It sought to work among the peasantry
Because the Marxists didn't do much aBout it; But the question
of its relationship with the larger Marxist iiiovement was not
worked out.
Q. I inquired whether William Silva and SuBasinghe had Been in
the B.I.P.?^ A. William Silva was. SuBasinghe had Been in
the L.S.S.P. with Philip and H.M.
Q. I inquired if he could tell me something aBout the Yamuna
talks in 194-7. A. He could not rememBer.
Q, I inquired aBout his electoral struggle during the 1952
elections. A. He had contested Dehiowita. A proctor named
Gunesekera had contested him; and he [Mr. Samarakkody] had won
By a majority of 96. In 1956, however, his majorit5'" at Dehiov/ita
had Been 5>000.
Q. I asked him v/iiat factors had operated against him in 1952,
to reduce his margin of victory that much? A. He stressed
the influence of B.S. Senanayake's death on voters as the major
factor in the '52 elections.
Q. I inquired whether the su6.den dissolution of parliament had
caught them unprepared organisation wise? A. That hadn't
affected the issue all that much. The situation was in favour
of the U.H.P.
Q. "But v/asn't it a fact that the L.S.S.P. had expected to do
quite well at the elections?" A. Mr. Samarakkody gave
hesitant assent and said that they had not expected to lose
"the Big seats".
Q. I inquired whether they even had hopes of Being aBle to win
enough seats to form a government. A. "No".
1. This effort on Gunesekera's part v^as in the immediate post
war years. I Believe he was, then, either a memBer or a
fellow-traveller of the Communist Party.
2. This Break-away section of the L.S.S.P. existed from 194.5_^q
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Q. I inquired v/hether their sponsorship of the hs.rtal had "been
an attempt to recapture popular favour? A. "There was a
situation. The party got itself integrated into the struggle
which was an anti-G-overnment struggle" .
Q. "How did the hartal work out?" A. The central issue was
the raise in the price of rice. There v/ere numerous other
issues such as the increase in train fares.
Q. I inquired where the hartal had received support, district-
wise? A.It was mostly confined to the Y/estem Province and
Saharagamuwa.
Q. I inquired about the extent of the popular support the hartal
had received and whether this had fulfilled their anticipations?
^^-6 hartal could have been taken further if they had antici
pated the extent of the support they were to get.
Q. \'fhaii sort of organisation did you have for the hartal? a.
"Propaganda meetings" . The hartal was mainly imder the sponsor
ship of the L.S.S.P. at the start [presumably meaning the
TT.L.S.S.P. as distinct from Philip's group, the V.L.S.S.P.].
There was an united front (of all the Marxist groups) of a kind
"only in the late stages". The Communist Party was reluctant.
If the L.S.S.P. had "well-defined perspectives", they might
have achieved better unity.
Q. I asked him to elaborate on the phrase "well-defined per
spectives" . A. The hartal had been"considered a kind of
general strike. They had planned on a two-three day protest.
But as it v/as, it turned out to be a kind of uprising in an
embryonic stage".
Q. I inquired if the hartal hadn't been strongest in the youth-
league areas. A. "Yes, that's right".
Q. Turning to the nature of SamaSamajist youth leagues in
general, I asked Mr. Samarakkody if these did not seem to have
a fluctuating history, each showing a capacity to stagnate and
rise up occasionally? A. Pie agreed. There was no proper
youth-league programme. They did v/ork in the locality but were
not channelled to?/ards specific objectives. Their work was
largely of an electoral nature, either for local government or
general elections.
Q.I asked him wh£t,t factors, had contributed to the change of
nvemment and U.rl.P. debacle in 1956? A. It had been
"helped by the general swing".
g
1. It will be seen that Mr. Samarakkod.y did not hear this
question correctly. He seem.s to have answered the
question: ""Why did the hartal break out?"
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Q. I inquired if lie thought that the vote v/as not so nuch pro
S.I.I'.P. as anti-U.lT.P. A. He did not ansiver this
directly hut seemed inclined to agree in that he said there
ivere "accumulated grievances against the U.ZT.P." which
operated in the '56 elections.
Q. I inquired after the l.S.S.P. intentions in entering into
a no-contest pact with the TI.E.P. coalition group during
the '56 elections,* and v/hether they hoped that the results
v/ould create a parliamentarj?- situation in which the l.S.S.P.
held the balance of power. A. The no-contest pact was an
attempt to gain the maximum possible number of seats for
themselves. The party had no intentions of joining
Bandaranaike's government.
Q. "If the possibility arose would you have joined the
government?" A. It v/as doubtful whether they v/ould have.
The furthest they v/ent afterwards was to take up "an equi
vocal position in relation to the government'.'
Q. "Deliberately equivocal?" A. "Yes, deliberately equivocal".
Q. "Didn't you prefer the S.l.P.P. to the U.'Z.P.?" A."There
v/as that underlying current" .
Q. I inquired if the l.S.S.P. stand on the langaa,ge issue
prevented a coalition v/ith the S.l.P.P. A. At that time
the party had not thought in terms of any type of parliamentary
power.
Q. This led me to ask him whether they were thinking in terms
of a radica.1 revolution. A. Their perspectives were that
of a mass struggle; and the overthrov/ of government.
jQ. Had this been the basic on which they functioned in previous
years, i.e. previous to 1956? A. "Yes, up to '56." it
v/as after that that they changed their emphasis.
Q. I said that if that v/as so, it would suggest that their
militancy had been reduced. A. In 1956 the situation in
the country turned the party's face tov/ards parliament.
Their standpoint thereafter v/as one of "responsive cooperation"
with the H.E.P. government. They gave "critical support".
Q. "Presumably, Philip's presence in the goverament v/as some
thing of an obstacle?" A. "No; it shaped party policy.
It gave the government a red colouration", said Mr.
Samarakkody, implying that it was viev/ed as a point in the
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government's favour.
Q. I inquired if they had had any feelers from Philip towards
some sort of unity? A. "iTo; nothing" .
Q. I inquired after their relationship with the Communist Party
at this time. A. There had "been no attempt to
strengthen any ties.
Q. I inquired if they had supported the S.l.P.P. at all
during the 1956 elections. A. There v/as no mutual
support. There were no leaflets or pamphlets asking people
to vote S.l.P.P.
Q. I inquired if they had used their own grapevine and local
"branches to influence their supporters to hack the M.E.P.
where no L.S.S.P. candidates ran. A. He believed that
that would have happened.
Q. I referred to the general theory that the bhiMchus had
helped the li.E.P. and said that what interested me was the
extent to which the U.H.P. reoaved support from the bhikkhiis.
A. They did not have bhikkhu support.
Q. I pointed to the well-loiown fact that the top hierarchy
had supported the U.TT.P. in the 1965 elections and said
that this suggested that they aided the U.N.P. in 1956 as
well. A. They "did not come in". They were not politi
cally involved then and stayed very much in the background.
Q. "In March I960 why v/asn't there a no-contest pact?" A. The
party was guided by the si'tuation. The picture of the
times v/as that of a S.L.E.P. party that was on the decline
follov/ing Bandaranaike's death, a party that was split.
The L.S.S.P. had "hopes of winning". This v;as the time
when "parliamentary illusions reached the highest point".
Q. 3;id the Commimist Party make an attempt to fonn a no-
contest pact with the L.S.S.P.? A. The L.S.S.P. tried
to do so but the O.P. "slipped out".
Q. "But didn't the L.S.S.P. itself feel that they could go
it alone?" A. "Yes, they felt that they could do well".
Q. I inquired if before March I960 they hadn't altered their
policy on the language issue? A. There was "a softening
of policy?" They made "an attempt to dilute their position"
and took up "an equivocal position" on both the language
question and citizenship question. They sought "a formula
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that would enable the old position to he read into it hut
give scope for other views as v/ell" .
Q, I renarked that in Ceylon socialism seemed to he an
emotional cry devoid of definite content and that all
parties represented themselves as socialistic; and inqu-i^®^^-
if this did not present a problem to the llarxists. A. Up
to 1956 there had been no problem. With Bandaranaike's
accession to power, the govemment had a socialist
colouration.
Q. I inquired whether the L.S.S.P. had changed their laiigu-age
policy still further after March I960? A. In March they
were at the crossroads. By July they had taken the turn
and linked up v/ith the S.l.B.P. Hot only was there a no-
contest for the July elections but they were giving each
other mutual support and the l.S.S.P. were "calling for a
S.L.P.P. government". In response to a further query, U-®
said they had adopted the S.L.B.P. position on the
language issue.
Q. I inquired if there had been a hot debate in the Central
Committee of the L.S.S.P. on this change of policy. A.
question came up, not as a language issue but as one
revolving on the best method of preventing the UN.P. gaining
power; on how to intervene in the elections.
Q, "But v/asn't it realised that the language issue v/as involved?"
A. "Yes, that was realised; but it was also seen that the
bigger issue was the question of linlcing up v/ith the S.L.P.U."
Q. I inquired if the fact that Mrs. Bandaranaike v/as the leader
of the S.L.P.P. had any bearing on their discussion. A.
"led to the argument" that the S.L.P.P. was weak as a result.
Q. I inquired if, in fact, Mrs. B. hadn't shown herself to be
stronger than her husband and the S.L.P.P. hadn't secured
a much stronger position. A. He agreed absolutely.
Q. I inquired what Mr. Samarakkody's stand had been when the
question arose around July I960? A. In July there had
been "a serious rift". N.M. Perera said that they must
call for the formation of a S.L.P.P. govemment and Colvin
"leaned" towards that view as well. Of the opposing viev/
were Edmund Samarakkody, Bernard [Soysa], Merrill Pemando,
Osmund [Jayaratne], Karalasingham and "even Bala" [Tampoe,
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I thinlc].^ Doric and Leslie, together with Colvin, were
in-hetween hut their weiglit was on rl.ii's side.
Q. I inquired if the split which had appeared momentarily on
that occasion hadn't continued throughout the next few
years, at least in an underlying manner? A. It was
"hound to broaden".
Q. I inquired if it had finally occ^irred in 1964. A. It
had; on the issue of coalescing with the S.L.P.P. govern
ment .
Q. I inquired after the numhers in the Central Committee who
had opposed a coalition. A. Fourteen people out of
forty-four in the Central Committee had heen against it.
Q. I inquired if any of the fourteen had taken up a middle
position and whether they were with Edmund's party.
A. "Karalasinghani has gone hack. Some have dropped out".
Q. I repeated my inquiry as to whether there was a middle
group; A. And the reply was in the negative.
Q. I inquired if the split in the country had extended to
the L.S.S.P. in the University campus. I am afraid my
notes are sketchy at this point hut I do loiow that I
proceeded to express the little information I had on a
small L.S.S.P. group on the campus who were disillusioned
with TT.II. and Company and followed a hard-revolutionary
line, and inquired whether he had any links with them.
He did not seem to know of this group and, showing interest
asked me when it had come into existence. I answered that
I had assumed that the date was 1964. A. "That can't
he. We were in touch v/ith the Caiapus till the 1966
[December '65] strike. At that time there was no such
group"
Q. Providing further elucidation, I said that it was connected
to some Tony Banda, a Ceylonese with contacts with a young
Socialist group in England. This struck a hell in Mr.
Samarakkody's mind, a hell v/hich he cast aside as 'unimportant
We discussed this group at some length. According to Mr
Samarakkody it was a sectarian party attached to a sectarian
group under Healey in Britain. In Ceylon their chief target
was the L.S.S.P. leadership and they v/ere not so much anti
Government and anti-U.TT.p. His own party could not, there
fore, work with such a group.
1. Ivly notes are not too clear here and I may have .cot
of the last lot of names in the wrong bracket.
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Q. "\fliat is the emphasis of your party^ [at present]?"
A. "The emphasis is more on the working class and av/ay
from parlieiment. It wishes to overthrow the government
and set up a workers' state."
Q. "Is there much scope for the party pushing for\7ard on these
lines, the ?;orking class heing in a minority?" A. "Yes,
they are in a minority; ahout two million. But the issue
has "been explained hy Trotsky in his theory of a permanent
revolution. This was tailored to suit Russian conditions
where the working class were a tiny minority".
Q. "Yes, hut does the Oeylonese working class have the
proletarian consciousness that was found in the v/est. llany
of them have runal roots and connections?" A. That was
true of the working class in the G-oonesinha era in the
1920's and 1930's when some workers even he^d land in their
home villages; hut it was no longer true today.
Q. "¥/liat does this objective mean in terms of tactics? Isn't
it possible [i.e. permissible] for the working class to
ally with the bourgeoisie, or some of the bourgeoisie - as
N.I-. and Company have done - and wait till the opportunity
arises to take control?" A. "Of course, tactics are
important". One could ally with the bourgeoisie and any
revolutionary forces that existed.
Q. "After all, doesn't the language issue have a revolutionary
content, particularly in the rural areas?" A. He agreed
that it did. And one had to fight oppression in all its
aspects, including linguistic oppression. Hov/ever the
working-class had to act as the vanguard of this movement
and lead the peasantry along to a proletarian state, even
though the peasantry v/ere not av/are of the issues. N.M. and
crov/d v/ere not leading the forces but travelling behind them.
This was wrong. One had to be in front.
Q. I inquired what his party's relationship was to the plantation
workers and the Ceylon Indian Congress. A. Their stand
point v/as "plain": those v/ho wanted citizenship should be
granted citizenship unconditionally. They were against
having stateless persons. They were against the Sirima-
Shastri pent.
Q. I inquired why they were against the pact-'' A. It was no
1. After the 1964 split a small group left the L.S.S.p.
majority and formed the L.S.S.P.(R) i.e. R for Revolution
v/ing. They were opposed to the opportunistic changes
in policy agreed to by the majority. Bala Tampoe recentlv
replaced Edmund Saraarakkody as Secretary of this group. •
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solution. Por instsjice, they had no ohjection to allov/ing
any number of those v/anting to go to India to depart. But
the pact was a "bargain in the context of oppression of the
Tamil minority. Apart from the technicalities of the pact,
the Tamils had to confront a policy which "made it a hell"
for them here [in Ceylon]. There were "o"bjective conditions
leading to compulsory repatriation".
Q. "Do Thondaman, Aziz and crowd^ oppose your party*s work
among the plantation workers?" A. They were working
through Aziz's union. They had a separate cell "but nothing
to talk of at the moment.
•Q. I inq^uired v^hat his party's stand had "been in late 1965
when C.P. Be Silva and others crossed over from the coalition
government. A. Their policy had been one of "irrecon-
cilia"ble opposition" to a coalition government; i.e. not
one of mutual support. They "were v/illing to "bring the
government dovm". It depended on the issue.
Q. I inquired what the issue was then [i.e. on that occasion]
and v/hy they voted as they did against the government.
A. The Throne Speech had "been reactionary. There was the
proposed take-over of the press, the Sirima-Shastri paco
and the proposal to make Buddhism a state religion, ilence,
they \7ere against the government. It was nevertheless a
difficult question.
Q. I inquired if they fened similar dilemnas when trade-unions
sprang v/ild-cat strikes: whether to wash their hands of
them or to lead them. A. "Yes". They would generally
lead them unless they were communal strikes.
1. Thondaman and Aziz are the leaders of the two unions
v/hich exist among the plantation workers, Thondaman':
"being far the stronger.
Unrecorded and Confidential Information provided by Mr. L.J, de S.
Seneviratne, Aufflist 1966.
When I remarked that Civil Servants had no proper training,
he disagreed. As a Cadet in llatara he had had G.S. Wodeman as
A.G.A. Everybody had sympathised with him when they heard of this
and said that Wodeman was difficult to get on v/ith and a thorough
martinet. As a matter of fact he had got on very well with Wodeman
and received a splendid and thorough training. V/odeman had taken
him on every circuit; also confided in him a lot, to the extent of
making remarks about other subordinates. Wodeman was a thorough
man and wanted everjrfching done just right and at the proper time ard
place. This had had drastic results on his marriage. I inquired
whether Wodeman was a perfectionist. After some reflection, Mr.
Seneviratne agreed. I inquired whether Wodeman had an unfortunate
manner which put people off. As far as I recall, Mr. Seneviratne
felt that this was so though he had got on well with him. When
eventually transferred to Jaffna, Mr. Seneviratne had Schrader as
G.A. and Schrader remarked that he had met Wodeman a week before
and when talking about l.J. de S. Wodeman had simply said, 'I taught
him everything'.
I added that what I meant by lack of training was lenk of plan,
the training varying according to the A.G.A. or G.A. one was under.
Mr. Seneviratne remarked that that was the plan.
He felt that one could get 'a fair deal' under the British.
I remarked that I was interested in Land Settlement work. He
said ths.t he had been nine years in that department and enjoyed it
thoroughly. He had got to know the people as a result, a knowledge
which he lacked because his education had been at St. Thomas. One
of the present Settlement Officers had told Mr. Seneviratne that his
(Seneviratne's) name was the only name v/hich had been specifically
mentioned in one of the annual Administrative Reports of the 1930's.
Mr. Seneviratne thought that present day settlement work had deviated
a great deal from the objectives of the 1930's. I remarked that
L.S.O's and A.S.O's got to know the people better than G.A's and
A.B.A.'s. He agreed wholeheartedly; the G.A's and A.G A's had the
whole weight of the official hierarchy intervening.
I remarked that I was interested in the L.D.O. of 1935 and
Senanayake's and Brayne's ideas. Mr. Seneviratne remarked that he
had played a large part in formulating this Ordinance. Senanayake
Used to come to him because he knew that they thought alike and
trusted L.J. de S. Thus, many of D.S's papers were written by 'an
insignificant character called L.J. de S. Seneviratne', according
to Mr. Seneviratne. He said that Senanayake rarely read administra
tive papers, etc. but preferred to discuss them. I remarked that it
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was his hahit to present his views and rely on his (Ceylonese)
lieutenants to put it into suitable English. Mr. Seneviratne implied
that he was one of the inner group. I asked about C.L. Wickremasin^e.
He gave a qualified, 'yes'; adding that C.L. and D.S. did not always
think on the same lines and was therefore not quite a member of the
inner circle. Sir Richard Aluwihare was. 'What about A.G-. Ranasinha?'
He was taken to London by D.S.', I inquired. Mr. Seneviratne said
that D.S. had wanted him (L.J. de S.) to come but he could not be
released; in effect stating that A.G. Ranasinha was reserve. He
agreed that Ranasinha was one of the lieutenants like C.L. but
implied that he was never one of the inner group. 'He had his own
ideas'.
D.R. Wijewardena, D.S. and Co. had in these days been making
an effort to emphasise the manner in which the Sinhalese had
suffered in 1915 and the way they had personally stiffened. D.R. j
had handed him a.< bundle of papers on the subject. I inquired whether
they were trying to make political capital of the subject and the
fact that D.S. etc. had been jailed and Mr. Seneviratne agreed.
While on this point, Mr. Seneviratne stressed that it was confidential:
'don't you dare publish it'. He was especially particular about the
secrecy of the point that D.R. and Co. had been circulating papers
on the sul^ct which were meant to stimulate the younger set.
He remarked that my father (T.W. Roberts) was "rather
aggressive". He also added a question: "He must have been involved
in a number of affairs"? I was not quite certain whether this
referred to administrative contretemps or flirtations. Probably
the latter; possibly both.
When the Needham University Commission Report had come out,
Banda had met him and said, "I read your dissent, I am inclined to
implement the dissent rather than the report".
M.W. Roberts,
16/8/66.
Unrecorded gind Confidential Inforraa,1;ion -provided "by L.J« de S,
Seneviratne, 27 October 1966»
Eanda liad kept calling Sir G.S. Bajpie, 'Sir Jirga' till
eventually Bajpie had intervened and told him that his name was
'Sir Girja Bajpie' whereupon Banda had said, 'My apologies, Sir
Jirga - I heg your pardon. Sir Girja'; and turned round and said
loudly to L.J. de S. 'Don't you think it will he better to call
him Sir Shankar'.
I inquired about Hiucham. He said that on one occasion Huxham
had been effectively quashed by Banda when they were together in
India on this delegation. Banda had turned to him \(Huxham) and
said 'I say, v/hat were you doing v/ith the lady in the green dress
last ni^t?'
It v/ould appear that the Ceylonese delegation had agreed
partially with St. John Jackson's report. Their policy towards
the immigrants v/as that they did not v/ant any more. Huxham
represented the views of the European Planters. Banda in particular
was inclined to take an independent line. [On the v/hole I got a
very confused pcture of the policies of the Ceylon delegation on
the immigration issue.] Later an Indian delegation came to Ceylon.
Sir Robert Drayton had drafted the final report. U.S. had turned
this over to L.J. de S. to make modifications. I inquired whether
any major alterations had been made. The answer was not specific
or clear but I gathered that they v/ere determined to bring the
Ceylonese influence to bear. 'We v^ere not going to let them [the





Conversations with R.K. Somasimtiaram (Ii.D.O.), P..S.Dayaratne (D.L.O.),
and. Ivan Samarav/ickreriie (G.A,), 23 Aufflist 1966.
•Rama Somasunderan agreed that there was much political inter
ference in the field. Land Kachcheries were virttially nm hy the
politicians rather than hy the District Land Officers. He agreed
that allottees who broke the conditions of tenure v;ere not evicted
etc. because of the possibilities of political trouble. He added
that the irrigation rates of Anuradhapura district had not been
collected for years, though the colonists v^rere relatively affluent,
I inotiired why the colonists- voted against G-ovemment -
v/hichever G-overnment was in power. I do not recall whether he
answered this question and as far as I remember it was at this point
that he criticised 'advanced alienation', implying that this v/as the
cause of such behaviour. 'Advanced aliens,tion' (i.e. accelerated
alienation of lands without the planned and prepared allotments of
earlier years, begun mider the Bandaranaike regime) had been a
total failure. The colonists got into trouble and into debt. At
the present moment his department concentrated on having houses
ready before the colonists arrived but actually irrigation was the
be-all and end-all of their problems; v/ithout wells and channels
they had a well-nigh impossible task.
I asked what sort of Minister, G.P. De Silva was. He made it
clear that his opinion of G.P. was pretty lov/. I inquired whether
G.P. was opiniated. He answered in the affirmative, in a quite
decided manner, adding that G.P. thought he knew everything; the
trouble was that he had been too long in charge of that Ministry.
I inquired whether in recent months he was going downhill, intellect
ually speaking. He said that G.P. put in quite a lot of hard work
and sometimes continued conferences till 2.00 p.m. But while there
was much talk and discussion even such long sessions often showed
few results or concrete decisions at the end of it. G.P. sometimes
brought up irrelevancies and concentrated on them. He agreed with
my comment that the Ten Year plan of 1956(?) was unrealistic. The
trouble too was that G.P. had built up 'a personal empire' within
the Ministry. Caste and political creed intruded.
R.S♦ Dayaratne said tha,t the Paddy Lands Bill was in conflict
with the L.D.O. The former was being implemented. But it had been
found that many L.D.O. allottees let out a portion or the whole of
their land. If these tenants were made the owners as the former
bill stipulated for ...
Ivan Saraarawickreme; 'generally speaking, he did not agree with
Parmer'. The trouble was that such men had no grounding in local
knowledge.
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He was opposed to the attempt to end suh-division of the land;
suh-division was alright 'up to a point'. It meant that the
descendants would resort to more intensive cultivation. But as far
as colonists were concerned, there would be a point in the second,
third or fourth generations v^hen they could not longer sub-divide.
As a m0.tter of fact., for all the conditions stipulated there
had been a lot of de facto sub-division between the descendants of
allottees. There v/as also some ande and leasing and sub-letting of
the land. This was particularly pronounced in the case of the Ex-
Servicemen's colony; I think he said that many of them were absentee-
landlords. In many v;ays the L.D.O. was 'antiouated' .
I inquired whether it had not succeeded in preventing the land
from falling into the hands of land-sharks. He was quite positive
that it had been successful in this objective. There was a small
percentage v/here this had happened but not such as merited concern.
He did not think that v/ith their knov;-how and management the
peasa,nts could cultivate rice with maximuin efficiency. The Isra-elis
had commented on this. In fact in the 1930's Kennedy (Director of
Irrigation) had asked v/hether it was not better to buy the cheap
Burma rice and concentrate on tea exports etc. But of course, they
were not thinking of 'social justice'. Colonisation schemes had
definitely provided employment to many; had also eased congestion.
In his experience in R'pura (in response to query) tattuma.ru
contributed to non-improvements in agriculture. Kanuring etc.
produced results in long-term sense. Thus chaps/rlluctant to manure
(In effect he disagreed with Earmer and Leach.)tattumaru lands.
M.W. Roberts
24/8/66
L.D.O. in the body of this note refers to the Land Development
Ordinance of 1935. R.E. Somasundarum is a Land Development Officer
whose tasks pertain to the clearing and preparation of land for
colonists, etcetera. R.S. Dayaratne is a District Land Officer, a
class of staff officers who were specially created to implement
the Ordinance of 1935. Both Dayaratne and Somasundarum were my
compatriots in the Peradeniya Campus in the late 1950's. Mr. Ivan
Samarawickreme is a senior G.A. at present stationed in Polonnaruwa
The conversation took pls.ce a.t a. friend's v/edding.
Comments on Interview with K. Somas-untharam, 16 May 1966.
Quite liale and hearty Kandiah Somasuntharam's memories were quite
fresh. He was clearly happy to go on record and pleased that he could
air his views in the knowledge that all this meant that his role in
the Island's history was not going to he forgotten. It is significant
that he had heen intending to write his memoirs. While thus having a
degree of self-importance common to many human heings, he also dis
played a vigorous mind, providing useful and discerning evidence on
many points. Aware though he was of the tape-recorder he was rarely
inhibited in his criticisms even of individuals, though he was perhaps
more cautious when it came to events of the 1950's.
His attitude to British Civil Servants and British rule was very
much that of a Ceylonese and his use of the word "imperialist" is
significant. Let me hasten to add that he was far from being a fierce
critic:. His outlook was that the British were not greatly sympathetic
to Ceylonese aspirations, that on some issues considerations of
British trade were paramount, that they sought to maintain law and
order and to keep things running smoothly but were rarely "progressive'^
but that all this was to be expected and a product of their background.
How far this was an attitude of his later years rather than his younger
days I am not prepared to say. It is of relevance that he was the
first Ceylonese allowed to enter the inner sanctum of the C.C.S., the
Secretariat, once the Administration was forced to appoint Ceylonese
to such posts. This would suggest, as he himself did suggest, that he
was trusted and was considered the least likely to give trouble. But
his views today indicate that he was far from being a stooge. In any
event the information on his three years in the Secretariat was very ,
valuable and I spent some time on this period.
At the same time he did not conceal his oppo^ion to universal
franchise or his dislike for most of our politicians, particularly
those of more recent times. Being a Tamil it is also obvious where
his partialities lie though he is far from being a rabid one or in
favour of the "fifty-fifty" cry. His information on the rising
communal split of the 20's was very meagre but he did suggest that it
was the Tamils who "set the ball rolling" in originating the be
ginnings of cleavage.
His experience in revenue administrative matters, it so happened^
was hi^ly limited. A glance at the posts he held will show that,
apart from his initial period of training, he held such posts only in
the period 1929-1932. For the rest his was mostly desk work in the
Secretariat or the Ministries of Labour, of Commerce and of Industries.
As a result I could not pursue such aspects as chena land policy,
Brayne's scheme of protected tenures, the influence of the headmen
svstem on the 1931/1936 elections and so forth. Most inauiries
under these heads brought little concrete, as one would expect.
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He made some in-teresting comments on some individuals under whom
he sei*ved. I do not know how to rate his appraisals hut he did pro
vide useful sideli^ts (e.g: Tyrrell's "patronising" attitude, Milling-
ton's fussiness, Halfour's impracticaHity). Prom what I've heard
elsewhere (e.g. C.E. Tilney, T.P.C. Roberts) I think he rated Periya
Sundaram much too highly.
There were a few occasions when he elaborated on a minor point
or on some esploit of his at some length. Prom hard-earned experience
I think I am nov/ less prone to prompt and to intrude with positive
comments of my own; i.e I am handling the interviews better and draw
ing out or awaiting comments rather than forcing mere affirmatives and
negatives. As in many interviesvs, however, I was mentally fatigued
pretty early on/^e interview (while Mr. K. Somasundaram seemed none
the worse for it) and I feel that I missed out on some possible
enquiries: e.g. attitude of the Secretariat to Goonesinha, the judicial
system, the contretemps between D.S. and Edmund Rodrigo, etc. I trust
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Octoher 1927-J'une 1928 Mayor, Colombo
Letter from V/.T. Stace - M.W. Roberts
I am so glad to hear that the Asia Poundation is financing
your project. And I think your project is admirable and I hope
ii; achieves the success which it deserves.
H,'- I have greatly enjoyed the process of answering, or trying to
answtr, your questions, and I am sending you my answers with this
letter. This has helped me to recall to memory many pleasant
experiences and my very pleasant life in Ceylon. But you must
bear in mind two things (1) it is all so long ago that one has
forgotten a great deal and (2) that being now nearly 78, I find my
memory failing anyhow.^ Worse still, I may have remembered wrongly,
but I hope not much! I look forvjard to seeing sometime v/hat you
have written.
You may get more infoimation from Newnham than from me,
because he has always kept full notes and diaries, whereas I,
being more happy-go-lucky, never kept any records!
1.
This is a retyped version. It was originally typed in elite
and copies in London and Oxford are in that form.
In these circumstances and given the overwhelming number q-p
questions I burdened Mx" Stace with, it is not surprising th
his answers are brief.
His answers should be matched v/ith his MSS autobiography (
the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London) written "in
^ the1950's. He is far more
he tends towards the 'defensive.
'attacking' in the autobiography
C5 n trci • * K'ere,
2 -
1. Irirhat made you clioose goveiument service as a vocatijn and the
C.0.S. in particular?
Answer:
Several generations of my family served the British G-overnmenI:
in dther army or civil service. I merely follov/ed suit.
2. Y/ould you have preferred the I.C.S.?
Answer: •'».
Yes, and I had that choice. See chapter 6 of my autohiograp'?^





4. With what feelings did you set out?
Answer: '
Sorry for myselfI




6. Bo you think this was generally felt among civil servants?
Answer:
I do not know. ;•»
7. If so did it not "breed cynicism and a degree of indifference? ' •
Answer: , >
No.
8. Would you say that cynicism prevailed to any extent in the
C.C.S.? Can you cite examples?
Answer:
No. Members were generally satisfied and happy. Why should
they "be cynical?
9. How did you, personally, take to the solitude of work in the
outlying posts?
Answer:iBW X.
, n • -u • 1 . ®°litud6Inaver, except for one week, had a job involving complete/
10. Bid public school life in England fit you for this sort of
thing?
Answer:




11. Did it have any hearing/influence on the pragmatic approach
so characteristic of British colonial rule?
Answer:
In contrast to the Americans, the British have alv/ays thought
that v/hat was req^uired was a humanitarian education to fit
a man for ruling human heings. Official technicues would
he better learned on the joh.
12. What ahout imiversity life? Did it fit you for colonial service
in any way?
Answer:
Reply similar to question 11.
13. Did this upbringing not conduce towards a separation from the
mass of the people? i.e. Were you not close to the villager
yet so far? - a vast social gulf?
Answer:
On the contrary, a humanistic education should yield under
standing and sympathy.
14. In British political terms, what v/as the prevailing shade of
thought in the O.C.S.?
Answer:
Can't say. The tendency vra,s to avoid political involvement,
and to he neutral.
15. Do you think this would have had great relevance to the
handling of colonial problems and day to day administration?
Answer:
See answer to Question 11.
16. Was a Labour or Liberal supporter likely to adopt a different
attitude to questions - say to the nationalists, to trade-
unionism, to principles of land policy?
Answer:
We did not think in these teims.
d
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18. "iThat alout religious convictions? V/ere the majority agnostics?
Did this have any appreciable hearing on policy?
Answer:
Religious or irreligious convictions varied. ITot much hearing
19. As an Office Assistant were you treated as a dogsbody?
Answer:
No. Certainly notj
20. Y/ould you have preferred your superiors to give you greater
responsibility at the outset?
Answer:
No. Not personally. One had to leara.
21. Where superiors tended to pile lots of responsibility on your
shoulders was it the result of laziness?
Answer:
'They did not do so.
22. Would not some more time spent accompanying the G.A. on circuit
have given you a better inlcling of what your kachcheri work was
about?
Answer:
Yes. Store ought to have been done in this v/ay.
23. Was not the general preference for revenue administrative work
rather than judicial 'usually' the result of 'an English dislike
of the law and a contempt for the proctors'?
Answer:
Don't think so. I at least had no 'contempt for the proctors '
24, Was it a question of higher status?
Answer:
It was in general more highly regarded.
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25. Do you think the British hahit of lule hy thujuh - of pragnatism
- sending officers into the country to leam for themselves -
was pushed too far?
Ansv/er:
A little perhaps. But this is preferable to a doctrinaire
approach.
26. Could there not have been more instruction and discussion?
Ansv^er:
A little perhaps.
27. Did it not leave room for grievous errors,and did it not
possibly imprint false notions in the minds of young officers?
Ansv/er:
No. I remember no such results.
28. In the nineteenth century I have found that both Government and
individual officials were not always versed in what happened
several decades before: i.e. certain orders, rules or discussions
pertaining to some revenue or land matter have been totally lost
sight of - did this happen in your time?s:
Answer:
I do not remember such results.
29. Did you find out much about the previous administrative history
by reading previous diaries, etc? How far back v/ould one go?
Ansv7er:
Personally I did not.
30. Despite the pragmatic approach would you not say that in the end
precedence dominated? Was it not all too often mere routine,
even blind routine?^
Answer:
Precedence is very important. Routine is routine, and there
is a lot of it. It is better that precedents should be
follov/ed in routine matters than that officials should try
stunts and too much 'originality.' However, where precedent
1. Phis question (part of my general questionnaire) was inspired "h
Stace's autobiography. One of his major criticisms of British ^
rule was that routine and precedence predominated. 'Blind
routine' is one of his phrases!
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should he followed and where new ideas should he tried is
obviously a matter of personal judgement. No douht 'geniuses*
will he original. But there are not ma-ny geniuses!
31. Was there a tendency to preserve the status quo?
Answer:
No douht.
32. Did the provincial or central H.Q. tend to quash new ideas?
Answer:
Do not renemher any such cases.
33. Would you not say that efficiency v/as sometimes sought as an
end in itself?
Ansv/er:
Of course. Why not?
35. \7asn't there a lack of purpose and of drive in British rule?
Answer:
To keep the machinery well-oiled and in running order is a
very good purpose. See question 30.
36. Would you agree with the viev/ that Stuhhs and Pagden had a highlj
hureaucratised approach - the clerk's outlook - to problems,
concentrating on details and not on general questions?
Answer:
No. Both good men, though Stuhhs had a rather limited outlook,








39. Don't you thinlc G-ovemaent was too centralised and that too
much devolved on the Secretariat? Was it a "bottleneck hy the
1910's?
Answer:
I don't see any reason to say this.
40. V/as this realised before the Donoughmore Commission arrived?
Ansv/er:
41. Y/ere there any occasions when Government destroyed em'barrassing
correspondence? Do you knov; of any?
Answer:
I'Tever Imew of any, and I don't believe it.
43. Would you say that the non-European civil servants were
excluded from the substantive administrative posts and generally
shunted into the judicial line?
Answer:
This tendency certainly existed.
44. Y/hat were the reasons?
Ansv/er:
'The universal wish of those who have power [is] to keep it in
their hands.
45. Was it not argued that 'the stability of Government would be
undermined —that local chaps could not be disinterested in
local politics and 'could be worked upon'?
Ansv;er:
I never heard this.




47. Was it not argued that the Ceylonese civil servants lacked
•independence of character* and the coolheadedness needed in
crisis?
Answer:
I do not rememher hearing this idea. I thinlc my answer to
44 tells most of the story, though it is possible that
individuals may have argued in this way to suit their own
interests.
48. In other v/ords their discretion was distrusted?
Answer:
I see no reason to accept generalizations of this kind.
4i. ^Vhat is your opinion on this point?
Answer:
See 48.
50. Was not the principal argument employed, the view that the
masses themselves v/ould not accept orders from one of their own
number - that 'in the Oriental mind there [ran] a streak of
distrust of his own brother and number' - that the people would
not believe in their integrity?
51. What is your opinion on this point?
Ansv^er:
I think there is some truth in this. Also the 'orientals'
trusted the integrity of the British, although they may have
disliked them.
52. But surely both people and officers could only sv/im if they
were thrust into the water? Surely, if this view v/as maintained
self-government was never possible?
Answer:
No doubt.
53. Bid these arguiaents apply against their employment in the
Judicial Service too if with lesser force? Were not there
several Ceylonese A.G.A's to belie these theories?
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Answer:
Yes, I suppose they'would apply. Yes, Aluvihare and Jansz
were good examples. a?liey v;ere fully trusted "by lioth
orientals and westerners. There were no douht others, hut I
do not remember v/ho.
54. How, in any event, did these arguments apply to West Indians?
Answer:
I don't think anyone thought of applying them to Vfest Indians.
I never heard this suggested or discussed.
55. Was there not an underlying unstated question of status behind
all this (in the 1920's as distinct from the 1930's)?^
Answer:
I don't quite understand the question.
HEAIE'.IEI4 and local goveri^eent
67. Did you trust the headmen when it came to land matters?
Ansv/er:
In the Land Settlement Department we inspected and checked
everything ourselves on the ground so that the village headmen
had little opportunity to deceive us.
68. Was there a distinction between the Kandyan headmen and their
low-country counterparts?
Answer:
Not in regard to trustworthiness so far as I know.
69. Would you comment on the municipal administration of the 1910's
and 1920's.
Ansv/er:
I had no experience of municipal administration between I910
and 1920. I did not become Tiayor of Colombo till much later.
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
78. What v/as the official attitude to the Theosophists and Free
Thinkers?
1. This question is not sufficiently clear. The point is that
A.G.A's and G.A's were the repositories of power and status an"'




No attitude and no interest so far as I know.
79. Would you say that the Theosophists had 'disordered minds', a
hlind hatred of everything European and needed to he 'put away
and prevented from preaching doctrines which [excited] the
East'?
Answer:
I would not say any of these things.
80. Would you rna.intain that the silence of the masses on political
problems reflected their contentment with British rule? Was it
rather a case of being inarticiilate?
Ansv/er:
Inarticulate.
89. Could the C.A's, A.G-.A's and village headmen be said to have




90. '.Vha.t v/as the government view on the nature of the 1915 riots?
Answer:
See next fev; ansv/ers.
91. Would you support the theory that the local agents (in Dumbara)
of G-erman firms like Ereudenberg contributed to the initial
riots in Kandy?
Answer:
I do not remember ever hearing of this, and I should think it
unlikely.
92. Did officials believe the 1915 riots to be an organised
conspiracy against G-ovemment?
Ansv/er:
Some individuals may have, but I don't thinlc this was in
any way the official view.
- 11 -




94. Bid they consid.er that Sinhala-Buddhist les.ders organised the
outbreaks?
Answer:
Some may have thought this, hut I don't think this opinion had
any official standing or credence.
95. Would you agree with the view that the Government suffered from
an acute attack of treasonitis (i.e. fears of treason)?
Answer:
No.
96. V/hy did they arrest certain Temperance leaders?
Ansv/er:
I do not remember the reasons.
97. Do you think initial firmness on the part of the police (a) in
Kandy (b) in Colombo might have prevented further trouble?
Answer:
(a) Perhaps. (b) I don't knov/. I wasn't there.
98. Bid the authorities in Kandy show great weakness? Was the G.A.
known to be a v/eak man?
Answer:
This is §, matter of opinion. It is alv/ays easy to be wise
after the event.
99. Would you say that the Colombo Police did not have the training,
the backbone or the resources to handle this sort of thing?
Answer:
I would not say this.
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100. Do you tliink martial law was necessary?
Answer:
It is very difficult to say vi^liat v/ould have happep.ed without
martial law. Things might have "been worse.
101. Do you think it was necessary to prolong martial law for three
months?
Answer:
102. Did Brigadier-General Kalcolm's advice have much to do v/ith it?
103. What sort of role did Sir Henry Dov/higgin play? Was it he who
advised the arrest of Senanajrake and Co.?
Ansv/er:
Not within my knowledge.
104. What influence did Bowes have?
Answer:
I never heard he had any.
105. Would you say that Sir A. Bertram v/as a weak man?
Ansv/er:
Certainly not a strong man!
110. Would you comment on the popular viev/ that Govem;iient panicked
and went to extremes?
Answer:
There was no panic. What was done was done after due
consideration, whether it v/as right or v/rong.
AGRICUDTUHE AND MIID
246. What were the purposes and tasks of the L.S.D.?
247. Could you illustrate these points from your own experience?
248. Besides defining what land v/as Government and what private did
l.S.Officers in practice also decide "between rival claimants
to a piece of private land?
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Ansv/er:
I have no written records, diaries, etc. with which to
refresh my memory v/hich, at my age, has "become very "bad. I
have not even a copy of the Waste Lands Ordinance in terms
of which we worked. However, it could "be said that we did
in practice, althou;^ not in lav/, decide "between rival
claimants. V/e would state our 'decision' and the claimants
could a,ccept it and sign an agreement to that effect. Or
they could refuse to do so. In that case, since we had no
legal power to enforce it, the issue would "be referred to the
lav/ courts. But wise claimants knew if it came to Court
adjudication the cards were stacked against them.
249. V/as this in excess of the duties laid down on paper?
Ansv/er:
Y/hat paper? The ordinance or the departmental instructions?
We v/ere certainly not operating illegally, "but I cannot
exactly remem"ber where the detailed instructions were.
250. Bid L.S. Officers consciously seek to protect "both the villager
and the village from outsiders and specula^tors?
Answer:
Yes.
251. Apart from deterring the speculator did L.S. Officers aim at
conserving the peasantry in their holdings and helping in
their improvement?
Answer:
V/e did what we could.
252. In fulfilling these aims wa,s there a great degree of flexibility
in the methods used - i.e. flexi"bility according to the
different regions?
Answer:
There were different kinds of settlement in different pa,rts
of the country, "because the pro"blems differed. For example,
in Sa"baragamuwa every inch of the chenas v/as claimed, "but in
the Worth Central Province the villagers laid no claim to
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jiongle lands. There was also a special kind of settlement
in N.W.P. called 'three to one', hut I forget the details.
I think it meant we allov/ed three times the area of chenas
than the area of the paddy fields. Some Governor had made
this promise and we had to honour it.
253. Was there also some variation in emphasis and aim - i.e. trying




254. Were the Ceylonese land speculators and buyers not unscrupulous
in the way they acq.uired land from the peasants?
Ansv/er:
Not always. Some were scrupulous hut I think there v/ere
unscrupulous cases.
255. V/ere these men from the ranks of la,v/yers, proctors, government
servants and established land-ov/ners? Any headmen?
Answer:
Can't remember who.
256. Did you consider that some of the politicians participating in
the attack on land policy and on the l.S.D. were also interested
in land buying and had ulterior motives? In other words were
they hypocrites?
Answer:
Possibly. But I do not remember.
257. Did land speculators and local capitalists have a hand in the
alternative policies and methods that were broached by the
Eegalla Maha Sabha, the Porest Committee and the Land Commission
258. Were these alternative policies such as would have aided
speculators?
258^*10 v/hat extent was the political attack on British land policy
the failure of the Authorities to interpret their policies to
the Ceylonese, both educated and -uneducated?
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258°'Was there ever a popular peasant response to criticism of
land policy?
258'^ 'Y/liat was the reaction and outlook of the peasantry towards
the l.S.O. and his v/ork? Did they object?
Answer:
? ?
259. Did the L.S. Officers grant safe titles to villagers who held
land so as to prevent future encroachment on their (the
villagers') lands "by speculators or influential landowners
who held neighbouring lands?
Answer:
If I remember rightly they ultimately got Crown Grants, if
they had signed the agreements.
260. Was 'first consideration given to the village claimants before
giving attention to outsiders, irrespective of whether the
land was planted or not, and [irrespective] of the bona fides
of the purchase'?
Answer:
V/e did v/hat we could for the villagers, trying to help them,
but outside purchasers also had to be treated with justice.
261. Speculative claims based on fraudulent purchase were rejected?
Answer:
I do not laiow what is meant by a 'fraudulent purchase.' But
there may have been some.
2 62. V/laat about those legitimate purchases by outsiders (before
the l.S.O. arrived) which were detrimental to the vill8.ge?
Answer:
See question 260.





264. Did the l.S.O. keep the interests of the village Lippermost in
his nind, reserving areas for village expansion and 'settling
something on villagers v/ho had sold everything'?
Answer:
We sometimes settled an acre on villagers v/ho had sold
everything, and had no real claim except to mercy.
265. Did you have complete freedom in naming the price of the land
you v/ere settling?
Answer:
freedom, hut there were customary rates - as low as possible
for the villagers, higher for outsiders.
266. Were villagers charged low prices?
Answer:
Yes.
267. What did you consider a low price?
Ansv/er:
I am not sure I can trust my memory, hut I helieve it v/as
Rs. 15/- per acre.
268. Where speculators v/ere trying to force a favourable settlement
or seeking to encroach on village land did you try 'to teach
them a lesson'^ by stipulating a stiff price?
Answer:
I don't think the idea of 'teaching' entered into it - though
some settlement officers may have talked that way for all I
know. I never heard it myself.
269. Did this sort of treatment and the uncertainty of the price:




1. This phrase is part of a quotation from Stace's diaries as
Settlement Officer quoted in lal Jajrawardena's thesis(Camb %
1963^ Stace's ansv/er is a reflection of his failing memo~^
point which he hiinself stresses. a
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270. In other v/ords, how effective were the deterrents to the
speculator deployed hy the L.S.O.?
Ansv/er:
271. Could not headmen get round these obstacles post-Settlement?
Ansv/er:
272. Did an L.S.O. undergo any training under an experienced L.S.O,
on "beginning his work?
Answer:
Yes.
723. How could "beginner-L.S.O* s tell the age of trees?
Answer:
Hourly - at any rate with coconut trees - "by the height,
and general conditions.
274. Did all L.S.O's have such a Icnowledge of the vernacular as to
ena"ble them to manage without interpreters? Hov/ trustworthy
were the interpreters? Could they he got at?
Answer:
ICnowledge of the vernacular would obviously be different
with individuals. Personally I am a poor linguist. I could
chatter a little v/ith the villagers while on inspection, but
I could not possibly take formal evidence without an inter
preter. I knew enough to follov/ the Sinhalese conversation
between interpreter and claimant sufficiently to get the
drift of it and, while I might miss some details, I could
hardly be deceived in a large way.
275• Hov/ was the '30 years occupation' stipulated by law interprete(|
with regard to chena land?
Answer:
If I remember rightly we did not regard chena cultivation as
permanent or continuous occupation from a legal standpoint -
although it would be taken into account in settlement.
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276. Colonel Wri^t complains that 25 years after he had hou^t
land - after checking on the facts - from some villagers in
the Eummegala area, the l.S.D. claimed that it v/as Government
land and made him pay Government for the land. Could a thing
like that occur?
Ans¥/er:
I know nothing ahout this.
277. How did Government delineate areas to settle?
Answer:
I think the settlement officer indicated the area and
"boundaries roughly on the plan and the Survey Department did
an accurate survey of what the settlement officer had roughly
indicated.
278. Could not peasant sales 'outpace the progress of settlement'?
i.e. damage the village "before the l.S.O. arrived?
Answer:
Not clear what this means.
279. What were the changes made follov/ing the land Commission(l927)?
Answer:
Don' t remem"ber.
283. What have you to say to H.R. Dreeman's charge that the land
Settlement Department was niggardly in its allocation of
chena reserves and the Government tmduly severe in restricting
cultivation outside the reserves?
Answer:
At that time we thought his charge unjustified. I am stil
not aware of any reason for changing that opinion.
284. What sort of raan v;as Preeman as a G.A.? a man? v/as he naive
and guileless?
Answer:
I did not know him v/ell enough to answer this question. He
may have "been too simple, hut was obviously a ma.n of good
will very anxious to help his villagers, whom he really
loved. But the question v/as whether his judgement was as
good as hie heart.
- 19 -
285. Vrtiat v/as the extent of landlessness among peasantry at the
beginning of your career?
Answer:
I cannot say. The question seems rather vague and over
generalized.
286. At the end of your career?
Answer:
Ditto.
288. Y/ere there not many peasants who were mere sharecroppers?
Can you provide a figure or a percentage? Do you consider
this to have "been excessive?
Answer:
I have forgotten what the phrase 'share croppers' means.
290. How about mortgagee-cultivation? How much of peasant land
was under mortgage?
Answer:
I do not Imow.
291. What was the extent of agricultural indebtedness, say in I914?
then in 1928? then, in the mid 30's?
Answer:
Ditto.
292. What factors, in your opinion, contributed to agricultural
indebtedness?
Answer:
If I ever knew, or had an opinion, I have forgotten.
293. Did the Depression affect the peasantry?
Si *




294. Did G-overrunent try to ascertain its impact?
Answer:
7
295. Were the lav^s and institutions pertaining to lands and land
sales not far too complicated and sophisticated for most of
the rural peasantry?
Answer:
Those who had to apply the lav/s understood them. One could
not expect the villagers to do so, except in a vague way.
296. V/as any attempt made, ever, to make matters more tangible to
the peasant?
Answer:
We did our best to explain.
297. Do you think Government was too severe in its measures to
suppress chena cultivation in such areas as Hambantota?
indeed, that the policy was futile in a region which was a
sea of old chena and had little or no timber of value?
Ansv/er:
I cannot express an opinion.
298. What was the policy towards chenaing in the Kandyan Highlands?
Answer:
299. Was a distinction drawn between the Kandyan Hi^^lands and the
lowlands with regard to policy towards chenaing?
Answer:
I do not remember.




301. If so v/as this in spite of or hecaiise of British land policy?
Answer:
302. Do you think a more liberalised land-sales policy was called
for vis-a-vis the peasants?
Answer:
No opinion,
303. V/ere the terms of land settlement and difficulties of obtaining
credit an effective deterrent to a poor peasant planting up
or retaining possession of land settled on him?
Answer:
I see no reason to think so.
304. To v/hat extent did the availability of estate work enable a
peasant to 'v/ait it out' until his smallholding came into
bearing?
Answer:










In your auto"biograpliy you state that L.S.O's merely
defined \vha.t land v/as Grovm and what land, vra.s not the
CrovTn's 'making no enquiry as to v/ho were the true ovmers'
(p. 181); hut later on you state that where people had
planted up lands without having a title to them you entered
into a settlement with them and you write, 'Our business
was to decide who was the true occupant who had the
plantation, and would therefore he entitled to a settlement
hy Crov/n grant' (p. 182). This seems somewhat contradict
ory to your earlier statement? In this connection I would
add that other evidence leads me to think that L.S.O's
went so far as to deprive a speculator of land he had
purchased from villagers on dubious title for paltry sums
and settled the land on the villagers - individually or
communally as the situation demanded - and only gave a
portion of the la.nd to the specula^tor asking him a fair
price in contrast to the low price charged from the
villagers. Is this correct? Questions 260-62, and 264
pertain to this aspect.'
A.2.
If L.S.O's were doing this sort of thing in practice,
was this in excess of their stipulated duties?
A.3.
In relation to Questions 255-58 1 would also like to
ask to what extent the political attack on British land
policy represented the failure of the authorities to
interpret their policies to both the educated classes and
the people?
A.4.
Again, was there ever a popular peasant response to
criticism of land policy?
A.5.
^^at was the attitude and reaction of the peasantry
acceptance.to the L.S.O. in your time?
1. Besides the memors^ndum-answer below Mr. Stace 8.1so made some
marginal comments on four of the queries.
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Answer to Appendix A.
I worked mostly in Saba-ragamuwa and N.C.P. iDut also to some
extent elsewhere.
There is no contradiction in the statements you quote from
pages I8l and l82 of the autobiography. If the cultivation was
over 30 years (or was it 33 years?) the Crown would have no claim
and it would he marked 'private' without enquiry about the ov/ners.
But if the cultivation was say 10 years or 20 years old, the planter
of it had not prescribed against the Crovm. Therefore the Crovm
still had a claim - it ¥/as still theoretically, i.e.in la,w, Crovm
land. This meant that we had the power to settle it on v;homsoever
we found had planted it up. In the case of land with over 30 (or
33?) years cultivation, since the Crown lad lost its claim we had
no power to grant it to anybody or to decide whose it was, and
therefore had no course open to us except to mark it 'private' ,
i.e. to disclaim it. This was not beyond our stipulated duties.
See also my marginal remarks on your question paper herewith
returned.
APPMDIX B.
B.l. With regard to the 1915 riots Governor Chalmers stated that
it was not politically inspired etc., etc. in one of his initial
despatches and you yourself state that it was not 'anti-British' ,
but is it not correct to say that some of the British community
regarded it as a premeditated uprising and an 'organised rebellion'
against the British?
B.2. How extensive was this feeling? Did many officials hold this
viev/?
B.3. Did Sir Robert Chaliaers change his initial views? - In I9I6
Bonar Law stated in the Commons that it v/as a premeditated series
of riots aimed at the British. While he vra.s no doubt deploying the
most effective argument he could find to defend a Government
involved in wartime mo^tters, he could only have done so if such a
viev; had been passed on by the authorities in Colombo.
B.4. On the 1915 issues your standpoint is that both Chalmers and
Anderson did v;hat was right in the circumstances. I cannot help
feeling that you have been influenced by a natural loyalty to
• rs.-; -
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Chalmers, Even as a general statement it seems lane. I have no
doiiht tha-t martial lav/ was necessary. I thinl: the indiscriminate
£.rrest of Buddhist leaders can he explained though I have my douhts
whether it v/as justifiable. (It v/as certainly foolish.) But the
main point is; should martial law have been continued for so long?
Should some of the officers have been allowed the freedom to
organise drum-head court nartials v/hile in the mood they were in
(mood of putting dov«i disorder with a firm hand and a general sense
of frustration at their inability to prevent the sporadic outbreaks)?
and finally, was the considered act of levying a fine on the
Sinhalese community justifiable? It seems to me to have some
similarity to a levy on the Negroes of Los Angelos for the recent
outbreak there. Certainly the innocent will suffer with the
guilty during action but such a considered application of this
principle on a v/hole community when they could do little or nothing
- and could not reasonably be expected to have done anything - to
stop the actions of some of their number, seems quite unfair.
(And so it was considered by contemporaries!)
B.5. I would like your appraisal of politicians like P. Hamanathan,
Ponnambalam Arunachalam, Sir James Peiris and H.L. de Mel?
Ansv/ers to Appendix B.
B.l. Possibly.
B.2. ?
B.3* Tbe statement attributed to Bonar Law is incorrect.^ I doubt
if any responsible official told him this. I have no idea what his
sources were or whether [he] just said what suited his case.
B.4. I really have nothing to say beyond what appears in the
autobiography, except that you may be right in thinking I am
influenced by my feelings for Chalmers.
B.5. I did not know them well. Hamanathan was a wily politician
(I mean nothing derogatory by this)and an effective speaker and
personality. He was not above playing to the gallery!
Arunachalam was, I thought, an official, not a politician
1. I have subsec[uently discovered that Bonar Law's statement •
word for word plagiary from a paragraph in the Report of ^Police Inquiry Commission (Sessional Paper XVI of igig) p ..
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Sir James Pieris I hardly knew. I think he was a worthy,
though not very bright, individual.
De Mel seemed very much out for his own hand, but I really
forget all details about him.
APPMDIZ C.
C.l.
After having made some very interesting comments on the
typically British pragmatism in administration you go on to make
the criticism that much of what was done was 'blind routine.' I
should have thought that, if anything, pragmatism would have
reduced blind routine. Not that they are mutually contradictory
but that pragmatism makes for greater individuality and flexibility.
Thus if the opposite of pragmatism wa.s followed would there not
have been more 'blind routine' and greater rigidity? I would
appreciate your cojiiments on this aspect.
Answer:
I don't loiov: what comment to make. You may be ri^t.
Mr. W.W. Williams* Answers to a further aet of QuestionB forwarded
by M.W. RoTjerts, 9 February, 1966.
I saw most of the people concerned at a distance, lie surveyors
of my generation - bad little respect for, or liking, for tbe
"Heaven Bom" as we called tbe Civil Servants. We - along witb the
Irrigation Bept - reckoned that we knew more about tbe villagers and
the villages than tbe Eacbcberis, but our opinions counted for
nothing. Tbe Civil Servants more and more lived in a paper world.
56. There seems to have been a considerable amount of internal
friction in tbe Irrigation Department in the 1920's and even in
the late 1920's. Did you come across or hear of it?
Answer:
I should not have thought"Biis very serious. There were some
odd characters. Meaden (?) not forceful. Wully Brown - a
tough Scot, wayward and not imaginative. Kennedy, brilliant,
but ^mfortunately an alcoholic, and Wilson, whose loss was a
disaster to Ceylon. He was able and energetic and fanatically
keen, but he didn't try to be tactful with Senanayake and they
parted. It was an awful pity. I think it was at this time
that the policy of working on small village tanks, or the large
schemes like Kalawewa and Minneriya was debated. They used to
wrangle about this. I always thought the Irrigation people
were a good lot. They had a fairly hard life - nearly as hard
as the surveyors!
57. Did you know anything about L.J.B. Turner's attempt to reform
organise reorganisation? How did it go down with the Public
Service? Is it correct to say that Woods would have nothing to
do with it and obstructed him so much as to drive him to resign?
Answer:
No recollection.
58. What did you think of Brayne's scheme of indivisible leasehol(ig7
Was it practicable from the administrative point of view?
Answer:
No recollection.
59. How would you appraise the following: [A list of Ceylon Civt^.
Servants was provided here and Mr. Williams has commented on
about half the number.]
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Answer:
A nimlDer of the men on your list were administrative Civil
Servants, and in any review of them and their performances
made at this stage, I think 2 general considerations should he
home in mind.
(1) I helieve that all of them (and especially the
Europeans) entered the Civil Service throu^ The Home Civil
Seivice Examination. Erom this list, the top people were
appointed to Great Britain, the next to India, and then to
Ceylon - and, as far as I know to other territories. The
consequence of this was that the Ceylon men were not of the
highest calihre: their inferiority I think was not in the
academic field: I think they were just not hig men, and cer
tainly some of us in technical departments with degrees equal
to theirs, found a numher of them niggling "so and sos" .
(2) Their attitude towards the Independence of Ceylon
should he seen against a background of the view that "it
could never happen in our time". Erom 1920-1930, or rather
up to 1930 no-one believed that things could move so fast, and
nearly everybody thought (myself included) that they shoixld
not do so. This meant that to most of the people you mention
Senanayalce and Co. were militant politicians, and Whitehall
was much more attentive to them than Ceylon. I do believe
this to be a very important point. The conversion of Ceylon
officials was rapid - when the realisation of coming events
came to us we began to think about it. Some of the Civil
Servants that you mention were among the slowest to do so.
Their attitudes and behaviour should be seen against this
background.
T.A. Hodson Bull at a haystack. No tact, but I believe he
was sincere, and he worked hard. But he always upset people
and had little sense of humour. I remember he had twice been
run in for motoring offences. Soon after the Governor came
to Kurunegala on his rounds. Thomas Arthur was organising
the group photo, putting H.E. in the middle and reserving a
place for himself next to him. "Oh no", said H.E. "I can't
sit next to you - if you have one more conviction you will
be an habitual criminal". Hodson was furious.
Banks (I.G.P.) I saw little of him after 1926, but heard of
him. I should have thought a sound middle of the road man.
Of course the police were completely overshadowed by Dowbiggj^^
who gave nobody a chance to use his brain or initiative - or
if he did, nearly always backed the wrong horse.
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E. T, Hillingon Tlie typical case of the man who passed 'the Civil
Service' exam. Very cautious - I shouldn't have thought his impact
was very considerable.
(Please remember that I saw a number of these people from a distance,
and heard of them in conversation - or gossip.)
Y/.l. Murphy C.G.S. and Mayor of Colombo (?). I don't know how
efficient he was, but he v/as a gentleman, and we got on alright with
him. I think he was probably a bit gentle.
Sir M. Eletcher My generation in the Depts, couldn't stand him.
Remember that when I was very junior he was very senior. But he
appeared to us a paper-ridden autocrat, quite inhuman. Through all
this I think it must be true that he v/as not good with people,
whatever good properties (if any) he had.
W.K.H. Campbell I used to meet him when he was in the land Settle
ment Dept. (Did he not start the Cooperative movement?) He was a
country man, and while I think he tried to appear forbidding, he had
a real interest in the villagers, and he was able to get to know
them. I believe his contribution to Ceylon was real and generous.
H.W. Codrington I should think a good conscientious G.A. No non
sense about him. A gentleman. I can't imagine him in any rough and
tumble, but I should have thou^t that he gave everybody a square
deal according to his own standards. I thou^t him a success.
J.D. Brown (Papaw Brown because of the shape of his head.) I believe
he was good on paper, but he had a most odd mannar: went barking and
getting everybody on edge. Had a prize row with Wullie Brown who
became head of the Irrigation Dept. - nearly a neurotic.
Wait Passed me in Sinhalese - so perhaps he was more kind than justl
Very fond of Ceylon. An old-world administrator, gentle and I
believe efficient, but of course he retired a long time ago. I grew
fond of him from the little I saw of him and never heard a word
against him.
Maybin I should think of a calibre well above his colleagues. I
foimd him approachable, clear thinking and able. I think it is a
pity that he didn't stay in Ceylon, but I rather think he became
badly placed for proioonlaon. I understand that he went to Africa.
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Hunter (I think a Burgher who hecame G.A. H.C.P. where I was
stationed.) The Europeans couldn't get on with Him at all. We
felt that he had hecome 'yes-man' to D.S. Senanayake, especially
over dry-zone affairs and the irrigation schemes. To be fair, I
believe he was quite efficient, but. he had no idea of bringing the
best out of people. He certainly never got it out of me.
E^an A nice chap, but his life marred by separation from his wife,
I liked him, but I doubt v/hether he was really very effective.
ConscienciousjJ'tJ-But his life was scarred.
Brayne Eollowed the ideas of his brother in the I.C.S. I think he
had very good ideas, but little personality. He was a rifleman
(private) in the Ceylon Planters Corps and not a very smart one.
One day the ragular R.S.M. (Coldstream Guards) thought he ou^t to
be smartened up, and said " 'ere, you. What's your name?" "Brayne,
sir." "Brain, brain, you ain't go no brain."
Wadia A Parsee, and looked at carefully (by us) as being one of
the first non-Europeans in high places. I never worked with Vi-im
but met him from time to time, and thou^t him a very reasonable man.
N. J. Luddington North Country, a good mathematician (Durham I think) .
A really good brain, and very intelligent and consciencious. But he
made no concessions to convention and was an almost militant Geordie
I think if he had been a sli^tly better mixer, and been more willing
to see the points of view of others, he would have had considerable
influence. I suspect that some people may have thought he was not
quite out of the top drawer. It wasn't that: he was over dogmatic
and rather hiuaourless - I say that in spite of the fact that I got
on very well with him.
V. Coomaraswamy I think he was the first Tamil G.A. , and was there
fore looked at with raised eyebrows. But I heard nothing but good
of his administration. I met him, but never had official contact
with him.
Worsley The typical public school Civil Servant, I think he was
approved by the Secretariat - a non-controversial figure who went
throu^ the motions, and did it pleasantly. I should think he was
a good G.A.
Sassett I saw a good deal of him. As Magistrate, Cooperative
Manager and land settlement officer he was excellent, a fmr.A ,
_____ ^3rain,
- 5 -
and a quick one. But I don't think he was a fighter or a campaigner
perhaps not ambitious, which is odd v^hen one realises how efficient
he was. He had a li^t touch and went down ver^-well with the
Ceylonese. I should think his impact was much more real than that
of most of his colleagues.
Rogerson I knew him well. A kind person, efficient, hut the real
specimen of the Ceylon Civil Service type - a good hrain, hut not
a hig man. Yet I'm sure he v/as energetic and consciencious, and was
a good G.A.
Your list is an interesting one. I heard of some of the other
men, hut I could only write gossip, and some of it v/as conflicting
Mr. v/.Y/. V/illiams' Answers (l) to Questions fomvarded "by rl/ff. RoTjerts,
26 Hovem"ber 1965.^





I hope that these notes may he of some use to you.
I should have much enjoyed doing them in slov/er time, hut I have
snatched an odd hour and had a go.
You will gather that I hoth love Geylon, and helieve




W.V/. Y/illiams : h. 21 Lecemher 1901
A graduate
Survey Department, Ceylon, 1926 - 1938,
retiring as A.S.P. Surveys.
1. V/ith what feelings did you set out for Ceylon? Did you feel
that you were going to 'a land of the second-rate*, to a
'social desert'?
Answer;
I was full of enthusiasm for a career in surveying, and thou^t
myself most fortunate that I had heen posted to Ceylon, an
island which from my reading and discussions had many
attractions. It had heen described to me hy several people
v/ho Imew it at firsthand - notahly Sir Lenox Cunningham, as
an island where countryside and people had great charm. I
was never inclined to chaaige my mind.
2. Yi/hat are your impressions of the public service in Ceylon?
Answer:
1926-38 seen at first hand. Of a high order. The aims were
1. This is a retjrped version. "".It was originally typed in
elite and copies in London and Oxford are in this fona.
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higiL, ano- limited only ly the realism of financial consider
ations. The individuals on the whole Vv'ere well qualified and
well intentioned. As could "be expected there were a few
exceptions. I think in 192 6 v/e were emerging from a rather
dead "beat stage, especially in my ovm (survey) departiaent.
Up to this it had "been unenterprising as to technology, "but
not as to the tasks it had "been undertaking. I thinlc the
Survey Uept. has served Oeylon very well. I make remarks
a"bout the Administrative Civil Service later. The Irrigation
Dept. was very good, and should not "be deemed inefficient
"because of their modest programme pre-1.S. Senanayake. That
was economics. The P.W.D. was good too, and railways good
enough.
3. In British political terms (parties) what v/as the prevailing
shade of thought in the pu"blic service?
Answer:
Bo you mean left and right in British politics? If so, I
think it was considered very little. I should thinlc on the
whole Conservative.
4. Was their much cynicism in their conceptions of their duties
and in their attitude to the local peoples?
Answer:
Of course it varied. There were a few English who in their
ignorance thought the Ceylonese an inferior race, hut this
was very minority stuff. My own recollection is clear; I was
told that I was alien to Ceylon, a coimtry which Belonged to
the Ceylonese, and that I was out there to give service.. Of
course we talked big sometimes, but I knov/ my attitude v/as
one of friendliness with my colleagues - a friendship which
still survives and fev/ things give me more pleasure than
having a son of an old colleague sent to my university. Even
when it was clear that v/e v/ere going to be dispensed with we
could discuss, and joke about, how Ceylon would get on without
us. I would say that there was a negligible amount of cynicioj^i
5. V/as the distinction betv/een the Civil Service proper and the
other services extended into social relations? Was tbp<Y.r>
"•tj-tre much
snobbery and social ostracism?
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Answer:
V/e called tlie Civil Service proper 'the Heaven hom. ' They
v/ere inclined to he snohhish, even to those of us who had got
better degrees at the old Universities. But I don't think
this really nattered much, and I think it derived from the
time when the Civil Service were Oxford and Cambridge graduates
who have succeeded in a competative examination, vis-a-vis
technicians v/ho might have worked with dirty hands. Things
improved while I was there; lirs. G.A. didn't try it on so
much. Me didn't get invited to Government House, but on the
whole v/e were glad of it. Of course a fev/ of the Civil
Service people latterly v/ere rather asses. (Please don't ask
me to enlarge upon this).
6. If so, did it mar administrative liaison?
Answer:
Not really. V/e thought the C.C.S. a bit patronising, but we
were able to say our piece, and it all went very v/ell.
7. Were there any changes in these aspects during the period of
your service?
Answer:
I have referred to this briefly alone, under (5).
8. Would you say that British policy as a whole lacked purpose and
drive?
Answer:
Certainly not. If more has been done since, it is because
attitudes ha,ve changed. The budget set the pace; there was
no Income Tax in 1926. The budgets were modest. We had
Malaria then. But I do believe that we did a good job.
E.g. Roads, Railways, Tanks, Colombo Harbour, etc.
9. Was there a tendency to preserve the status quo and concentrate
on efficiencj'" as an end in itself?
Answer:
If you mean 'status quo' politically, so that autonomy was
postponed, emphatically no. I think at the top the constituti(
was v/orked fairly. If there was resistance to advance towards
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autonomy at the lower levels, it really was because v/e thou^t
the consequence would he less efficiency. This v/as never a.t
risk in my dept. because in 1926 Ceylonese were being groomed
for the top job to which in due course they succeeded: - and
deservedly so.
10. How did public servants react to the political criticisms to
v/hich they were subject in the 1920's and 1930's?
Answer:
I never suffered from these much, and I don't remember them
very well. But on the whole they were shrugged off. I
suffered from a nasty attack by Y/imalasurendra (quite without
foundation) about some surveys that I did for the tunnel
survey at Walavyala Hudro-Electric Scheme. But they were so
wild that I didn't really bother. Y/e all laiew that mud-
slinging was part of the political game, \7hat was so nice
was that it had not the least effect on our close Ceylonese
colleagues.
11. Bid these criticisms cause some 'demoralisation'?
Answer:
I don't think so at all; perhaps a. little discouragement. I
expect we had a good moan about it among ourselves.
12. Bid not the contem.pt with v/hich British public servants (and
especially the Civil Servants ) held politicians in general and
those in Ceylon in particular contribute tov/ards these political
attacks in that it needled the politicians?
Answer:
Your assumption is too general. In a.ny case contempt is a
hard word. Hard hitters like Tambimuttu and Co. were quite
nice chaps really, and it was part of the game to overplay
their hands. I, personally, resented a situation in V7hich,
when I had to discipline an assistant, he ?/amed me that he
would have to tell his uncle - father - etc. about it, a^g
I should care. V/e British have contempt for that situation
and should laugh at it, in our own country. But here again
the situation was a new one. It was time - consuming,
irritating etc. to have the politicians interfering in our
activities, but I should never use the \yord 'contempt' in
this context.
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13. is yoiir personal opinion of politicians of the time -
taking tliem in general?
Answer:
Let me confine my remarks to a fev/ whom I met, in the first
instance.
D.S. Senanayake. A pioneer; ruthless, hut trying to be fair;
able, not willing to be influenced. Alv;ays very Ceylonese.
I don't thinlc he was in communication with our way of
thinking, and frankly, I don't think he liked Englishmen.
But we knew he was a dedicated patriot and we respected him
for that.
Eotalawela tried to keep a foot in both camps.. A good mind,
but a playboy, and he wanted to move the big pieces without
doing the chores.
On re-reading your qiiestion - you say 'in general'. I find
it difficult to generalise - some were clearly careerists.
But I thinlc the field was what one would expect. They were,
on the whole, people of a kind that I had not met in my
everyday life - most of us didn't quite know what to expect.
Obviously they had a lot to leam.
14. Do you think the politicians were ultra-sensitive, dominated
by an inferiority complex and aggressive as a result?
Answer:
I thinlc there is some truth in this - Yes, it would be my
opinion. But not more sensitive than I would have expected.
After all, the changes in the political scene were big; a
number of these people, to use plain terms, became important
overnight. The attitudes of those about(?) them to this
change v/ere mixed - there was reason for sensitiveness.
15. VThat v/as your reaction to the suggestions of the Donoughmore
Commission?
Answer:
My ovm reactions then, and I still hold to it, was that it
went too fast. But don'task me how it could have gone
slower. It could have been arranged, but anything slower
than Donoughmore would not have satisfied the Ceylonese
politicians.
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16. Hov/ did you find the change in the practice? lid you find
that it made a great deal of difference in your ovm v/ork?
Answer;
No. We v/ere in 1.3. Senanayake' s ministry. He was an
expansionist, and we were treated well.
17. "^Tho were the Ministers you worked under and v/hat is your
opinion of their ability, honesty, etc.?
Answer:
I have referred to 1.3. Senanayake before. I regard him as
a big man. His responsibilities were new; he v/as able,
wayward. (I Vvould criticise his handling of the Irrigation
lept., from which he drove J.H. Wilson who was/man of
outstanding ability and energy.) But on the whole 1.3.3.
did very v/ell. I thinlc he was the best of them. I think
he was ruthless, but he had to be. Certainly the Survey
lept. -under him worked quite as well under him as it had
done before.
18. Could you provide your ov/n appraisal of the following Civil
Servants (since deceased):
Answer:
I^rre11: Seen from a distance. A paper wallah; not very
h-uman.
Y/edderburn: I saw a good deal of him. Perhaps too kind..
Able, unassuming, no striving after effect. I was one of
his admirers, and thought him the best Civil Seiwant I
enc o-untered.
Irayton: No laiowledge.
Stanley and Stubbs: Not very impressed; they made no impact
on me.
Graeme 'Thomson: The best Governor of my time. Had a clear
mind and sound motives. I know nothing about his attitude
to Ceylon politics, but we felt that he was able to direct
affairs in Ceylon.
Caldecott: Never very impressed.
Moore: No knov/ledge.
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19. Were Indian events and the decline of British power in India
and Ceylon ever discussed by public servants? Did they, in
the late twenties 8.nd the early thirties, anticipate self-
government in their lifetime?
Answer:
Only as news items - not as affecting ourselves or Ceylon.
We speculated about self-govei*nment. We thought that to
grant it in our lifetime would be premature, but on the whole
we expected that rising iDublic opinion in India would force
the issue - as it did. And we alv/ays realised that a labour
government would give v/ay easily.
20. 'Was it ever feared (seriously) tliat Indian sedition would
spread to Ceylon?
Ansv/er:
See Answer to Question 21.
21. If not, was it considered even as a possibility?
Answer:
Hot considered. We thought the Ceylonese treated the
S. Indian estate labourers badly by not giving them a vote.
(Equally we thought we ouglit to have had votes as well.)
22. Do you think Bracegirdle was preaching sedition and a dangerous
revolutionary (1937)?
23. V/hy was he deported?
Answer:
He was a nasty bit of work and was rightly deported I think
I don't remember all the details now.
24. Did the fact that he was a former white planter and a British
subject challenging British rule influence Government's
decision? Was it not a question of a chap letting one's own
side down?
Answer:
I think he was an exhibitionist. What happened to him after
the incident? I think he was of the same kidney a,s this
Nazi fellow who is now making a nuisance of himself this
country, [i.e. Jordan].
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25. Did the planters "bring pressure to "bear on the Colonial
Secretary to have him deported?
Ansv/er:
Don't know.
32. Did your survej^ing v/ork hring you into touch with the peasantry?
Answer;
Yes, happily.
33. Hov/ v/ould you describe the condition of the peasantry that you
came into contact with (please specify regions) in 1929?
in 1939?
Answer:
It must be 1929 and 1938; I left Ceylon in 1938.
Regions - every province - especially Moneragalle, N.C.P.,
S.P. , N.P., least of all Vif.P. and Uva.
Living marginally - at near subsistence level. Rot working
very hard. A 'goiya' growing paddy need v;ork only about
thirty or forty days a year. I thinlc the apathy came from
a long history of malaria and other disea-ses. Hot
ambitious - their attitude 'nikkang.• Por instance, I used
to have a vegetable garden at my camp v/hich the villagers
thought v/onderful - it is only what I do here in England.
Of course doesn't help. I saw little change between 1926
and 1938; coriimodity prices stayed much the same. I'ethods
didn't change; the v/hole idyllic - cum-depressing life went
on. Let me say that I foinid these people quite delightful.
34. ViTas there a preponderance of tenant-cultivators?
Answer:
Yes, I thinlc so.
35. Do you think there was a great degree of indebtedness among
the peasantry?
Ansv/er:
Always I think: they financed themselves on v/hat I think of
as a 'panguwa' system with the local mudalalis, etc.
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36. v7as land-alienation^ taking place to any apprecialDle exteni
in the 1920's and early 1930's?
Answer:
Yes in 1920 and 1930. The land Settlement Ordinance was in
force and v/as "being applied steadily "by a special dept.
There v/as a kind of race output "between the Survey and
Settlement l-epts.
37. Did the Depression hs-ve any apprecia"ble influence on them?
Answer:
On the estates, yes; not so much on the real villagers and
goiyas.
38. What were the o'bjectives of British Land Policy (a) sale of
land to planters and capitalists of whatever nationality? and
("b) conservation of land in a native peasantry?
Answer:
I thinlc there was a shift of policy during my service. The
requirements of the indigenous population were always care-
fully attended to. I thinlc the British finance com.panies
found it more and more difficult to acquire land for
estates. (It may "be that they sought far less "becaii.se they
saw independence coming.)
39. V/here did the "balance lie between these two objectives?
Answer:
In 38 above.
40. Was Government's policy that of trying to place the European
and other capitalists 'near enough to the native to influence
him, but not so near as to dispossess him'?
Answer:
I didn't thinlc things were ever considered in this way.
never heard of such a suggestion.
41. Did G.A's, A.G.A's and L.S.O's try to prevent or discourage
the process of dispossession of villagers which followed
private
1. I was using this term with reference to alienation of
1— j_-. ... _ . . " -Ls.-ngby the peasants themselves but was not adequately ex
Hence Mr. Williams has taken it in the sense of ali




Yes; and sometimes it v/as necessary to save villagers from
themselves.
42. Wliat were the aims and tasks of the land Settlement Department?
Answer:
As set out in the Waste lands Ordinance?
43. Was it in the pov;er of an l.S.O. to deprive a speculator or
planter of land acquired in dubious title and settle it on the
villagers if this land was hadly needed hy them? \Yas 'first
consideration given to the village claimants before giving
attention to outsiders, irrespective of whether the land was
pl8-nted or not, and irrespective of the bona fides of the
purchase'?
Ansv/er:
I am not sure, but I think the pattern was this. An l.S.O.
decided v/liether land was Grov/n or private. If the claims
was dubious, terms of settlement were arranged with the
private party. I do not thinlc the l.S.O. ever settled
disputes in claims between tv/o private parties; these would
have gone to the Civil Courts.
The villagers' interests were always paramount in my time,
44. If so, v/as this done often?
Ansv/er:
See Answer to Question 43.
45. Apart from deterring the speculator did l.S. Officers aim at
conserving the peasantry in their holdings and helping in
their improvement?
Answer:
They were interested in seeing o\'mership settled, but I do
not think they were at all concerned with subsequent
development.
46. Did you consider that some of the politicians participating in
the attack on policy and on the l.S.l. were also interested in




I have heard it said so.
47, \/as there ever a popular peasant response to the criticism
of waste lands policy?
Answer:
I thinlc it was welcomed; of course there was "bargaining
with the L,S,0. Even at the survey stage the villagers
were pretty astute at making large claims for lands which
they reckoned had a prescriptive claim, e.g, claiming 10
acres for 4 coconut trees, one at each comer, the rest chenal
48, Do you thinlc that the tea and ru"b"ber plantations in any
district had encroached on land needed by Kandyans to a
gveatly detrimental extent? If so, can you specify any regions?
Answer:
I thinlc probably did happen early in the century or before.
•The Kandyan village lands became restricted. As a piece of
history however, I suspect that the Eandyans, when the
estates were cleared, were pretty thin on the grounds.
49, Was the Survey Dept. able to keep pace with the demands made
on it by the land Settlement Dept.?
Answer:
I don't Icnow v;hich set the pace, I remember that we were
ahead of the Land S.D, at one time, which was a bad thing,
because the plans were getting out of date. They appointed
more L.S.O's and then we got behind.
50. V/ould the existence of a good cadastral survey from early
British times have forestalled many troubles for Govt. and
people in the t\7entieth century?
Answer:
Yes indeed; but there isn't a country in the world that has
learned this lesson, and the Africa,n countries won't learn
it now. They are heading for dreadful trouble.




I don't think so. In the pa.ddy lands they had as much land
as they had water for - often water v/as the limit. And
they hadn't learned, or didn't like, vegetahler growing etc.
and had no markets for perishable stuffs really.
52. Do you think better credit facilities should have been provided?
Answer;
I don't understand finance. I thought the Cooperative
llovement filled the bill.
53' Were marketing facilities inadequate in the areas you are
familiar with?
Answer:
I don't think so. I think villa^gers were exploited by the
entrepreneurs. I believe it worked well.
54. Were the peasantry too pampered?
Answer:
ITot really, but they were made very conscious of their
ri^ts, and they loiew all about them.
55. Were the laws and regulations much too sophisticated and
intangible for most of the peasantry?
Answer:
I don't think so.
56. What were the shortcomings, if any, in British agricultural
and irriguous policy?
Ansv/er:
This is very difficult. There was a financial limit to v/hat
could be done. The villagers v/ere apathetic, probably due
to their medical history. They were never - or hardly ever -
enterprising.
Perhaps the Agriculture Dept. could have been more
enterprising v/ith stock improvement - chickens, cattle, etc
But again there v/ere difficulties arising from religious
taboos. I thought the Irrigation Dept. a good one - too
small perhaps. The Agricultural Dept. ought to have done
more missionary work. Their impact on most villagers was
nil.
Mr. (t.S. Wodeman's Answers to Questions forwarded "by M.W. RoTperts,
9 Pebiruary 1966.
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Asst. Com'er of Excise, Southern Division;
Asst. Com'er of Excise, Central Division;
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Principal Collector of Customs & Chairman,Colomho Port
Comm.;
Acting Deputy Chief Sec.;
Resumed duties in Customs;
Acting Deputy Chief Sec.;
Resumed duties in Customs;
Acting Deputy Chief Sec. and Registrar of Aircraft;
Acting Deputy Chief Sec. and Registrar of Aircraft;
26.5* " 29*6.1937 Chief Sec.
1,7. - 15.10.1937
Acting Chief Sec.
Officer Administering the Govt.




I liave looked tlrrou^ your 83 questions, and I am really not
able to answer most of them in detail at this stage,
1. As a Cadet and an O.A. did you find that the older Civil Servants
tended to treat you with scant respect and a kind of amused
tolerance? Would you have liked greater responsibility than that
which was given to you? Were you treated as a dogsbody?
Answer;
I received valuable tuition and advice from older Civil Servants
when I arrived in Ceylon as a Cadet, and I had quite enough
responsibilities. Indeed I was acting as a P.M. within 6 months
of my arrival.
2. Did the British habit of empirical training - sending officers out
into the country to leam for themselves - hold true in your case?
Could you have done with more training and discussion? Without
wishing to overstress the uses of theory, do you think courses like
those they subsequently had in Oxbridge would have helped you?
Answer:
It is possible that a further year at the University such as the
I.C.S. successful candidates had, would have been useful, but no!t
having any experience of the courses followed in that year, I
not know.
3. Did you feel that there was too great a reliance on precedence and
that routine dominated administration to an undue extent?
4. While in the field did you feel that provincial or central H.Q
tended to be obstructionist and unreceptive to new ideas?
5. In the period pre 1931 did you feel that, in matters large or
there was a tendency to preserve the status quo and a policy of '
quieta non movere?
5, In this same period did you feel that there was a lack of purpog
drive and imagination in policy, particularly in the sense of t '





Y, Due to pressure of business was the Secretariat a bottleneck
1910's? by the 1920's? If so, why wasn't anything done to
this problem?
Answ©i* •




10. How competent were the vel vidanes in maintaining and repairing
village tanks and small irrigation channels?
Answer:
Vel vidanes were useful.
11. Did A.G.A's have to keep pushing vel vidanes and gansahhas to
ensure that their work was done?
Answer:
No answer.
12. How useful were the village tribunals? If useful, in what way?
Answer:
So were Village Tribunals.
13. Did the villagers prefer the Police Courts to the Village Tribunals?
Answer:
Villagers probably preferred the Police Courts.
14. Do you think the people corrupted the Courts in that they used
them as instruments of revenge and oppression?
Answer:
False cases were very common.
15. Did the British bring law rather than justice?
Answer:
No.
16. Y/here the majority of land disputes were concerned could a Magis
trate or Judge on the bench get to the heart of the matter without
having all the village deeds before him and without knowing the
configuration of the land?
Answer:
Yes generally speaking.
17. In this sense would it not have been more ideal to put a Civil
Servant in charge of a smalher territorial unit and provide him witl:judicial and executive powers in the former Indian and Ceylone
tradition rather than having larger territorial units with two




18. V/liat were the current (1920* s and 1930's) criticisms of the
village headman system? What are your views on the subject?
Answer:
Personally I thou^t the headman system was the correct method
of administration and had little to criticise. A good Chief
Headman kept the subordinates up to the mark.
19. Have you any idea what motivated the Ceylonese politicians' attack
on the headman system?
Answer;
Ceylonese politicians considered the system undemocratic.
20. Hid you think that the politicians of your time suffered from an
inferiority complex which stimulated aggressiveness? Hid many of
them have an exaggerated sense of self-importance?
Answer;
... and sought to get more influence and power in their own
hands.
21. What sort of bodies were the temperance societies of the first
few decades of the 19th century? 7/ere their meetings political
meetings under the cloak of temperance?
Answer;
There was evidence that the "temperance" society meetings were
political.
23. What was the G-ovemment view on the nature of the I915 riots'?
they consider them an organised and premeditated uprising again.^^*^
Government? If so, why?
>
Answer;
The 1915 riots were largely due to economic factors - ^
"-na digi^i
of the moorish trader and moneylenders.
I have tora, up the remainder of my jottings because I(a) am sure •l-^^
are of no use to you. The Riots of 1915 were communal and ^^4- ^iiSi Q-ati-.
(a) Questions 21-52 cover the 1915 riots, Goonesinha, tho n
politicians, the 1924 Constitution and the 7)onoughmo^ o^^°^ese
He must have considered his notes on these inadvisabl ®^issi
- 5 -
European or anti-Government, There was some evidence that they were
organised through the so-called Temperance Societies - hut they are
fully documented and I have nothing to add. I know of no criticism
of E.E. Marshall and I have not read Sir P. Ramanthan's/account.
53. Did heads of departments attend their respective Committee meetings?
Answer:
Yes.
54. What was the relationship between heads of departments and
Committees like?
Answer:
I had no difficulty at all - so long as full and frank informa
tion was given I found the Committee cooperative.
55. Vfhat were the relations between the 3 Officers-of-State and the
Ministers like? Was there much friction at the outset? Why?
Answer:
Differences of opinion perhaps but not friction.
56. What is your opinion of the administrative ability of the new
Ministries (those with which you were familiar)?
Answer:
Ability of Ministries varied as you would expect with the capacity
of the Minister. Some were excellent and some mediocre and some
very poor.
58. Can you recall the Suriya Mai Campaign? Was this taken seriously
and resented by the European community?
Answer:
No. Never heard of it.
I am sorry 1 have neither the time nor the energy to deal with the
rest of your questionnaire which I return herewith.
